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Understanding emotions of social partners is of fundamental importance in day-to-day life. 
Humans share their affective states and intentions not only by language, but also by facial 
expressions, body posture or tone of voice. Nonverbal emotional expressions are specified as 
being part of an emotional episode, which additionally consists of action tendencies including 
underlying autonomic changes and subjective feelings. Although the communication of emotions 
has been studied for decades, our understanding of what exactly is communicated and how it is 
processed is still far from complete. Emotional expressions are frequently produced to fulfil social 
requirements calling into question the reliability to infer actual emotional states. As recognizing 
expressions that accompany underlying emotions would be of relevance for subsequent behavior, 
the ability to detect emotional deception seems to be essential in emotional communication. 
Especially vocal expressions seem to be promising for revealing underlying emotions, due to the 
strong autonomic innervation of the vocal tract. 
Moreover, the recognition of emotions has been found not to be invariable but to depend on 
the speaker-listener relation. Sharing group membership, for example, positively affected 
emotion recognition, which might be caused by an attention-shift towards people of higher 
relevance but also by facilitated empathic concern. Successfully understanding others’ emotions is 
closely linked to mirroring or simulating the perceived emotion internally. Research in the field of 
affective neurosciences could demonstrate a shared neural network during attending and 
experiencing emotions, which is influenced by the social relevance of the individual showing the 
expression. The extent to which affect sharing is necessary on the behavioral level to recognize 
emotional expressions and whether it is positively affected by increased speaker’s relevance, is 
still debated. 
In this thesis, I investigated vocal emotion expressions, with the objectives to first 





our knowledge about the importance of affect sharing and speaker’s relevance on emotion 
recognition. 
In the first part of this thesis, I compared the recognition of spontaneous and play-acted 
vocal expressions in a cross-cultural study. In contrast to spontaneous expressions, acted ones 
were assumed to be influenced by social codes and were therefore less accurately recognized in 
cultures other than the culture of origin. Alternatively, emotion recognition for both conditions 
might rest on a universal basis. This cross-cultural comparison was conducted using 80 
spontaneous vocal expressions, recorded in emotional situations by a German radio station and 
the re-enactments by professional actors. Short excerpts of these speech tokens were presented 
to participants in Germany, Romania and Indonesia with the tasks to indicate the expressed 
emotion and the authenticity. Generally, participants were poor in distinguishing the encoding 
condition and German listeners were more accurate in both tasks, independent whether the 
expression was play-acted or not. Emotion recognition showed a comparable pattern across all 
cultures, speaking for a universal basis for both encoding conditions. Recognition accuracy for all 
emotions was low and authenticity affected only anger, which was more frequently recognized 
when play-acted and sadness, which was more accurately recognized when spontaneous.  
In the second part of this thesis, I aimed to understand the source of these differences 
and to disclose the importance of acting training on the credibility of emotion depiction. I added 
vocal expressions of acting-inexperienced people to the comparison, and conducted an additional 
acoustic analysis. Professional actors were predicted to be more suited to produce credible 
emotion expressions than inexperienced speaker. This was not confirmed, as professionally acted 
expressions were even more frequently recognized as being play-acted than the ones by 
inexperienced people. For professional actors I found the same pattern in the emotion 
recognition as in the cross-cultural study; while expressions by non-experienced speakers only 
deviated from the spontaneous ones by less accurate sadness recognition. Acoustically, the main 





ones. Both studies demonstrated a complex, universal interaction between emotion recognition 
and stimulus authenticity. Acted expressions were only poorly detected and not more 
stereotyped, and it was shown that acting inexperienced people were more suited to produce 
vocal expressions that resemble spontaneous ones than were professional actors. 
In the third part I focused on investigating the processes of recognizing the emotions of 
others. To this aim, I experimentally manipulated biographical similarity between fictitious 
speakers and the listener. I predicted that vocal expressions spoken by the more similar character 
would be recognized more accurately due to the increased social relevance of the speaker. In 
order to disclose the impact of affect sharing on emotion recognition, I additionally measured skin 
conductance responses (SCR) and pupil size, which account for autonomic reactions, while 
participants judged joyful, angry and neutral vocal expressions. Similarity affected neither the 
emotion recognition nor the autonomic measurements. Overall, emotional expressions did not 
trigger arousal related SCR, but emotion-related responses in pupil size. This finding indicates that 
affective processing does not involve the whole autonomic system and is not an essential 
component of recognizing emotions, at least when people only attend to vocal expression. 
Similarity might presumably affect emotion recognition in a more lifelike situation in which an 
actual tie can be established between both partners, not in a merely artificial setting. Empathic 
reactions presumably need a more holistic approach to be effective. 
My thesis concentrated on the understanding of emotional communication by regarding 
vocal expressions and I could show that attending to single emotion expressions is not sufficient 
to reveal the actual affective state of the sender in terms of differentiating acted from 
spontaneous expressions. Additionally, I demonstrated that vocal expressions do not evoke strong 
autonomic reactions in the listener. The communication of vocal emotion expression seemingly 






Ein wichtiger Aspekt des täglichen sozialen Lebens ist das Erkennen von emotionalen 
Zuständen in unserem Gegenüber. Unsere Emotionen und Intentionen teilen wir nicht nur durch 
sprachliche Äußerungen mit, sondern auch über die Mimik, Körpersprache und den Tonfall in der 
Stimme. Diese nichtverbalen, emotionalen Ausdrücke sind Bestandteile einer Emotion, zu denen 
darüber hinaus das subjektive Empfinden, die Handlungsbereitschaft und die damit 
zusammenhängenden physiologischen Reaktionen gehören. Obwohl die emotionale 
Kommunikation schon seit Jahrzehnten im Fokus der Wissenschaft liegt, ist noch unklar, welche 
Bestandteile einer Emotion genau kommuniziert und wie diese Informationen verarbeitet 
werden. Zudem spielen emotionale Ausdrücke eine wichtige Rolle in sozialen Interaktionen und 
werden häufig bewusst verwendet, um sozial-angepasstes Verhalten zu zeigen. Damit ist ihre 
Reliabilität, die tatsächliche Gefühlswelt des Gegenübers wiederzugeben, fraglich. Das Erkennen 
von Emotionsausdrücken, die auf empfunden Emotionen basieren ist jedoch von enormer 
Wichtigkeit für die nachfolgenden Handlungen. Deswegen sollte die Fähigkeit, empfundene von 
gespielten Emotionen unterscheiden zu können, essentiell sein. Da vokale Ausdrücke durch 
Einflüsse des autonomen Nervensystems auf den Vokaltrakt gebildet werden, sind diese als 
besonders vielversprechend anzusehen, um zugrundeliegende emotionale Zustände aufzudecken. 
Die Erkennung von Emotionen im Gegenüber ist nicht unveränderlich, sondern hängt 
unter anderem auch von der Beziehung zwischen dem Sprecher und dem Zuhörer ab. So konnte 
in einer früheren Studie gezeigt werden, dass bei Personen, die derselben Gruppe angehören, 
Emotionen besser erkannt werden konnten. Dieser Effekt lässt sich einerseits mit einer 
Aufmerksamkeitsverschiebung hin zu Personen mit erhöhter sozialer Relevanz deuten. 
Andererseits gibt es Erklärungsansätze, die auf eine erhöhte Bereitschaft für empathische 
Reaktionen hinweisen. Erfolgreiches Verstehen von Emotionen wird in der Forschungsliteratur 





affektiven Neurowissenschaften zeigten bisher ein gemeinsames neuronales Netzwerk, welches 
aktiv ist, wenn Personen eine Emotion bei anderen wahrnehmen oder selber empfinden. Die 
neurale Aktivität in diesem Netzwerk wird zudem von der sozialen Relevanz der Person 
beeinflusst, welche die Emotion zeigt. Welches Ausmaß das Wiederspiegeln einer Emotion auf der 
Verhaltensebene hat um eine Emotion zu erkennen ist hingegen noch ungeklärt. Auch die Frage 
nach dem Einfluss des Sprechers auf die empathische Reaktion ist noch nicht abschließend 
geklärt. 
In dieser Arbeit untersuchte ich vokale Emotionsausdrücke und versuchte zunächst das 
Verhältnis zwischen gespielten und spontanen Ausdrücken zu verstehen. Anschließend 
konzentrierte ich mich auf die Frage, welche Bedeutung das Teilen einer Emotion und die 
Relevanz des Sprechers auf die Emotionserkennung haben. Im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit verglich 
ich die Wahrnehmung von spontanen und gespielten vokalen Ausdrücken in einer interkulturellen 
Studie. Im Gegensatz zu spontanen Ausdrücken wurde angenommen, dass gespielte Ausdrücke 
vermehrt auf sozialen Codes basieren und daher von Hörern anderer Kulturen als der 
Herkunftskultur weniger akkurat erkannt werden. Alternativ könnte die Emotionserkennung 
beider Bedingungen universell sein. Dieser interkulturelle Vergleich wurde anhand von 80 
spontanen Emotionsausdrücken durchgeführt, die von Menschen aufgenommen wurden, welche 
sich in emotionalen Situationen befanden. Die gespielten Stimuli bestanden aus den 
nachgespielten Szenen, die von professionellen Schauspielern eingesprochen worden. Kurze 
Sequenzen dieser Ausdrücke wurden Versuchspersonen in Deutschland, Rumänien und 
Indonesien vorgespielt. Die Versuchspersonen erhielten die Aufgabe anzugeben, welche Emotion 
dargestellt wurde und ob der Ausdruck gespielt oder echt war. Im Ganzen konnten die 
Versuchspersonen nur unzureichend angeben, inwieweit ein Ausdruck gespielt war. Deutsche 
Hörer waren in beiden Aufgaben besser als die Hörer der anderen Kulturen. Dieser Vorteil war 
unabhängig von der Authentizität des Stimulus. Die Emotionserkennung zeigte ein vergleichbares 





Erkennungsraten im Allgemeinen waren schwach ausgeprägt und ob ein Ausdruck gespielt oder 
echt war, beeinflusste lediglich die Erkennung von den Emotionen Ärger und Trauer. Ärger wurde 
besser erkannt wenn er gespielt war und Trauer wenn sie echt war. 
Der zweite Teil meiner Arbeit beschäftigte sich mit der Ursache für die oben erwähnten 
Unterschiede in der Emotionserkennung und untersuchte, welchen Einfluss Schauspieltraining auf 
die Glaubwürdigkeit der Emotionsdarstellung hat. Zu diesem Zweck erweiterte ich den Stimulus-
Korpus um Emotionsausdrücke, die von schauspiel-unerfahrenen Sprechern eingesprochen 
wurden. Zusätzlich zu der Bewertungsstudie führte ich eine akustische Analyse der 
Sprachaufnahmen durch. Es wurde vorhergesagt, dass professionelle Schauspieler besser 
geeignet seien als schauspiel-unerfahrene Sprecher, um glaubwürdig Emotionsausdrücke zu 
generieren. Diese Vorhersage konnte jedoch nicht bestätigt werden. Die Ausdrücke der 
professionellen Schauspieler wurden im Gegenteil sogar häufiger als gespielt wahrgenommen als 
die der unerfahrenen Sprecher. Für die professionellen Sprecher konnte ich das Muster in der 
Emotionserkennung, welches sich in der interkulturellen Studie zeigte, replizieren. Die Ausdrücke 
der unerfahrenen Sprecher hingegen wichen nur in den geringeren Erkennungsraten für Trauer 
von den spontanen Ausdrücken ab. Der Haupteffekt der akustischen Analyse bestand in einer 
lebhafteren Sprachmelodie der gespielten Ausdrücke. 
Im dritten Teil der Arbeit untersuchte ich den Prozess der Emotionserkennung. Zu diesem 
Zweck manipulierte ich in einem Experiment die biographische Ähnlichkeit zwischen fiktiven 
Sprechern und dem Hörer. Auf Grund der höheren Relevanz eines ähnlichen Sprechers, sollten 
emotionale Ausdrücke in der ähnlichen Bedingung besser erkannt werden als in der unähnlichen. 
Um den Einfluss des gemeinsamen Erlebens einer Emotion auf die Emotionserkennung 
festzustellen, zeichnete ich außerdem die Hautleitfähigkeit und die Pupillenveränderung auf, 
welches beides Marker für Reaktionen des autonomen Nervensystems sind. Währenddessen 
wurden den Versuchspersonen ärgerliche, freudige und neutrale vokale Ausdrücke präsentiert, 





Emotionserkennung noch auf die peripher-physiologischen Messungen. Die Versuchspersonen 
zeigten keine Reaktionen der Hautleitfähigkeit auf vokale Ausdrücke. Die Pupille hingegen 
reagierte emotionsabhängig. Diese Befunde deuten darauf hin, dass die affektive Verarbeitung 
nicht das gesamte autonome Nervensystem miteinschließt, zumindest nicht, wenn lediglich die 
Stimme verarbeitet wird. Das Teilen einer Emotion scheint demnach kein notweniger Bestandteil 
des Verstehens oder der Erkennung zu sein. Die Ähnlichkeit zwischen Sprecher und Hörer könnte 
die Emotionsverarbeitung in einer lebensnahen Umgebung beeinflussen, in der eine persönliche 
Verbindung zwischen beiden Interaktionspartnern möglich ist, nicht hingegen in einer 
mehrheitlich artifiziellen Manipulation. Empathische Reaktionen brauchen um wirksam zu werden 
einen ganzheitlicheren Ansatz. 
Meine Arbeit konzentrierte sich auf das Verständnis von emotionaler Kommunikation in 
Bezug auf vokale Emotionsausdrücke und konnte zeigen, dass das bewusste Hören einzelner, 
kontextfreier Emotionsausdrücke nicht ausreichend ist um auf tatsächliche emotionale Zustände 
rückschließen zu können. Dies wird durch die fehlende Differenzierung von gespielten und 
spontanen Emotionsausdrücken deutlich. Darüber hinaus konnte ich aufzeigen, dass vokale 
Emotionsausdrücke im Hörer keine starken Reaktionen des autonomen Nervensystems auslösen. 
Die Kommunikation mittels vokaler emotionaler Ausdrücke scheint daher vermehrt auf kognitiven 











1 General Introduction 
 
Humans share their inner states not only by language, but also by facial expression, body 
posture as well as by their tone of voice. Hardly any social interaction takes place without using 
these nonverbal behaviors to communicate emotions (Vrana & Rollock, 1998). Although the use 
of these expressions is a common process in human life, emotional communication is far from 
being understood. This thesis concentrates on vocal emotion expressions, with the objectives first 
to disclose the relation between spontaneous and play-acted expressions in order to investigate 
the human ability to distinguish between “true” and “deceptive“ expressions; and second to 
reveal the impact of social connectedness between speaker and listener and the importance of 
affect sharing on the understanding of emotions in others. In this general introduction I give an 
overview on emotions, describe the mechanisms that underlie vocal expressions, and the 
processes of understanding others’ affective states. I then summarize the knowledge on 
emotional deceptive behavior, before describing the aims of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Emotions 
1.1.1 Definition of emotions 
“One of the mysteries of psychology is how it has been possible to define and construe emotion in 
such apparently incompatible ways […]” (Russell, 2003; p. 167) 
 
Research on emotions started more than 100 years ago (e.g., Darwin, 1872; James, 1884), 
but a valid definition has yet not been agreed upon (Averill, 1980; Ekman, 1999; Mulligan & 
Scherer, 2012; Russell, 2003; Scarantino, 2012; K. R. Scherer, 1984). It would go beyond the scope 
of this thesis to give an extensive overview of the debate on emotion theories. In their 
encyclopedia entry on emotion definition in the Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective 
Sciences, Frijda and Scherer (2009) summarized four aspects that are included in every emotion 





emotional reaction is evolved to prepare the individual for action (motivational aspect), 3) there 
are reactions of the motor and somatovisceral system to support the action, and 4) the emotion 
demands priority in behavior. In the following paragraph, I give a summary of the three main 
directions that dominate emotion research. 
Basic emotion theorists (going back to Darwin, 1872) propose the existence of a distinct 
set of emotions with prototypical characteristics (e.g., physiological reactions and expressive 
behavior), regulated by a central organizing mechanism (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 1992; Levenson, 
2011). These emotions are universal, innate and evolved to deal with fundamental life tasks. The 
number of basic emotions and their composition is however not consistent across theorists, 
ranging from about two to eleven (see Ortony & Turner, 1990). On the other hand, 
representatives of the psychological constructionists approach (Barrett, 2009; Lindquist, Siegel, 
Quigly, & Barrett, 2013; Russell, 2003, going back to James, 1884) argue that our experience of 
distinct emotional categories emerge from an intrinsic affective state of arousal and valence (also 
named core affect) combined with a mental conceptualization of the emotion and is thus 
psychologically constructed. According to this approach, affective states are based on dimensional 
scales (the intrinsic physiological states), while their classification is categorical. Emotion 
categories do not represent specific mental entities, but classify a broad range of different states, 
meaning that for instance “fear” might be experienced quite differently across situations (see also 
Pinker, 1997 p. 387: "Fear is probably several emotions"). Lindquist et al. (2013) metaphorically 
described the dispute between basic emotion theorists and constructionists as the “hundred-year 
emotion war” that is still not settled. Finally, appraisal theories (going back to Arnold, 1960; 
Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970) describe emotions as flexible processes rather than distinct 
mental states and focus on the cognitive evaluation of the situation (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; 
Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013; K. R. Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). This 
assumption is in contrast to the constructionist view, in which categorization is done by evaluating 





pleasantness and goal significance, leading to an infinite number of possible emotional episodes, 
in contrast to the basic emotion point of view. Classification with an emotional label (such as fear) 
is done by summarizing the appraisal pattern; e.g. “fear” is elicited when novelty and goal 
significance are high, while intrinsic pleasantness and coping potential are low (Ellsworth & 
Scherer, 2003). The emotional episodes consist of a variety of components, flexibly adapting 
towards reappraisal of the situation (Moors et al., 2013; K. R. Scherer, 2009). Next to the appraisal 
(that is not necessarily conscious, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Mortillaro, Mehu, & Scherer, 
2013), further components are the motivational component including action tendencies, the 
somatic component including peripheral physiological reactions, the subjective feeling and the 
motor behavior including emotional expressions (Moors et al., 2013). Causal relations between 
the components are unsettled. 
 
1.1.2 Emotional expressions  
Emotions can be expressed via the face, the voice and the body. While facial and bodily 
expressions are strongly based on activation of the somatic nervous system (SNS), vocal 
expressions are affected to a large extent by the autonomic nervous system (ANS) that is not 
under voluntary control (Rinn, 1984; K. R. Scherer, 1986). In addition, the various expression 
channels – face, body, or voice - seem to have a different significance on emotion recognition 
(Regenbogen, Schneider, Finkelmeyer, et al., 2012). Despite the differences, discussing vocal 
expression cannot be completely done without mentioning facial and gestural expression, at least 
for comparative reasons. I will first give a detailed overview about emotional expression in the 







1.1.2.1 Vocal expressions 
The voice is affected by a variety of physiological changes caused by the ANS and the SNS 
that influence the structure of our vocal tract (K. R. Scherer, 1986). Emotional expressions 
normally underlay spoken language; hence emotion-based acoustic changes interact with 
phoneme based differences. The phonemes that are mostly analyzed for emotional reasons are 
vowels, as they have stable acoustic characteristics and are produced via phonation. The process 
of phonation includes the activation of the vocal folds and is strongly influenced by peripheral 
physiological activity, such as respiration or muscle tone. Vowels are created according to the 
source filter model of speech production (see Fitch, 2000; Kent & Read, 1992). Air from the lungs 
is pressed through the glottis (the source). This leads to the vibration of the vocal folds, which 
causes the air flow to oscillate at a specific frequency (called the fundamental frequency or pitch) 
and at its multiple integers (the harmonics). These acoustic frequencies then pass the resonance 
structures of the vocal tract (the filter; including the pharynx, the throat, and the nasal and oral 
cavities) in which they are filtered or enhanced; this process is called articulation. Vowels are thus 
characterized by a fundamental frequency (ranging from approximately 50 Hz to 150 Hz in men 
and from 150 Hz to 250 Hz in women) and frequency regions in the harmonics with high energy 
densities (called formants) or low energy densities. The distribution of formants in the spectrum 
characterizes the different vowels (see Kent & Read, 1992 for details). Physiological activation 
influence speech production in the following ways (for a complete description see K. R. Scherer, 
1986). An increase in muscle tone tenses the vocal folds and results in a higher pitched voice. 
Faster and deeper respiration fortifies the air flow and causes louder, higher pitched vocalizations. 
At the same time, speech gets faster, as the number of syllables between inhalations is held 
consistent. Salivation, affected by the ANS, changes the resonance characteristics of the oral 
cavity, leading to changes in the energy distribution of the spectrum. Lastly, even facial 
expressions influence acoustic structure; smiling for example shortens the vocal tract and thus 





 K. R. Scherer (1986) made predictions for emotion effects on acoustic parameters as 
reactions towards appraisal checks, most of which were later confirmed by Banse and Scherer 
(1996). Highly aroused anger for example is characterized by a high fundamental frequency, fast 
speech rate, large amplitude, high variability of fundamental frequency, as well as high energy 
density in the higher frequency regions, while sadness is characterized oppositely (Banse & 
Scherer, 1996). Single emotion categories can thus be acoustically distinguished (e.g. Goudbeek & 
Scherer, 2010; Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007; Juslin & Laukka, 2003; Laukka, Juslin, & Bresin, 
2005; Murray & Arnott, 1993), while listeners are able to recognize the intended emotion (Banse 
& Scherer, 1996; Pell & Kotz, 2011; K. R. Scherer, 2003; K. R. Scherer, Clark-Polner, & Mortillaro, 
2011; Van Bezooijen, Otto, & Heenan, 1983). The listener’s differentiation whether a voice sounds 
emotional or not happens quickly, indicating the fast attention shift towards and importance of 
emotional expressions in social partners. Studies on event-related brain potentials for example 
indicate that emotions in the voice are detected within 200 ms (Paulmann, Bleichner, & Kotz, 
2013; Paulmann & Kotz, 2007; Schirmer, Chen, Ching, Tan, & Hong, 2013).  
The communication of emotions via vocalization seems to be deeply biologically and 
evolutionary rooted (see for an extensive overview Scheiner & Fischer, 2011). Comparative 
studies revealed similar acoustic structures for aversive vocal expression in humans and squirrel 
monkeys (Fichtel, Hammerschmidt, & Jürgens, 2001; Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007). 
Additionally, research on normally hearing and hearing impaired children found a comparable 
usage of seemingly predetermined emotional vocalization (Scheiner, Hammerschmidt, Jürgens, & 
Zwirner, 2002, 2004), speaking against vocal learning. Lastly, vocal expressions are universally 
encoded (Pell, Paulmann, Dara, Alasseri, & Kotz, 2009) and recognized (Pell & Skorup, 2008; K. R. 
Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001), although cultural variations (Pell et al., 2009) and an advantage 
for the same cultural background exists (called in-group effect; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; K. R. 





1.1.2.2 Other channels of emotional expressions 
Emotional expressions have been studied most widely in the facial domain, and extensive 
research started with Izard (1971) and Ekman and colleagues (Ekman & Friesen, 1969b; Ekman, 
Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969). Facial expressions related to emotions are characterized by activation 
of different muscle movements (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 1971). Whether these expressions 
are seen as representing distinct emotions or more flexible componential appraisal patterns 
depends on the theoretical position of the researchers (Ekman, 1993; Levenson, 2011; K. R. 
Scherer & Ellgring, 2007). Facial expressions are universally recognized (Ekman et al., 1969; 
Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), although cultural variations and an in-group effect exist (Elfenbein, 
Beaupre, Levesque, & Hess, 2007; Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012). Body gestures are 
also used in emotional communication, but have been studied rarely (but see De Gelder, 2009; De 
Gelder & Van den Stock, 2011; K. R. Scherer et al., 2011). De Gelder (2009) stated that 
investigating body expressions is especially informative, as they strongly display action tendencies 
and might be less easily controlled than the face. 
 
1.2 Understanding emotions in others 
“You can only understand people if you feel them in yourself.” 
(Steinbeck 1952; cited by Preston, 2007) 
 
Emotions possess strong social functions; sadness for example is understood to be a call 
for support, while happiness signals a lack of threat and an invitation to approach (Fischer & 
Manstead, 2008; Hendriks & Vingerhoets, 2006; Shariff & Tracy, 2011). A quick recognition and 
understanding of emotional expressions in others is therefore of importance for effective social 
interactions. Emotional expressions are quickly classified and distinguished (Paulmann et al., 
2013; Pell & Kotz, 2011), but the underlying processes that allow to infer emotions to other 





of the concept of social cognition, which is defined as “the processing of any information which 
culminates in the accurate perception of the disposition and intentions of other individuals” 
(Brothers, 1990, p. 28). Beliefs, intentions and desires are attributed to others via a process called 
mentalizing (or Theory of Mind (ToM); U. Frith & Frith, 2003; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Singer, 
2006), although it is still debated how mentalizing is achieved. People might use a theory-based 
strategy to make predictions about others’ states (Theory-theory; Carruthers, 1996; Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978), but they might also put themselves imaginatively into the shoes of others and 
simulate the perceived mental processes (Simulation theory; Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Singer, 
2006) (see also Davies & Stone, 1998; Völlm et al., 2006). Understanding emotions has been 
closely linked to affect sharing and simulation (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; 
Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Singer, 2006), which will be the focus of the next section. 
Sharing the affective state of a social partner is called empathy1 and is thought not only to 
be an important aspect to understand inner affective states but also to cause prosocial behavior 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hein, Lamm, Brodbeck, & Singer, 2011; Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 
2011; Singer, 2006). Empathic reactions comprises reflections of the complete emotional episode, 
including subjective feeling, and autonomic responses (see the perception-action model by 
Preston & de Waal, 2002; Hatfield, Rapson, & Le, 2011) and are followed or linked to the more 
automatic process of contagion2 (Coricelli, 2005). Both processes are however difficult to tell 
apart (Preston & de Waal, 2002). The term “empathy” was introduced by Titchener (1909; cited in 
Gallese, 2003) as the translation of the German word “Einfühlung”, which was established by the 
philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps (1903). According to Lipps, inner imitation of actions 
is the basis to the understanding of others. In the middle of the 1990s, the discovery of the so-
called “mirror neurons” in monkeys emphasized the link between sensory and motor processes 
(Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Kilner & Lemon, 2013; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
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 Empathy is defined according to Preston and de Waal (2002, p. 4) as “Subject’s state results from the 
attended perception of the object’s state.” 
2
 Contagion is defined according to Preston and de Waal (2002, p. 4) as “Subject’s state results from the 





Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). These neurons were interpreted to be involved in action understanding 
as they were activated during observing as well as during performing an action (Rizzolatti et al., 
1996) (for evidence in humans see Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). This 
interpretation was later expanded to the understanding of emotions in others (Carr et al., 2003; 
Gallese, 2003; Mier et al., 2010; Ramachandra, Depalma, & Lisiewski, 2009). Functional magnetic 
imaging studies found shared activation of the brain network between imitating emotional 
expressions and observing them (Carr et al., 2003). Additionally, there has been extensive 
research on pain perception (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Singer et al., 2006; Singer et al., 
2004), showing that brain structures activated during experiencing pain, such as the anterior 
cingulate cortex and the anterior insular cortex, are also involved when perceiving pain in others 
(Jackson et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004). Feeling pain is not generally described to be an emotion 
per se (Ortony & Turner, 1990), but has been extensively investigated in the context of empathy 
(Jackson et al., 2005; Singer, 2006). These findings highlight the shared representation of one’s 
own and others’ emotions (Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
At the behavioral level, evidence for affective processing, that is sharing emotions, is also 
increasing. Congruent facial reactions to pictures of emotional expressions, called facial mimicry 
(first described by Dimberg, 1982), were reliably found in various studies, even towards vocal 
expressions (Blairy, Herrera, & Hess, 1999; Dimberg, Andréasson, & Thunberg, 2011; Magnée, 
Stekelenburg, Kemner, & de Gelder, 2007). For example, looking at angry faces or hearing angry 
voices induce activation of the corrugator supercilii muscle, leading to a frown. This effect is 
intensified when people’s trait empathy is high, that is when they declare to be easily emotionally 
moved by others (Dimberg et al., 2011; Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012; Sonnby-Borgström, 2002). 
Facial muscle activity has been proposed to depict a direct emotional response (Dimberg, 1997) or 
to elicit emotions via proprioceptive feedback according to the facial feedback hypothesis 





actually influence the subjective feelings of the receiver (Hess & Blairy, 2001; Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 
2001).  
Sharing the emotion of others is thought to be a quick, and thus efficient road for 
understanding them (Stel & van Knippenberg, 2008). The embodied simulation theory of emotion 
proposes explicitly that mirroring emotions is essential for their comprehension and thus predicts 
that emotion recognition is facilitated when emotion evocation in the beholder is effective (see 
e.g. Goldman & Sripada, 2005). Recent studies could find the predicted link between facial 
mimicry, subjective experience and emotion recognition; people showing more intense facial 
mimicry, indicated stronger subjective feelings and revealed more accurate emotion recognition 
(Künecke, Hildebrandt, Recio, Sommer, & Wilhelm, 2014; Sato, Fujimura, Kochiyama, & Suzuki, 
2013). 
The embodied simulation theory is however not unchallenged, as easier roads for 
recognizing emotions in others are suggested, such as a simple feature-based recognition (Zahavi, 
2008) and not all studies on facial mimicry revealed an interaction with emotion recognition 
(Blairy et al., 1999; Bogart & Matsumoto, 2010; Hess & Blairy, 2001). Autonomic reactions to 
emotional expressions in others – such as increased respiration, perspiration or cardiovascular 
activity (Kreibig, 2010) - would complete the shared emotional episode (Moors et al., 2013). These 
somatic responses have been revealed for interactions in real life settings, such as including 
context and verbal content (Cwir, Carr, Walton, & Spencer, 2011; Levenson & Rueff, 1992), while 
responses to context-free presented expressions are ambiguous (Alpers, Adolph, & Pauli, 2011; 
Aue, Cuny, Sander, & Grandjean, 2011; Wangelin, Bradley, Kastner, & Lang, 2012). 
The ability to share emotions by contagion or by empathizing seems a useful tool to react 
adequately in emotional situations, but people do not empathize equally with everyone. Empathic 
reactions are influenced by appraisal processes (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Preston & de Waal, 
2002), and even the more automatic contagion reactions do not happen haphazardly (Norscia & 





socially connected and of higher relevance, as when they are familiar (Preston & de Waal, 2002), 
similar to each other (Cwir et al., 2011; Preston & de Waal, 2002) or share group membership 
(Brown, Bradley, & Lang, 2006; Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010). Additionally, empathic 
responses are increased when the partner is perceived as more likable or fair, respectively (Singer 
et al., 2006). Indeed, shared group-membership – a situation in which empathic concern is high- 
was found to improve emotion recognition (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008; Young & Hugenberg, 
2010). Situations in which empathic concern is facilitated might therefore positively impact the 
classification of emotional expressions due to an increase in affect sharing. In contrast, however, 
the effect might also result from higher attention and increased motivation to decode the more 
relevant emotion by in-group members (Ackerman et al., 2006; Thibault, Bourgeois, & Hess, 
2006). In this case the improved performance rests on cognitive processes rather than on 
affective ones. Out-group members are however not only socially less relevant than in-group 
members, but might also promote the perception of negative emotions (Bijlstra, Holland, & 
Wigboldus, 2010; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008), as it is of higher 
importance to detect threat in people from different groups. To investigate the effect of social 
relevance on emotion processing without the interference of these prejudices, the use of a more 
neutral social connection might be of advantage. Personal similarity (sharing first name, birth 
date, or interests) for example, was found to directly create a social link between two individuals 
(Walton, Cohen, Cwir, & Spencer, 2012), increase behavioral mimicry (Guéguen & Martin, 2009) 
and has been found to increase empathic reactions (Cwir et al., 2011), and it is therefore 
promising for studying the impact of social relevance on emotion recognition and affect sharing. 
Affective neurosciences developed a detailed picture about the reactions of the central 
nervous system during empathic responses or affect sharing (Dalgleish, 2006; Mathur et al., 2010; 
Singer, 2006; Wicker et al., 2003). At the behavioral level there is still a lack of clarity regarding 
the effect of these processes. One of the open questions is whether the social relevance of 





understanding, due to the fact that people can easier “put themselves into the shoes of others”. 
Beyond that, the knowledge on actual “bodily sensations” (as termed by Singer, 2006, p. 856, 
meaning the autonomic reactions of an emotional episode) during the processing of emotional 
expressions in others is generally scarce. Answers to these questions would enlighten the 
necessity and the extent of affect sharing during emotion communication. 
 
1.3 Play-acted expressions and reliability 
 
In the previous sections I described the processes how emotions are transmitted by the 
voice through modulations of the vocal tract as well as the possibility to understand others’ 
emotions by sharing their affective state. The above mentioned studies were, however, mostly 
conducted using play-acted expressions that do not mirror the affective state of the individual 




Following the concept of emotions (Chapter 1.1.1), an expression is accompanied by 
physiological reactions and reflects the inner affective state of the person showing the expression. 
However, the occurrence of emotional expressions is strongly social (Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-
Belda, 1995; Fridlund, 1991) and the coherence between expressions and other components of an 
emotional episode could until now not sufficiently be demonstrated (see Fernández-Dols & 
Crivelli, 2013; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005; Reisenzein, Bördgen, 
Holtbernd, & Matz, 2006; Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstman, 2013). Scherer proposed a model 
accounting for this twofold use of emotional expressions (K. R. Scherer, 2003; K. R. Scherer & 





influenced by internal physiological reactions (“push factors”), and by social requirements or 
display rules (“pull factors”). Emotional expressions are produced via an interplay of peripheral 
physiological responses that “push” an expression and deliberate modulations that are used to 
fulfil social expectations (pull factors). According to this model, whether an emotion is truly felt or 
deliberately produced is a false dichotomy as it is always both (K. R. Scherer & Bänziger, 2010).  
From a biological-evolutionary point of view the differentiation between emotion-based 
expressions and unfelt, rather socially used ones is however of relevance. Three recent theoretical 
papers extensively discuss the topic of emotional expressions as signals in a stable communicative 
system (Dezecache, Mercier, & Scott-Phillips, 2013; Mehu & Scherer, 2012; Schmidt & Cohn, 
2001). They highlight that in order to provide any information3 to the beholder, emotional 
expressions should, at least on average, be reliable (see also R. A. Johnstone & Grafen, 1993; 
Maynard Smith, 1991; Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995). I will use an example to clarify the matter. 
Happiness indicates an invitation to approach and the absence of threat (Fischer & Manstead, 
2008). If the expressions of happiness can be used deceptively, everyone would produce it 
regardless of the actual intention. The expressions would soon lose its value. Coming back to 
Scherer’s model, it is the question whether expressions purely produced by push factors are 
different from expressions that are only based on pull factors, and whether listeners or beholders 
can distinguish both from each other. 
Research on deceptive behavior in facial communication has been conducted by Ekman 
and colleagues (e.g. Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990; Ekman & Friesen, 1969a; Ekman & 
O'Sullivan, 2006). They proposed that facial expressions can be masked or faked but that the felt 
emotion will shimmer through by subtle, rapid muscle movements that are difficult to be 
influenced voluntarily, a process called “leakage” (Ekman & Friesen, 1969a; Ekman & O'Sullivan, 
2006, see also Porter & ten Brinke, 2009; Porter, ten Brinke, & Wallace, 2012). Specific muscles 
are assumed to be activated only under effort, these are called “reliable muscles” and include the 
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prominent orbicularis oculi (cheek raiser), which in combination with the zygomaticus major (lip 
corner pull) accounts for the Duchenne smile (Ekman et al., 1990; Ekman & Friesen, 1982). This 
smile, created by activation of the zygomaticus and the o. oculi, has been proposed to be a read-
out of felt positive emotions, in contrast to a smile generated by zygomaticus activity only (non-
Duchenne smile) (Ekman et al., 1990; Ekman & O'Sullivan, 2006). Mehu, Mortillaro, Bänziger, and 
Scherer (2012) supported the assumption of reliable muscles experimentally. In their study, facial 
expressions including muscle activity, which was rated as being difficult to activate deliberately 
beforehand, were actually perceived as more authentic than expressions that were produced 
without activation of these muscles (see also Warren, Schertler, & Bull, 2008). Recent research, 
however, failed to confirm the dichotomic differentiation between Duchenne and non-Duchenne 
smiles, indicating rather a relation with smile intensity and thus challenging the assumption of 
reliable muscles (Gunnary & Hall, 2014; Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009; Riediger, Studtmann, 
Westphal, Rauers, & Weber, 2014). Timing pattern seems to distinguish between felt and 
deliberately produced facial expression (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 2006; Hess & Kleck, 1990), but 
further empirical support is needed here. From the receiver’s side, recognition of emotional 
deception was only poorly achieved, mostly at or barely above chance level (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 
1991; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009; Porter et al., 2012; Warren et al., 2008). 
This short overview indicates the dominance of facial expressions in the line of research 
on reliability of emotional expressions. Vocal expressions rests more strongly upon responses of 
the autonomic nervous system (see chapter 1.1.2; K. R. Scherer, 1986) and might thus be more 
prone to reveal underlying emotional episodes. No markers have been suggested to expose 
deceptive expressions - with the exception of fluctuations in the fundamental frequency (jitter, 
see Juslin & Laukka, 2001) -, but deliberately expressed emotions were assumed to be more 
intense and stereotypical, as the speaker might not be able to control the subtle adaptations of 





Considering that the knowledge on differences between felt and socially used expression 
is scarce, it is of interest that research on emotional expressions was mostly conducted using 
actors’ portrayals. While this procedure avoids the difficulties of recording spontaneous 
expressions, such as ethical constraints or technical problems of high quality recording conditions 
(Bänziger & Scherer, 2007; K. R. Scherer, 2003), it certainly restricts ecological validity, especially 
as stimuli were preselected in order to ensure the correct emotional content, leading to highly 
stereotypical and intense expressions (i.e., Banse & Scherer, 1996). With regard to the scarce 
knowledge on actual expression pattern, Barrett (2011) stated that researchers study merely 
symbols of emotional expressions instead of emotional expressions as they occur in daily life. 
According to her, researchers might consider the wrong expression patterns as long as it is not 
clarified how emotions are actually expressed - for example when looking at coherence between 
expressions and subjective feelings (Barrett, 2011; Carroll & Russell, 1997). The knowledge on 
spontaneous vocal expressions so far comes from depressed or anxious patients (Laukka, 
Linnman, et al., 2008) or from recordings of talk shows (Grimm, Kroschel, & Narayanan, 2008), 
telephone services (Laukka, Elenius, Fredrikson, Furmark, & Neiberg, 2008) or during emergencies 
(Williams & Stevens, 1972). Emotion induction methods were also used to gain stimulus material 
(T. Johnstone, van Reekum, Hird, Kirsner, & Scherer, 2005). The results so far are corresponded 
with the findings on acted expressions, but with smaller effect sizes (Laukka, Elenius, et al., 2008). 
Yet most of these studies had a restricted sample of different emotion categories, or dealt with 
low intense expressions. 
A set of studies concerning the comparison of spontaneous and play-acted expressions 
was conducted in our research group. We collected radio sequences, in which people were 
interviewed in emotional situations and compared these with re-enactments of the same 
situation by professional actors. An acoustic analysis (Jürgens, Hammerschmidt, & Fischer, 2011) 
revealed that the production in both conditions differed, as articulation differences and a more 





differed only slightly across the emotion categories (in contrast to Banse & Scherer, 1996; 
Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007) and no interaction between emotion and recording condition 
(whether the recording was acted or spontaneous) was found. Drolet, Schubotz, and Fischer 
(2012) showed in their imaging study using the same stimulus set that BOLD responses (blood 
oxygenation level dependent responses) during listening to spontaneous expressions differed 
compared to listening to play-acted ones. Participants were poor in distinguishing the play-acted 
expressions, however. Most interestingly, play-acted expressions were not more easily recognized 
than spontaneous ones, which reflects the acoustic analysis and speaks against the assumption 
that acted expressions are more stereotypical than spontaneous ones. Play-acting had 
nevertheless an influence on emotion recognition, namely a more accurate recognition of angry 
and a less accurate recognition of sad speech compared to spontaneous expressions. This result 
indicated that play-acting might have a more complex, emotion-specific influence on recognition, 
but that people are poor in recognizing whether the expressions was acted or not. The play-acted 
stimuli of this study were produced by professional actors, who represent a special case of 
encoders. Actors are trained to act emotional expression and might therefore be especially suited 
to produce credible expressions (K. R. Scherer & Bänziger, 2010). A comparison of acting-
inexperienced people would disclose the issue whether people are generally capable to play-act 
expressions convincingly.  
It is important to clarify that when referring to “spontaneous” expressions in the context 
of this stimulus set, I do not state that these rely solely on push factors. This is often 
misconceived. The spontaneous recordings are done in social situations, and expressions are 
certainly influenced by social requirements (pull factors), although they are not staged (see also K. 
R. Scherer & Bänziger, 2010). The play-acted expressions on the other hand can be regarded as 
incoherent with the underlying emotional episode. Although specific acting techniques use the 
recollection of emotional episode to create actual emotions and some actors do feel into their 





1989) and the actors did not prepare themselves in that way. There might be the possibility that 
the spontaneous expressions are play-acted, however unlikely this explanation seems to be - 
regarding the situations in which they were recorded (people speaking about the death of their 
children or winning in a lottery). In this case the whole concept of emotion communication in 
daily life would be challenged. 
 
1.3.2 Acted expressions in cross-cultural emotion research 
The use of preselected, highly intense, play-acted stimuli might bias research findings on 
emotional expressions as stated by Barrett (2011). The problem of unrealistic, acted emotion 
portrayals has been discussed for example in the context of universality of emotional expressions. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1.1.2 emotional expressions are recognized accurately across different 
cultures and language families, but people from the same cultural background were found to 
possess an advantage in recognizing the expressions (in-group effect, Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; 
K. R. Scherer et al., 2001). On the one hand, this in-group-effect might be caused by the higher 
motivation, the increased attention or facilitated empathic concern towards people of the same 
group (see Chapter 1.2, Thibault et al., 2006), or, in the case of vocal expressions, by familiarity 
with the language. On the other hand Matsumoto, Olide, and Willingham (2009) proposed that 
the in-group-effect across cultures might be created artificially by using play-acted expressions. 
They argued that acting rely more strongly on social codes than spontaneous expression (see also 
Hunt, 1941) and that while spontaneous emotional expressions are universally equivalent, acted 
expressions differ across cultures. In their study, Matsumoto et al. (2009) demonstrated a lack of 
intragroup advantage when looking at spontaneous facial expressions of joy. Another 
unintentional effect of play-acted expressions was introduced by Elfenbein, Mandal, Ambady, 
Harizuka, and Kumar (2002), who stated that using preselected, highly aroused and intense 
expressions might cover possible culture specific decoding rules (see also Wagner, 1993). 





situation the expression is perceived as appropriate does vary across cultures (Matsumoto & 
Hwang, 2011). In collectivistic societies attributing negative emotions to people has been 
assumed to endanger group stability, which might lead to a bias against using negative emotion 
categories during recognition (Matsumoto, 1989, 1992). This effect might be covered by the 
unambiguousness of preselected play-acted emotion stimuli (Elfenbein et al., 2002; Wagner, 
1993) and lead to an overestimation of cross-cultural similarity. These examples, which again 
referred to facial expressions, highlight the importance to look at daily life expressions and to 





In the previous sections, I disclosed open questions concerning vocal emotion expressions. I 
summarized that the relation between spontaneous and deliberately produced expressions and 
thus their reliability is still not disclosed. Additionally, I pointed to the fact that the processes 
which lead to an understanding of others’ expressions and especially the importance of affect 
sharing are also far from being understood. Generally, the literature review emphasized the lack 
of knowledge concerning vocal expression. 
In my thesis I investigated the relation between spontaneous and play-acted speech tokens 
to reveal the human ability to produce and to detect deliberately expressed vocal emotions 
portrayals in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. These two chapters belong to a set of studies that aimed to 
reveal how play-acted and spontaneous expressions are differently processed and perceived (see 
Drolet et al., 2012; Jürgens et al., 2011). Chapter 2 concentrates on the emotion recognition and 
the perceived authenticity of spontaneous expressions and their re-enactments in a cross-cultural 
comparison including German, Romanian and Indonesian listeners. This study enlightens the 





emotion recognition patterns, found by Drolet et al. (2012), have a universal basis or are a result 
of listeners’ culture. In case that acting rests on social codes, I predicted that emotion recognition 
would be less accurate for acted expressions in cultures other than German. If the relation of 
spontaneous and play-acted expressions in contrast is based on a universal basis, similar 
recognition rates across the three cultures would be found. In accordance to Elfenbein et al. 
(2002), I predicted additionally that the cultural-dependent decoding biases against negative 
emotions in collectivistic cultures (Romania and Indonesia) have stronger effects on the more 
ambiguous expressions, which would include the authentic anger and the fear stimuli. 
In Chapter 3, I clarify whether acting training affects the production of emotional expressions 
and their recognition, by including emotional portrayals by acting in-experienced people. This 
aims to disclose whether acting emotions has to be trained to be convincing. Furthermore, 
including non-trained people clarifies the source of the emotion recognition pattern mentioned 
above, namely whether it is caused by acting in general, or by especially trained actors’ speech. 
This study consists of an acoustic analysis and a rating experiment to focus both on the 
production and on the recognition of vocal expressions. Under the hypothesis that professional 
actors are better suited to produce credible vocal expressions, as they are trained for this task, I 
predicted that expressions by non-trained people deviated more strongly in their emotion 
recognition from the spontaneous expressions than the ones by actors; namely possessing even 
higher recognition rates for anger and lower for sadness. In their production, actors’ portrayals 
would resemble the spontaneous expressions more strongly than the non-trained people. It might 
however be the case, that acting- and speech training interferes with the production of emotional 
expressions, in this case I predicted that the expressions by professional actors are most extreme 
both in the acoustic analysis and in the rating data. 
Chapter 4 expands the topic of recognizing and processing vocal expressions. In chapter 2, I 
implicitly dealt with the effect of social connectedness on emotion recognition by regarding 





increased social relevance, manipulated by biographical similarity, improves vocal emotion 
recognition. This study investigated whether attending to vocal expression alone elicits emotional 
engagement including autonomic reaction (skin conductance and pupil size) and whether 
increased relevance of the speaker interacts with emotion recognition and emotion sharing. I 
hypothesized that sharing biographical characteristics increased emotion recognition either by 
shifting attention, or by stronger empathic concern. In the first case I would predict an increase in 
pupil dilation, which is a marker for attention (Laeng, Sirois, & Gredeback, 2012), for expressions 
spoken by a similar character, and in the latter a general increase in emotional engagement 
measured by autonomic skin conductance response. 
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Although the expression of emotions in humans is considered to be largely universal, 
cultural effects contribute to both emotion expression and recognition. To disentangle the 
interplay between these factors, play-acted and authentic (non-instructed) vocal expressions of 
emotions were used, on the assumption that cultural effects may contribute differentially to the 
recognition of staged and spontaneous emotions. Speech tokens depicting four emotions (anger, 
sadness, joy, fear) were obtained from German radio archives and reenacted by professional 
actors, and presented to 120 participants from Germany, Romania, and Indonesia. Participants in 
all three countries were poor at distinguishing between play-acted and spontaneous emotional 
utterances (58.73% correct on average with only marginal cultural differences). Nevertheless, 
authenticity influenced emotion recognition: across cultures, anger was recognized more 
accurately when play-acted (z = 15.06, p < .001) and sadness when authentic (z = 6.63, p < .001), 
replicating previous findings from German populations. German subjects revealed a slight 
advantage in recognizing emotions, indicating a moderate in-group advantage. There was no 
difference between Romanian and Indonesian subjects in the overall emotion recognition. 
Differential cultural effects became particularly apparent in terms of differential biases in emotion 
attribution. While all participants labeled play-acted expressions as anger more frequently than 
expected, German participants exhibited a further bias towards choosing anger for spontaneous 
stimuli. In contrast to the German sample, Romanian and Indonesian participants were biased 
towards choosing sadness. These results support the view that emotion recognition rests on a 
complex interaction of human universals and cultural specificities. Whether and in which way the 








Emotions are an important part of human social life. They mediate between the internal 
state and external world and they prepare the organism for subsequent actions and interactions. 
Although there is an ongoing debate about the definition of emotions (see for example Mason & 
Capitanio, 2012; Mulligan & Scherer, 2012; Scarantino, 2012), there is a growing consensus among 
theorists that emotion needs to be viewed as a multi-component phenomenon (Frijda, 1986; 
Lazarus, 1991; K. R. Scherer, 1984). The three major components of emotions are 
neurophysiological response patterns in the central and autonomic nervous systems; motor 
expression in face, voice and gesture; and subjective feelings. Many theorists also include the 
evaluation or appraisal of the antecedent event and the action tendencies generated by the 
emotion as additional components of the emotional process (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; K. R. 
Scherer, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). 
Different theoretical frameworks have been put forward as to whether emotions are 
universal and evolved adaptations (Darwin, 1872) or whether they are socially constructed and 
vary across cultures (Averill, 1980). Both approaches are, however, not mutually exclusive, and it 
has recently been argued that the dichotomy between nature and nurture should be abandoned 
(Juslin, 2012; Mason & Capitanio, 2012; Prinz, 2004). Matsumoto (1989), for example, argued that 
although emotions are biologically programmed, cultural factors have a strong influence on the 
control of emotional expression and perception.  
Scherer and Wallbott (1994) conducted a series of cross-cultural questionnaire studies in 
37 countries to investigate the influence of culture on the experience of emotions and found 
strong evidence for both universality and cultural specificity in emotional experience, including 
both psychological and physiological responses to emotions. Ekman and colleagues (Ekman et al., 
1969; Ekman and Friesen, 1971; Ekman and Oster, 1979) tested the universality of facial 
expressions and demonstrated that a standardized set of photographs depicting different emotion 





time, recognition accuracy was higher for members of the cultural background from which the 
facial expressions were obtained. Thus, facial expressions are considered to be largely universal 
(but, see Jack et al., 2012), while cultural differences are observed in the types of situations that 
elicit emotions (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011), in small dialectic-like differences (Elfenbein et al., 
2007) and in the culture-specific display rules that alter facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; 
Matsumoto et al., 2008). 
The human voice is also an important modality in the transmission of emotional 
information, both through verbal and nonverbal utterances (Banse & Scherer, 1996; 
Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007; Juslin & Laukka, 2003; Sauter et al., 2010). Expression of 
emotion in the voice occurs via modifications of voice quality (Gobl & Ni Chasaide, 2003) and 
prosody in general (K. R. Scherer, 1986). Initial research on vocal emotion recognition indicated 
that the patterns in prosodic recognition were largely universal (Frick, 1985), which paralleled the 
results from facial expressions (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Ratings of vocalizations by listeners 
showed that they were able to infer vocally expressed emotions at rates higher than chance 
(Banse & Scherer, 1996; Juslin & Laukka, 2003). In a classic study, Scherer and colleagues (2001) 
compared judgments by Germans and members of eight other cultures on expressions of 
emotions by German actors. They found that with increasing geographical distance from the 
speakers the recognition accuracy for emotional expressions decreased. Additionally, recognition 
accuracy was greater for foreign judges whose own language was closer to the Germanic language 
family. A meta-analysis on emotion recognition within and across cultures revealed that the in-
group advantage found by Scherer and colleagues (2001) for German judges is a typical finding in 
cross-cultural emotion recognition studies (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). This meta-analysis 
included studies that used different types of stimuli, from facial and whole-body photographs to 
voice samples and video clips. Emotions were universally recognized at better-than-chance levels. 
However, there was also a consistent in-group advantage: accuracy was higher when emotions 





This advantage was smaller for cultural groups with greater exposure to one another, measured in 
terms of living in the same nation, physical proximity, and telephone communication (Elfenbein & 
Ambady, 2002). 
Cultural variations in emotion recognition can not only be explained by differences in the 
emotion encoding, but also by response biases on part of the recipient due to culture-dependent 
decoding rules (Elfenbein et al., 2002; Matsumoto, 1989). For example, revealing that Japanese 
participants were less accurate in recognizing anger, fear, disgust and sadness, Masumoto (1992) 
suggested a bias against negative emotions in collectivistic societies as an important factor to 
maintain group stability (but see Elfenbein et al., 2002 for divergent results). 
Much of the research cited above has been performed on stereotypical and controlled 
expressions of emotions often produced by actors. Though actors spend many years perfecting 
the authenticity and clarity of their portrayals of human behavior and emotions (Goldstein & 
Bloom, 2011), acted emotional expressions may still be more stereotyped and more intense than 
spontaneous expressions (Wilting, Krahmer, & Swerts., 2006; Laukka et al., 2012, but see Jürgens 
et al., 2011; K. R. Scherer, 2013) and are thought to be more strongly bound by social codes (Hunt, 
1941; Matsumoto et al., 2009). In addition, preselected, stereotypical expressions might conceal 
possible effects of response biases in cross-culture studies due to their clear and unmistakable 
expression patterns (Elfenbein et al., 2002; Wagner, 1993). 
In a series of previous studies we presented listeners with emotional speech tokens 
produced without external instruction (“authentic”) obtained from radio archives, as well as 
corresponding tokens re-enacted by professional actors (“play-acted”). We found that (German) 
listeners were poor at distinguishing between authentic and play-acted emotions. Intriguingly, the 
recording conditions nevertheless had a significant effect on emotion recognition. Anger was 
recognized best when play-acted, while sadness was recognized best when authentic (Drolet et al., 
2012). Moreover, using an fMRI approach, we found that both explicit recognition of the source of 





emotion) and authentic stimuli (versus play-acted) lead to an up-regulation in the ToM network 
(medial prefrontal, retrosplenial and temporoparietal cortices). Moreover, acoustic analyses 
revealed significant differences in the F0 contour, with a higher variability in F0 modulation in play-
acted than authentic stimuli (Jürgens et al., 2011). 
Based on these findings, we here aim to expand our understanding of the recognition of 
play-acted and authentic stimuli and biases in emotion recognition. By testing participants from 
different cultures we intended to gain insights into the influence culture has on our findings. We 
selected Romanian and Indonesian participants because they differ in terms of the distance to the 
German sample, with a higher degree of overlap between the Romanian and German cultures 
than between Indonesian and German. Moreover, Romania and Indonesia have been described as 
collectivistic societies in contrast to the individualistic German society (Hofstede, 1980; 1996; 
Trimbitas, Lin, & Clark, 2007), which allows a comparison of listeners’ culture-dependent response 
biases on non-instructed, more ambivalent speech tokens (Elfenbein et al., 2002; Matsumoto, 
1992). If the observed interaction between emotion recognition and recording condition is based 
on universal processes in emotion recognition, we would predict a similar pattern across the three 
cultures. Specifically, more stereotyped displays should be recognized more easily across cultures 
(Elfenbein et al., 2007). If, in contrast, acting reflects a socially learned code, then the higher 
recognition of play-acted anger should disappear in the other two cultures (Hunt, 1941; 
Matsumoto et al., 2009), with a stronger effect in Indonesian than Romanian participants, due to 
cultural distance. If collectivistic societies foster a response bias against negative emotions, 
Romanian and Indonesian participants should reveal a bias against judging an emotion as anger, 
fear or sadness in contrast to the German participants (Elfenbein et al., 2002; Matsumoto, 1992). 
This effect should be increased in cases in which the stimulus material is less clear and less 







Material and Methods 
Recordings 
We focused on four emotions that differ in terms of valence, dominance and intensity: 
anger, fear, joy and sadness (Bryant & Barrett, 2008; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Ethofer, de 
Ville, Scherer, & Vuilleumer, 2009). These are the most commonly used emotions in this field of 
research (Juslin & Laukka, 2003; K. R. Scherer et al., 2001; Sobin & Alpert, 1999) and were 
accessible in the radio interviews used for stimulus material. Neutral prosody, while interesting for 
comparative reasons, is rare and hard to control in real-life settings. One possibility, news anchors, 
whose voices are characterized by neutral prosody, unfortunately represents a way of speaking 
more related to acting than to natural speech. We compared emotional expressions that were 
obtained during radio interviews to re-enacted versions of the same stimuli. The authentic speech 
recordings were selected from the database of a radio station and consisted of German 
expressions of fear, anger, joy or sadness. The recordings were made during interviews with 
individuals talking in an emotional fashion about a highly charged ongoing or recollected event 
(e.g. parents speaking about the death of their children, people winning in a lottery, being in rage 
about current or past injustice, or threatened by a current danger). Emotions were ascertained 
through the content of the text spoken by the individuals, as well as the context. While the 
possibility of social acting can never be completely excluded we aimed to minimize this effect by 
excluding clearly staged settings (e.g. talk-shows). Stimuli were saved in wave format with 44.1 
kHz sample rate and 16 bit sampling depth. Only recordings of good quality and low background 
noise were selected. Prior to the experiment, we asked 64 naïve participants to rate the 
transcripts for emotional content to ensure that the stimulus material was free of verbal content 
that could reveal the emotion. Text segments that were assigned to a particular emotion above 
chance level were shortened or deleted from the stimulus set. Thus, the stimuli that were used in 
the experiment did not contain any keywords that could allow inference of the expressed 





ihn 43 Jahr”) was used as a sad stimulus, and “up to the window crossbar” (German: “bis zum 
Fensterkreuz”) as a fear stimulus. Of the chosen 80 speech tokens, 35 were made outdoors and 
varied in their noise surroundings. The final stimulus set consisted of 20 samples of joy and 
sadness, 22 samples of anger and 18 samples of fear, half of which were recorded from female 
speakers, resulting in a total of 80 recordings made by 78 different speakers. Segments had a 
mean length of 1.9 s (SD: 1.2 s). These wave files represent the so-called authentic stimuli. An 
information sheet was prepared for each authentic stimulus, which indicated the gender of the 
speaker, the context of the situation described, and a transliteration of the spoken text 
surrounding and including the respective selection of text. 
The play-acted stimuli were produced by 21 male and 21 female actors (incl. 31 
professional actors, 10 drama students, and 1 professional singer) recruited in Berlin, Hanover, and 
Göttingen, Germany. Actors were asked to reproduce 2-3 of the authentic recordings. Using the 
recording information sheet, the actors were told to express the respective text and emotion in 
their own way, using only the text, identified context, and emotion (the segment to be used as 
stimulus was not indicated and the actors never heard the original recording). Each actor could 
practice as long as needed, could repeat the acted reproduction as often as they required, and the 
recording selected for experimental use was the repetition each actor denoted as their first 
choice. To reduce any category effects between authentic and play-acted stimuli, the environment 
for the play-acted recordings was varied and 30 out of 80 randomly selected re-enactements were 
recorded outside. Nevertheless, care was taken to avoid excessive background noise. The relevant 
play-acted recordings (wave format, 44.1 kHz, 16 bit sampling depth) were then edited so they 
contained the same segment of spoken text as the authentic recordings. The average amplitude of 









It was not possible to obtain informed consent from the people whose radio statements 
were used, as these were not individually identified. The brevity of the speech samples also 
precluded individual identification; we thus deemed the use of these samples as ethically 
acceptable. Actors gave verbal informed consent and were paid €20; experimental participants 
gave written informed consent and were paid €5 for their participation. Both actors and 
participants were informed afterwards about the purpose of the study.  
 
Procedure 
Due to the unequal numbers of speakers in the two conditions, we split the dataset in two 
and presented the two sets (playback A and playback B) to different groups of listeners. This also 
served to avoid participant exhaustion. Each set contained five authentic and five corresponding 
play-acted duplicates per speaker gender and intended emotion, resulting in a total of 80 stimuli 
(40 authentic, 40 play-acted) per set. Apart from three exceptions the playbacks were prepared in 
such a way that each actor was present in one set only once and related recordings (authentic 
versus play-acted) were presented in a pseudo-randomized fashion with the stipulation that 
speech token pairs were not played immediately after each another to make direct comparisons 
between recording pairs unlikely. 
Each of the two sets of stimuli was presented to 20 listeners (10 female and 10 male) per 
country, resulting in 40 participants per country. In Germany, all participants were native German 
speakers recruited at the Georg-August University, Göttingen. Thirty-six were students, three were 
Ph.D. students and one was an assistant lecturer. The age of German listeners varied between 20 
and 33 years, the average age was M = 24.4, SD = 2.8 years for the listeners of playback A and 
M = 25.1, SD = 3.0 years for the listeners of playback B. The 40 Romanian listeners were recruited 
at the Lucian-Blaga-University of Sibiu, Romania. All of them were students. The age of Romanian 





listeners of playback A and M = 19.5, SD = .7 years for the listeners of playback B. The 40 
Indonesian listeners were recruited at the Jakarta University, Indonesia. All Indonesian participants 
were students aged 18 to 31 years. The mean age was M = 20.7, SD = 2.8 years for the listeners of 
playback A and M = 20.5, SD = 1.9 years for the listeners of playback B. Neither the Romanian nor 
the Indonesian participants spoke any German. Romanian participants were, however, more 
familiar with German due to a large German community in the town of Sibiu. We did not collect 
any information about the emotional state of the participants before or during the experiments. 
The stimuli were played back using a laptop (Toshiba Satellite with a Realtek AC97 
Soundcard) via a program called Emosurvey (developed by Martin Schmeisser). Participants heard 
the stimuli via earphones (Sennheiser HD 497). They could activate the playback of the stimuli 
themselves and each stimulus could be activated a maximum of three times. The ratings were 
made via mouse clicks on the screen. When all questions were answered, the next stimulus could 
be activated. The listeners’ ratings were automatically saved in a log file, which could afterwards 
be transferred to other software packages for analysis. In a forced-choice design participants were 
asked to determine, for each stimulus, the emotion expressed (emotion-rating: joy, fear, anger, 




All models were implemented in the R statistical computing environment (R 
Developmental Core Team, 2008). We analyzed the authenticity ratings as well as the emotion 
ratings with generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) using the glmer function from the lme4 
package for binomial data (Bates, 2005). The responses for correct authenticity rating and for 
correct emotion rating were tested with the predictor variables Country, Intended emotion, 
Stimulus authenticity, as well as their interactions and the random factors Participant and Text 





factor Text stimulus + Random factor Participant). Both models (Authenticity rating and Emotion 
rating) were compared to their respective null models (including only the intercept and the 
random factors, model formulation: correct recognition ~ 1 + Random factor Text stimulus + 
Random factor Participant) using a likelihood ratio test (function anova with the test argument 
“Chisq”). This comparison revealed differences, such that each of the full models accounted for 
more variance than the null models. Based on the chosen model we specified a set of 
experimental hypotheses that we tested post-hoc using the glht function from the multcomp 
package (Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall, 2008), adjusting the p-values for multiple testing via single-
step method. 
Assessing recognition accuracy by simply counting hit rates, without addressing potential 
false alarms or biases (a strong preference towards one response), can be misleading (Wagner, 
1993). For instance, if participants have a strong preference for rating stimuli as “authentic”, then 
one would obtain high hit rates for “authentic” speech tokens, but also many wrongly classified 
play-acted ones (called false alarms). Although the mean recognition rate in this case is quite high, 
the true ability to recognize authenticity is low. This example shows the importance of calculating 
biases for understanding rating behavior. A standardized method for analyzing the true 
discrimination ability for two response options was first introduced as Signal Detection Theory 
(SDT; Tanner, Wilson, & Swets, 1954). This technique offers both a measure of discriminatory 
ability d´ (also called sensitivity) which is the true ability to discern one stimulus from another, and 
a measure of the response bias towards one category, which is independent of sensitivity 
(criterion c). As the emotion recognition task in our study included four response options (four 
emotions), we analyzed the ratings using Choice Theory (Luce, 1959; 1963; Smith, 1982). Choice 
theory is a logit-model analogue to SDT, which allows the analysis of more than two discrete 
response categories. A Choice Theory analysis provides (1) the participants' relative bias (b), which 
is the equivalent criterion c and (2) dissimilarity values (), which are equivalent to the 





We implemented the choice theory analysis as a baseline-category logit model (Agresti, 
2007). We used the fitted intercept and slope coefficients to derive the bias and similarity 
parameters of choice theory. The binomial ‘mixed’ model for authenticity recognition (binomial 
due to the two response options “authentic” and “play-acted”) was calculated in R using the glmer 
function of the lme4 package (Bates, 2005). The multinomial 'mixed' model for emotion 
recognition was programmed under WinBUGS (Lunn, Thomas, Best, & Speigelhalter, 2000) using 
the R2WinBUGS interface package (Sturtz, Ligges, & Gelman, 2005) to account for the four 





Across cultures, recognition accuracy for authenticity was only slightly above chance 
(M = 58.73%, SD = 8.84 %), with a higher recognition rate for authentic (M = 67.81%, SD = 12.37) 
than for play-acted speech tokens (M = 49.58%, SD = 16.78). Post-hoc tests confirmed this 
difference in recognition rates (z = 18.39, p < .001; Figure 2.1). German raters, correct in 62.43 % 
of cases, were, on average, more accurate in their authenticity ratings than either Romanian 
(57.20%) or Indonesian raters (56.67%; German - Romanian z = 2.99, p = .028; German– 
Indonesian z = 2.95, p = .031). 
The analysis of ratings using choice theory revealed that participants had a strong bias 
towards choosing the response ‘authentic’ in the authenticity ratings (Figure 2.2), which may 
explain the higher recognition accuracy for authentic speech tokens. The post-hoc pair-wise 
comparisons between the participants of the different countries revealed a significantly greater 
bias in Romanians than Germans (z = 2.64, p = .045; Figure 2.2). 
The overall mean dissimilarity of 0.40 implies a generally low discriminatory capability 





2005). Post-hoc tests revealed that German participants had a higher dissimilarity value and thus a 
better discriminatory ability than Romanian and Indonesian participants (German-Romanian: z = 
4.535, p < .001; German- Indonesian: z = 4.590, p < .001).  
 
Figure 2.1 Probability of correct authenticity recognition by intended emotion (A - anger, F – fear, J – joy, S – 
sadness) and stimulus authenticity (authentic or play-acted). The data are split by cultural affiliation (G - 
Germany, R - Romania, I - Indonesia). Given are means and 95% confidence intervals. The probability of 
correct authenticity recognition by chance is .5 as indicated by the dashed horizontal lines.  
 
Figure 2.2 Discrimination of authentic and play-acted vocal expressions of emotions as assessed by choice 
theory. The discriminatory ability is described by the dissimilarity between authentic and play-acted stimuli 
(depicting how well the stimuli could be discriminated) and by the participants' relative bias towards choosing 
authentic as a response, which are plotted against each other. The figure shows how these parameters vary in 
dependence of cultural affiliation (G - Germany, R - Romania, I - Indonesia) and the intended emotional 
content (A - Anger, F - Fear, J - Joy, S - Sadness). Positive values on the x-axis indicate a bias towards 
preferentially choosing the response ‘authentic’, while higher dissimilarity values indicates a better ability to 





Emotion Recognition  
In total, the correct response rate in emotion ratings was 40.65% (SD = 6.41%), which is 
higher than a chance response rate of 25% resulting from a random selection of one of the four 
emotions. The emotion recognition ratings in general showed similar patterns in the three 
countries (Figure 2.3). The GLMM analysis revealed that the rate of correct emotion recognition 
was influenced by Intended emotion, Stimulus authenticity and Country (see Table 2.1 for the 
results of the post-hoc analysis). Play-acted stimuli were recognized more accurately (42.78%) 
than authentic stimuli (38.52%). Specifically, play-acted anger was recognized more frequently 
than authentic anger and authentic sadness more than play-acted sadness. Authenticity did not 
significantly influence the emotion recognition rates for fear and joy. Concerning the four emotion 
categories, anger and sadness were on average recognized significantly more frequently than fear 
and sadness was recognized more frequently than joy. Finally, emotion recognition rates were 
significantly higher for German participants in comparison to Romanian and Indonesian 




Figure 2.3 Probability of correct emotion recognition. Given is the probability of correct emotion 
recognition with respect to the intended emotion (A - anger, F – fear, J – joy, S – sadness) and stimulus 
authenticity (authentic or play-acted). The data are split by cultural affiliation (G - Germany, R - 
Romania, I - Indonesia). Given are means and 95% confidence intervals. The probability of correct 






Post-hoc tests of cultural affiliation, and stimulus-specific factors (stimulus authenticity, intended emotion) 
on the probability of correct emotion recognition 
 
 Linear Hypotheses Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Auth - Play == 0 -0.175602 0.046608 -3.768 0.00226 **  
Germany - Romania == 0 0.291267 0.059652 4.883 <.001 *** 
Germany - Indonesia == 0 0.351577 0.059665 -5.893 <.001 *** 
Romania - Indonesia == 0 0.06031 0.06036 0.999 0.97849   
A - F == 0 1.22244 0.242372 5.044 <.001 *** 
A - J == 0 0.536029 0.233757 2.293 0.23193   
A - S == 0 -0.193133 0.233599 -0.827 0.99434   
J - F == 0 0.686411 0.247431 2.774 0.06781 . 
S - F == 0 1.415573 0.247282 5.725 <.001 *** 
S - J == 0 0.729162 0.238845 3.053 0.02912 * 
Auth - Play (A) == 0 -1.356013 0.090051 -15.058 <.001 *** 
Auth - Play (F) == 0 0.077003 0.105342 0.731 0.99776   
Auth - Play (J) == 0 -0.007027 0.088324 -0.08 1   
Auth - Play (S) == 0 0.583629 0.088031 6.63 <.001 *** 
Note: The p-values are adjusted for multiple testing. Auth = non-instructed. Play = instructed. A = anger. F = fear. J = joy. 
S = sadness. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
The response bias for emotion judgments was calculated with respect to cultural affiliation 
and stimulus authenticity. In all three countries participants showed a bias towards rating play-
acted stimuli as angry (Figure 2.4). This bias was higher for German than for Romanian or 
Indonesian participants. German participants were also biased towards rating authentic stimuli as 
angry, while Romanian and Indonesian participants preferentially chose ‘sadness’ and were 
additionally biased against choosing ‘anger’ when rating authentic stimuli. There was no effect of 
authenticity or country of origin with respect to the responses ‘joy’ and ‘fear’. Indonesian 
participants, whose bias against ‘joy’ was less distinct than for Romanian or German participants, 







Figure 2.5 Analysis of emotion recognition data using choice theory. Given is the dissimilarity for different pairs of 
emotion stimuli with respect to cultural affiliation (G - Germany, R - Romania, I - Indonesia). The rows and 
columns of this matrix plot indicate the four emotion stimuli (A - Anger, F - Fear, J - Joy, S - Sadness) and the four 
possible responses (anger, fear, joy, sadness), respectively. Filled and open symbols refer to authentic and play-
acted conditions, respectively. Data are given as means and 95% uncertainty interval. The dissimilarity describes 
how well each stimulus (depicted by rows) is discriminated from each other stimulus (depicted by response 
columns). 
Figure 2.4 Analysis of emotion recognition data by choice theory. Given is the log-transformed response bias 
for each of the four possible choices (anger, fear, joy, sadness) with respect to cultural affiliation (G - Germany, 
R - Romania, I - Indonesia). The filled and open symbols indicate the response bias for authentic and play-acted 
stimuli. Data are given as means and 95% uncertainty interval. In the absence of any bias, all four log-
transformed bias values would be zero. Positive values indicate a bias towards choosing the response named 






The outcome of the calculation of the dissimilarity values for all possible stimulus-
response pairs during emotion ratings (including effects of country and stimulus authenticity) are 
shown in Figure 2.5. There were few differences between authentic and play-acted emotional 
expressions and between the participants of the three countries. High dissimilarity values were 
found between anger and sadness, which indicates that these emotions could be distinguished 
easily. The very low dissimilarity values for the stimulus "fear" (see row "F" in the matrix plot in 
Figure 2.5) indicate high confusion with the other emotion categories and reflect the low 
recognition rates for fear. 
 
Discussion 
Participants in all three cultures had difficulties distinguishing between authentic 
(spontaneous) and play-acted (instructed) emotional expressions. The recognition of the 
expressed emotion also showed relatively low rates, but varied with respect to the emotion 
category and listener country of origin. Notably, the stimulus origin (authentic vs. play-acted) had 
a clear impact on the recognition of vocal expressions of anger and sadness across all three 
cultures: anger was recognized more frequently when play-acted and sadness was recognized at 
higher rates when authentic, bolstering earlier findings for an independent German population 
(Drolet et al., 2012). While these results are significant, it remains unclear what leads to this 
effect. It may be that play-acted anger is more exaggerated than spontaneously expressed anger, 
while sadness, in contrast, is more difficult to play-act. On the other hand, it may be that, overall, 
some stimulus feature makes play-acted stimuli more likely to be perceived as anger and 
spontaneous stimuli as sadness. 
With regard to our initial hypotheses, we found support for the conjecture that play-acted 
anger was recognized with higher accuracy than authentic anger across cultures, possibly because 
of its stereotypical nature. For the other three categories, acting does not necessarily appear to be 





, Krahmer, & Swets, 2007; Laukka, Audibert, & Aubergé, 2012). According to our results, play-acted 
expressions do not represent a socially learned code (Matsumoto et al., 2009). Considering the 
similar interaction of emotion recognition and stimulus authenticity across the three cultures, our 
findings lend further support for the notion that emotion recognition is underpinned by human 
universals. 
The fact that listeners of all three cultures were poor at discriminating between authentic 
and play-acted vocalizations shows that previous findings (Drolet et al., 2012) are applicable cross-
culturally. If emotional expressions are indicators for underlying states that may require behavioral 
responses by the observer (see for controversial discussion Barrett, 2011; Russell et al., 2003), the 
ability to detect fake emotional expressions should be important and evolutionarily adaptive 
(Mehu & Scherer, 2012; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). The inability to distinguish between play-acted 
and spontaneous expressions is, therefore, counter-intuitive, but has also been found in previous 
studies (see for corresponding results Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Audibert, Aubergé, & Rilliard, 
2008). People tend to believe in the truthfulness of a statement rather than mistrust it (Zuckerman 
et al., 1984; Levine et al., 1999). This effect, labeled as “truth bias”, is reflected in our participants’ 
bias to choose the answer “authentic” when asked about the encoding condition of the emotional 
expression. It may be that the social cost of ignoring an emotion in others (miss) or wrongly 
considering others to be deceivers (false alarm) may make a bias towards believing in the 
authenticity of social signals advantageous (Ekman, 1996). 
In addition to the well documented in-group effect for German participants (Elfenbein & 
Ambady, 2002; K. R. Scherer et al., 2001) in both emotion and authenticity recognition, cultural 
effects mainly became apparent in rating biases of emotions and not in recognition accuracy or 
dissimilarity. This has also been demonstrated by Sneddon, McKeown, McRorie, & Vukicevic 
(2011), who showed that emotional stimuli were recognized similarly across different cultures, 
although the intensity ratings varied. Our initial hypothesis that Indonesian and Romanian 





had, in accordance to our hypothesis, a clear bias against selecting ‘anger’, but only for authentic 
stimuli. When listening to the spontaneous speech tokens, Indonesian and Romanian participants 
preferentially chose ‘sadness’. No cultural difference was found for the selection of ‘fear’. German 
participants showed a bias towards selecting ‘anger’ for both authentic and play-acted stimuli. 
According to the hypothesis that individualistic cultures are expected to reinforce the expression 
of negative emotions, German participants may have expected a higher likelihood of being 
confronted with expressions of anger based on their everyday experiences, regardless of the 
stimulus type presented. Conversely, the more collectivistic Romanian and Indonesian participants 
may have expected expressions of sadness to be more likely (see Matsumoto, 1989 for similar 
results). Thus, sadness seems to rank differently compared to anger and the lumping of all 
negative emotions in the context of response bias seems to be an over-simplification, which might 
also explain the absence of clear bias effects in previous studies (Elfenbein et al., 2002; Sneddon 
et al., 2011). Interestingly, the expected response bias against ‘anger’ for the Romanian and 
Indonesian participants is only present for authentic stimuli, which can be explained by stimulus-
inherent features of the play-acted speech tokens overriding the response bias (Elfenbein et al., 
2002; Wagner, 1993). The link between putative cultural biases requires stronger empirical 
investigations before firm conclusions can be drawn, in particular regarding limitations on the 
number and types of countries examined (with respect to language and cultural distance). 
However, our results demonstrate that the implicit effects of authenticity clearly derive from a 
complex interaction between stimulus-inherent features and cultural expectations about the 
likelihood of specific emotional expressions. 
Due to the use of spontaneous emotional expressions taken from anonymous radio 
interviews, our study did not allow for a within-speaker design. We thus could not explicitly test 
whether individual differences in speaker expressivity affected the results. However, the large 
number of radio speakers and actors involved (more than generally seen in comparable studies) 





and joy were quite low compared to previous studies on vocal expressions of emotions (e.g. Pell & 
Kotz, 2011; K. R. Scherer et al., 2001; Van Bezooijen et al., 1983;). This is interesting, taking into 
account that not only the spontaneous emotions, for which a low recognition would have been 
predicted, but also the play-acted ones, revealed recognition rates near chance levels. In contrast 
to standard methodology, we did not use exaggerated emotional expressions, preselected speech 
tokens, or emotional outbursts in a word or two (Pell et al., 2009; K. R. Scherer et al., 2001; Van 
Bezooijen et al., 1983). Actors were provided with longer transcripts (several sentences) to portray 
emotionally to ensure situations as similar to the authentic recordings as possible. It seems 
unlikely that specifically these professional actors were unable to encode joy or fear, considering 
that this has been done by laymen and inexperienced actors before (Pell et al., 2009; Van 
Bezooijen et al., 1983;). In particular, the low recognition rates for joy and fear at or close to 
chance levels might reveal interesting facts about emotional expressions in general. The inability 
to recognize fear may indicate that fear is less clear in segments of longer speech samples than 
previously thought. In fact, we believe that the low recognition rates overall is what made the 
discovery of the interaction with authenticity, as well as the differences in the response bias, 
possible. It is clear that further work in this direction is needed to understand the relevance of 
emotion recognition research to day-to-day life. Nevertheless, the cross-cultural results revealed 
that spontaneous and play-acted emotional expressions are recognized similarly across cultures, 
indicating that both the recognition of play-acted and spontaneous emotional expressions rest on 
a similar universal basis. Furthermore, our results emphasize the importance of rating response 




Combining all results, this study supports the view that emotion recognition rests on a 





found the same pattern of recognition and the same implicit effects of encoding conditions across 
cultures; on the other hand, cultural differences became evident in distinct biases. In addition, 
although the low recognition of encoding conditions would appear to argue for acted stimuli in 
vocal research, the implicit effects on emotion recognition seen here indicate that the design of 
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 Both in the performative arts and in emotion research, professional actors are assumed to 
be capable of delivering emotions comparable to spontaneous emotional expressions. This study 
examines the effects of acting training on vocal emotion depiction and recognition. We predicted 
that professional actors express emotions in a more realistic fashion than non-professional actors. 
However, professional acting training may lead to a particular speech pattern; this might account 
for vocal expressions by actors that are less comparable to authentic samples than the ones by 
non-professional actors. We compared 80 emotional speech tokens from radio interviews with 80 
re-enactments by professional and inexperienced actors, respectively. We analyzed recognition 
accuracies for emotion and authenticity ratings and compared the acoustic structure of the 
speech tokens. Both play-acted conditions yielded similar recognition accuracies and possessed 
more variable pitch contours than the spontaneous recordings. However, professional actors 
exhibited signs of different articulation patterns compared to non-trained speakers. Our results 
indicate that for emotion research, emotional expressions by professional actors are not better 









Acting is not only an essential part of human performative culture, but also of everyday 
social life, since emotion expressions in natural settings are frequently play-acted due to social 
requirements (Goffman, 1959; Gross, 1998; Hochschild, 1979; Kappas, 2013). At the same time, 
actors’ portrayals can be strongly influenced by subjective feelings, especially when produced via 
techniques based on emotional imagination or memory (Gosselin, Kirouac, & Dore, 1995; K. R. 
Scherer & Bänziger, 2010). Therefore, it has been argued that genuine expressions of emotions 
and play-acted ones are difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish (K. R. Scherer & Bänziger, 2010). 
Other authors have criticized clearly staged expressions as being stereotypical, exaggerated and 
more intense than spontaneously occurring expressions (Barrett, 2011; Batliner, Fischer, Huber, 
Spilker, & Nöth, 2000; Douglas-Cowie, Campbell, Cowie, & Roach, 2003). However, only a handful 
of studies have directly compared authentic expressions and actors’ portrayals (Aubergé, 
Audibert, & Rilliard, 2004; Drolet et al., 2012; Greasley, Sherrard, & Waterman, 2000; Laukka et 
al., 2012; Williams & Stevens, 1972). In most of these studies, play-acted expressions were found 
to be more intense or more stereotypical (Laukka et al., 2012; Wilting et al., 2006). Yet, some 
more recent studies failed to detect such a pattern (Drolet et al., 2012; Jürgens et al., 2013; K. R. 
Scherer, 2013). 
In a set of earlier studies, we compared vocal expressions of emotions taken from natural, 
non-staged situations recorded by a local radio station with their re-enactments by professional 
actors. In the course of the paper we will use the terms “authentic,” “play-acted,” and “realistic” 
according to the following definitions. “Authentic” is used for stimuli that are recorded in 
spontaneous non-staged, daily life situations, reflecting the expressions we use in our day-to-day 
emotion communication. The term does not reflect the physiological (affective) state or inner 
feelings of the encoder. “Play-acted” stimuli are recorded under the instruction, to transmit 
specific emotional information using a given wording, without an intrinsic motivation of the 





to be spontaneous. Our results showed that listeners were poor at identifying the encoding 
condition (that is whether the stimuli were authentic or play-acted). Furthermore, in contrast to 
the prediction that they are more stereotypical, play-acted expressions were not generally 
recognized more accurately (Drolet et al., 2012; Jürgens et al., 2013). Instead, we found a 
significant interaction between emotion category and encoding condition with anger being 
recognized more frequently when play-acted, while sadness was recognized more frequently 
when authentic. This effect has been replicated across different cultures (Jürgens et al., 2013). An 
imaging study comparing brain activation via BOLD response (blood oxygenation level dependent, 
measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging) of the authentic and play-acted stimuli 
showed that listening to the authentic but not to the play-acted stimuli activates the Theory of 
Mind network (ToM) (Drolet et al., 2012). The encoding condition of emotional stimuli thus 
interacts with neural processing, indicating its importance on human response behavior. 
A comparison of the acoustic structure revealed differences in articulation and a more 
variable pitch contour for play-acted stimuli, showing that measurable differences in the stimulus 
material between play-acting and authentic encoding condition exist (Jürgens et al., 2011). As we 
compared not only acting to non-acting but professional actors’ voices to normal people’s voices 
and speaking style, our results raised the question whether the effects referred to acting in 
general, or to the elaborated articulation of professional actors.  
Professional actors may produce emotional expressions that are more realistic than 
expressions by lay people (hereafter “non-actors”), due to their acting training (hypothesized by 
Krahmer & Swerts, 2008; K. R. Scherer & Bänziger, 2010). Specific acting styles include own 
feelings as part of the actors’ performance; these methods require extensive training and are 
supposed to increase realism, precisely because they rely on inner affective states, thereby 
emphasizing the advantage of using actors for creating emotional stimuli that resemble 
expressions in spontaneous situations (Enos & Hirschberg, 2006; Gosselin et al., 1995; K. R. 





 Actors, however, need to transmit their emotional expression to the back row of the 
theater, which might lead to overexpression (Kracauer, 2005) and their speech training may 
influence phonation and articulation in order to produce loud, intelligible, and persisting speech 
(Master, Debiase, Chiari, & Laukkanen, 2008; Nawka, Anders, Cebulla, & Zurakowski, 1997; Roy, 
Ryker, & Bless, 2000). Thus, professional actors may not necessarily produce more realistic 
emotional expressions compared to non-actors (see Krahmer & Swerts, 2008). Spackman, Brown, 
& Otto (2009) tested the influence of acting training on emotional expressions in voice comparing 
eight drama students with an inexperienced control group. An acoustic comparison revealed 
interaction effects between encoding conditions and the acoustic structure for single emotions. 
From the perspective of the listener, anger and fear stimuli produced by actors were recognized 
more accurately than those by laymen, but the reverse was true for happiness and sadness. 
Krahmer and Swerts (2008) induced positive and negative affective states in their participants via 
the Velten induction method (Velten, 1968) and compared the resulting facial expressions with 
portrayals by experienced theatre actors and non-actors. Contrary to their prediction, facial 
expressions by actors were perceived as the most intense. These studies indicate that 
professional actors may not be more suited to producing emotional expression than non-actors, 
at least when resemblance to spontaneous expressions is the goal. 
Our study aims to deepen the understanding of training effects on vocal expressions of 
emotions and to put them in relation to expressions produced in spontaneous situations. With 
this approach, we aim to advance the discussion about what differences concerning the effect of 
authenticity (Drolet et al., 2012; Jürgens et al., 2011; Jürgens et al., 2013) are due to acting per se 
and which might be due to the actors’ way of speaking.  
We formulated two opposing hypotheses: (1) If professional actors are more suited to 
producing realistic emotional expression through their acting training, we would predict that the 
acoustic structure of non-actors’ speech tokens deviate more from the authentic expressions than 





stereotypical and exaggerated and, thus, were more easily recognized as being play-acted. 
Recognition accuracies for the emotion categories would be the highest for the non-actors’ 
expressions. (2) If however, professional acting and speech training leads to different speech 
patterns, we would predict that expressions by professional actors differ from the other 
conditions, both in their acoustic structure and in their perception, while the differences between 
non-actors and authentic emotion expressions were negligible. Recognition accuracies both for 
authenticity recognition and emotion recognition would in this case be the highest for actors. 
Based on earlier research (Jürgens et al., 2011), we made clear predictions for the acoustic 
parameters. In the past decades acoustic parameters have been described that differentiate the 
expressions of different emotion categories (Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007; Juslin & Laukka, 
2001; K. R. Scherer, 1986). These parameters mirror the phonation (sound production) and the 
articulation process (modulation of sound via nasal and oral cavities) respectively. Highly aroused 
emotions such as anger, are spoken faster, less monotonously, more loudly, with more energy in 
the higher frequencies, more noise in the signal and in a higher fundamental frequency (pitch); 
while low aroused emotions such as sadness are spoken slower, monotonously, quietly, with 
more energy in the lower frequencies, with less noise, and in a lower fundamental frequency. 
Speed of speech, speech melody, fundamental frequency, harmonic-to-noise-ratio, and peak 
frequency are thus parameters that distinguish emotional speech and that are related to arousal 
differences in general (Juslin & Laukka, 2001; K. R. Scherer, 1986). In the previous study on the 
extensive acoustic analysis of the authentic and professionally acted expressions (Jürgens et al., 
2011), none of these parameters differed systematically between authentic and actors’ speech 
tokens, with the exception of peak frequency, which was found to be slightly lower in play-acted 
expressions and the more variable speech melody in acted portrayals. The most pronounced 
differences between actors and authentic speech tokens were the broader bandwidths of the first 
formants, the more dominant fundamental frequencies, both of which are not affected by 





2011). If non-actors’ portrayals were more exaggerated (and thus more aroused) than actors’ 
expressions, we would predict higher values for the arousal related parameters (fundamental 
frequency, speed of speech, peak frequency, harmonic-to-noise ratio, energy distribution, and 
pitch contour) in the non-actors condition. Additionally, the bandwidths of the first formant and 
the more dominant fundamental frequency should be even more pronounced. However, if the 
articulation and modulation differences are something related to the actors’ voice, we predict 




Authentic. The authentic speech recordings were selected from the database of a German 
radio station and were taken from interviews made while the individuals were talking about an 
emotionally charged on-going situation or describing their emotional state while recollecting a 
past event. 80 recordings were selected that had a good recording quality and a low amount of 
background noise. The selected recordings contained interviews in which the individuals 
expressed anger, fear, sadness, or happiness (specified via situation context and verbal content of 
the recordings). The radio recordings were then converted into wav files (sampling rate of 44.1 
kHz). From these interviews, short segments up to 5.5 s in length were cut and consisted of 
neutral verbal content that does not indicate any specific emotion. Neutral content was rated 
prior to the study by an additional set of 64 naïve participants. Only these short segments, which 
ranged from three words to half-sentences, were used for the study, such as “ -up to the 
crossbar” [German original: “bis zum Fensterkreuz”], “twice in a row and such” [“zweimal 
hintereinander und so”], and “read it again” [“lesen Sie es noch mal vor”]. The 80 speech 
segments were spoken by 78 speakers and consisted of 22 anger, 18 fear, 20 joy, and 20 sadness 
stimuli (half spoken by female speakers). The emotional content of the recordings (whether we 





analysis by a post-doctoral member of our research group. Recordings in which speakers were 
talking about a loss were categorized as sadness, while situations regarding winning and 
celebration were categorized as happiness. Recordings in which people reported or lived through 
a threatening event were grouped as fear and the ones in which people verbally attacked 
someone were grouped as anger. The selected recordings represented a broad variety of emotion 
situations and emotion intensities. We could neither exclude the possibility of mixed emotions by 
the sender nor could we control their actual physiological affective state. However, our focus was 
on the natural communication of emotion that is seldom clearly distinct and controlled. The 
recording instructions of the actors and non-actors were adjusted to allow for comparable mixed 
expressions. Examples of the stimuli and of the context situations are found in the Appendix. 
Play-acted expressions. Professionally play-acted stimuli (hereafter stimuli produced by 
“actors”) were produced by 21 male and 21 female actors (M age = 31 years, SD = 7.9, age range = 
21 - 48 years), 30 of them were professional actors who mainly worked on stage, 11 were acting 
students at the end of their education and one was a professional singer with acting experience. 
All of the actors had taken part in professional acting training. They were asked to enact one to 
three of the authentic recordings. Most of them (33 of 41) reproduced two original recordings 
with the same intended emotion that is two times anger, or two times joy, respectively. The 
actors used an information sheet (indicating the gender of the speaker, a situational description, 
and a transcription of the spoken text, including the respective text segment later used for the 
study) and were told to express the text in their own way. The respective emotion was mentioned 
in the situational description (e.g., “…She said full of joy…, …an inhabitant reports her fears…, she 
reports her pain and her sadness…, he got terribly agitated…”). This allows mixed emotions and 
different intensities expressed by the actors to mirror the recording condition of the authentic 
expressions. The actors were instructed not to speak in their stage voice, to imagine the situation 
and to feel into it. The short segment that was later used for the study was not known to the 





expression they considered to be most successful. The recordings were made with a Marantz 
Professional Portable Solid State Recorder (Marantz, Kenagawa, Japan) with a sample rate of 44.1 
kHz, a sampling depth of 16 bit and a Sennheiser directional microphone (Sennheiser, Wedemark, 
Germany, K6 power module and ME64 recording head).  
Non-professionally play-acted recordings (“non-actors”) were recorded similarly. Twenty 
women and 19 men (M age = 45 years, SD = 14.8, age range = 21 – 67 years) were recruited via 
postings at a university notice board and by recruitment in the second authors’ circle of 
acquaintances. The sample of non-actors consists of students, teachers, and normal employees. 
The non-professional actors were thus older on average than the professional actors; however, 
age classes could not be determined for the authentic speakers. Ten of the speakers indicated 
experiences in amateur theatre groups (like school theatres), but none of them received 
professional acting training. Recordings were made using the same procedure and the same 
transcriptions as for the actors and were made with a Field Memory Recorder (Fostex, Tokyo, 
Japan, FR-2LE) and a Sennheiser directional microphone (Sennheiser, Wedemark, Germany, K6 
power module and ME64 recording head) with a sampling frequency of 44.1 kHz and a 16 bit 
sampling depth. To reduce category effects between authentic and play-acted stimuli, both the 
professional and the non-professional re-enactments were partly recorded outside with varying 
background noise, as the radio recordings also varied in their background noise. 
For all three conditions, the recordings were edited with AvisoftSASLab Pro Version 5.1 
(AvisoftBioacustics, Berlin, Germany) to cut the short segments used for the study out of the 
longer interviews. The final stimulus set consisted of 240 short text segments (80 authentic, 80 
professional play-acted, and 80 non-professional play-acted) with non-emotional text content 
(e.g., “up to the crossbar”) flanked by 0.5 s silences. The mean duration of all stimuli was 1.87 sec 
(SD = 1.29, range: 0.327- 8.03 sec). Duration did not vary between the encoding conditions (M 
authentic = 1.89 s, M actors = 1.95 s, M non-actors = 1.79 s, linear mixed model comparison χ² = 






Design. The 240 stimuli were divided into four sets of 60 stimuli made up of 20 
“authentic” stimuli, 20 “actors,” and 20 “non-actors” expressions so that subjects were not 
confronted with the same sentence spoken by the authentic speaker, the actor, and the non-
actor, in order to avoid a direct comparison of sentences. The 60 stimuli of one set were selected 
in such a way that there was neither a repetition of one specific stimulus (e.g., an authentic 
stimulus and the same stimulus re-enacted by an actor) nor a repetition of one speaker in one set. 
Each participant listened thus to only one fourth of the whole stimulus material. 
The rating experiment was performed using the program NBS Presentation 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Albany, California). Participants had to evaluate each of the 60 
stimuli in regards to the specific vocal expression of emotion and to authenticity. During the 
experiment they either had to rate whether the stimulus represents “anger” [German original: 
Wut], ”fear” [Angst], ”sadness” [Trauer], or “joy” [Freude] (emotion recognition), and whether it 
is “play-acted” [gespielt], or “authentic” [echt] (authenticity recognition). The sets were pseudo-
randomized to avoid serial repetition of trial order (order of the emotion and authenticity 
judgment task) more often than two times, of encoding condition (“authentic,“ “non-actors,” or 
“actors”) more often than two times, and of intended emotion more often than three times. This 
was done to reduce any systematic or pattern-related effects. In addition, the order of the four 
possible emotion-responses (“joy,” “anger,” “fear,” and “sadness”) and the two possible 
authenticity-responses (“authentic” and “play-acted”) was counterbalanced per participants to 
avoid enhancement of a specific response by preferential effects for a specific response button. 
Participants and experimental procedure. Participants for the rating experiment were 
recruited in the Cafeteria of the Georg-August-University of Göttingen and at the German Primate 
Center, Göttingen, Germany. They were all native German speakers. Two-hundred and twenty-
eight subjects participated (69 female and 59 male) in the rating experiment. The subjects were 





subjects. Eighty of the subjects were between 18 and 24 years of age, 36 between 25 and 29 
years, seven between 30 and 34 years and five subjects 35 years or older. 
The stimuli were played back with a laptop (Toshiba Satellite M70-187 with a Realtek 
AC97 Soundcard) via NBS Presentation. Subjects heard the stimuli via earphones (Sennheiser HD 
448 and HD 280 pro). Before the experiment started, subjects read a description about their task 
and the experimental procedure. All remaining questions were answered before the experiment 
started, after which there was no further interaction between participant and experimenter and 
the trials were played back automatically by Presentation as defined in the script. 
Ethics. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Georg-Elias-Müller-
Institute of Psychology (University Göttingen). Professional and non-professional actors 
consented to the use of their shortened recordings in our rating experiment and to the 
anonymous acoustic analysis. Professional actors were paid 20 Euros for their participation. The 
non-professional actors and the participants of the rating experiment received candy bars for 
their participation. For the rating study, we did not obtain informed consent as data was collected 
and analyzed anonymously. 
 
Acoustic Analysis 
The acoustic analysis was conducted on two levels – on single vowels (Level 1) and on the 
short speech sequence (Level 2). Level 1) Vowels (a, e, i) were cut out of the speech tokens to 
obtain comparable units. For these vowels, we calculated the mean fundamental frequency (F0), 
the harmonic-to-noise-ratio, the frequency with the highest amplitude (peak frequency), the 
bandwidth of the first formant (hereafter “first formant”) and the amplitude ratio between third 
frequency band and F0 (hereafter “amplitude ratio”). All measurements were conducted using 
the spectrogram analysis software LMA (Lautmusteranalyse, developed by K. Hammerschmidt), 
except the first formant that was analyzed using Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2009). We used this 





articulation (peak frequency, first formant, amplitude ratio). Furthermore, they are independent 
of each other, known to be affected by emotions (F0, harmonic-to-noise ratio, and peak 
frequency) and were already used in the comparison between the professional actors and the 
authentic recordings (see Jürgens et al., 2011). 
Level 2) We measured the speech tempo and the variability of the F0-contour for the 
entire speech tokens that were used in the rating experiment. To determine the speech tempo, 
we calculated the speech rate (syllables/sec including pauses) and the articulation rate 
(syllables/sec excluding pauses). The variability of the F0-contour was measured via the standard 
deviation of the F0 for each speech token. All measurements were done manually using 




Recognition of encoding condition. The statistical analysis was done using R (R 
Developmental Core Team, 2012). Pure recognition rates reflect the behavior of the listener, but 
do not mirror the listeners’ actual ability to distinguish the categories. High recognition rates in 
one condition might simply be caused by the participant’s bias to only or preferentially choose the 
respective response category. Therefore, we calculated unbiased hit rates according to Wagner 
(1993). Unbiased hit rates reflect the probability of one participant that a stimulus is correctly 
recognized and that a response is correctly given, thus incorporating individual biases in response 
behavior. We tested the effect of emotion (“anger,” “fear,” “sadness,” or “joy”), encoding 
condition (“authentic,” “actors,” or “non-actors”) and their interaction on the recognition of 
encoding condition establishing a Linear mixed model (lmer function of the lme4 R package Bates, 
Maechler, & Bolker., 2011). As “actors” and “non-actors” provided two to three stimuli to the 
dataset, we had to deal with the dependency among our data. For the rating experiment, we 





actor. We then included participant-ID and stimulus block (1 to 4, representing the set, in which 
the stimulus was presented) as random effects into the statistical model to account for the 
influence of these variables. Participant gender was added as a fixed factor, while speakers’ 
gender was not, as the calculation of individually unbiased hit rates incorporated every stimulus 
presented to one participant. Unbiased hit rates are proportions and were thus arcsine 
transformed prior to the analysis. The full model was compared to the null model (only including 
intercept and random factors) using a likelihood ratio test (function anova with the test argument 
“Chisq”), to establish the significance of the full model. The interaction effect of both categorical 
predictors was also tested using a likelihood ratio test. Afterwards, we conducted twelve post–
hoc comparisons for all emotions between the three encoding conditions using the function glht 
(from the package multcomp Hothorn et al., 2008). P-values were adjusted using a Bonferroni 
correction. 
Following the suggestion by Wagner, we calculated for every participant the chance 
probability that a stimulus is recognized correctly and compared the unbiased hit rates to the 
chance levels. The statistical model was built with hit rates as the response variable, type of hit 
rate (unbiased or chance), encoding condition and emotion as fixed factors, as well as participant-
ID as a random effect. The full model was compared to the null model; post-hoc tests for type of 
hit rate (chance or unbiased hit rate) regarding every condition were done using the glht function, 
p-values were Bonferroni corrected. 
Emotion recognition. Similar to the recognition of encoding condition, we calculated 
unbiased hit rates as well as the respective chance probabilities for the emotion recognition. The 
analysis followed the procedure mentioned above for the recognition of encoding condition. 
Acoustic structure of vowels. Altogether we included 1176 vowels into the analysis, 
divided into 446 by authentic speakers, 346 by actors, and 384 by non-actors. We analyzed the 
acoustic parameters separately for vowels a, e, and i as a previous study revealed interaction 





parameters F0, harmonic-to-noise ratio, peak frequency, amplitude ratio, and bandwidth of the 
first formant (hence first formant) were tested using linear mixed models (LMMs). Emotion, 
encoding condition, speaker’s gender, and the interaction between emotion and encoding 
condition were entered as fixed factors. As random effects, we included speaker-ID and stimulus-
text. Normal distribution and homogeneity of residuals were tested by inspecting Quartile-
Quartile-Plots (QQ-plots) and residual plots. For the following acoustic parameters (a, e, and i) a 
deviation of assumptions was found and they were thus log transformed: the amplitude ratio, the 
peak frequency, and the first formant. We then compared the full models to the null models 
(function anova test argument “Chisq”) to establish significance of the models. We tested for 
interaction effects by comparing the model including the interaction with the model excluding the 
interaction and used the reduced model when appropriate (function anova test argument 
“Chisq”). Main effects for fixed factors were also tested by model comparisons. We treated the 
acoustic parameters separately and adjusted the p-values with a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple testing within the three vowels. Finally, we conducted a post-hoc analysis for the 
acoustic parameters that were affected by encoding condition (function glht with Bonferroni 
adjustment for all possible comparisons). 
Speed of speech. We tested the influence of emotion, encoding condition and their 
interaction on both speech rate and articulation rate by using linear mixed models (lmer from the 
package lme4). Stimulus text and speaker-ID was entered as a random effect. The assumptions of 
normal distribution and homogeneous residuals were tested by inspecting the QQ-plots and the 
residual plots. We then compared the full model to the null model using the likelihood ratio test 
of the function anova (test function “Chiq”).  
Pitch variability. We tested the influence of encoding condition on the F0-standard 
deviation (F0-SD) by using linear mixed models (lmer from the package lme4). We included 
encoding condition as predictor and stimulus text and speaker-ID as random effect into the model. 





normal distribution and homogeneous residuals were tested by inspecting the QQ-plots and the 
residual plots. The variability of pitch contour depends strongly on the type of sentence (that is 
exclamatory or interrogative sentence, beginning, or end of a sentence) or on stimuli length. 
Therefore, different sentences cannot be compared without restrictions. For the encoding 
condition, we could compare the same sentence across different modalities (as every sentence 
was present in every condition), which could not be done for the emotion effects. Hence, emotion 
was not regarded as a predictor for this analysis. We compared the full model to the null model 
(test anova, test function “Chisq”) to look for an effect of encoding condition on F0-SD and used 




Recognition of encoding condition. Encoding condition was correctly classified in 59.8% 
of all cases. The authentic recordings were recognized correctly as being authentic in 72.7% of all 
cases, while the actors’ recordings were recognized as being play-acted in 57.5%, and the non-
actors’ recordings in 49.1% of all cases. The comparison to the null model established an overall 
effect of the predictors on unbiased hit rates (χ² = 314.31, df = 12, p < .001). Additionally, an 
interaction effect between emotion and encoding condition was found (interaction: χ² = 46.684, 
df = 6, p < .001, Figure 1). Post-hoc tests revealed that authentic speech tokens were recognized 
as such with the highest accuracy, regardless of the emotion category. Actors’ expressions were 
recognized more accurately than the non-actors’ expression, but only for anger, fear, and joy 
stimuli (Table 3.1, Figure 3.1). Participant gender (χ² = 0.2156, df = 1, p = .642) had no effect on 
the recognition of the encoding condition. The recognition rates were generally quite low, 
indicating a poor ability to judge encoding condition. In fact, recordings by non-actors of anger, 
fear, and joy were not recognized above chance level (post-hoc comparison for anger: z = 2.071, p 





above chance (all z > 3.660, p < .003). In sum, the encoding condition was only poorly recognized 
by the participants, but nevertheless differed between encoding conditions. Although the 
authentic stimuli were recognized at a higher rate than the acted stimuli, both acting conditions 
were often misjudged as being authentic as well. The portrayals by non-actors were significantly 
more frequently misjudged as being authentic than the expressions by professional actors.  
 
 Recognition of emotion. The different emotions were correctly recognized in 44.7% of 
cases, with a recognition accuracy of 46% for authentic stimuli, 45% for actors’ recordings and 
43% for non-actors’ recordings. Regarding the recognition accuracy (unbiased hit rates), the full 
model, including emotion, encoding condition and their interaction, was significantly different 
from the null model (χ² = 251.55, df = 12, p < .001). Furthermore, we found a significant 
interaction between emotion and encoding condition (χ² = 30.565, df = 6, p < .001) (Figure 3.1). 
Post-hoc-tests between “authentic,” “actors,” and “non-actors” for all four emotions revealed 
that professionally acted anger was recognized better than authentic anger, while the reverse was 
true for joy and sadness. Non-actors’ expressions showed a less accurate sadness recognition than 
the authentic speech tokens (Table 3.1). Overall, unbiased hit rates for expressions by 
professional actors were similar to the ones by non-actors, while both differed from the 
Figure 3.1 Recognition of encoding 
condition (A) and emotion 
recognition (B) across all conditions. 
A) Unbiased hit rates for recognition 
of encoding condition (responding 
“authentic” when the stimulus is 
authentic, “play-acted” when 
stimulus is either from actors or 
non-actors), given as mean values ± 
SEM. B) Unbiased hit rates for the 
emotion classification (mean values 
± SEM). X marks the mean chance 
levels per condition. Asterisks refer 
to the significance level . < .1; * p < 
.05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Asterisks at the bottom of the bars 
indicate differences between 






expressions in the “authentic” condition. No effect of participant gender on the emotion 
recognition was found (χ² = 0.2601, df = 1, p =.610). Unbiased hit rates were very low, but differed 
in every emotion condition from the individual chance level, even in the fear condition (post-hoc 
comparison for every condition, unbiased hit rates – chance level: z > 4.94, p <.001). Fear was 





Post-hoc comparisons for recognition of encoding condition and emotion (unbiased hit rates). 
 









anger authentic actors 0.00848 0.002049 4.138 <.001*** 
  authentic non-actors 0.01520 0.002049 7.418 <.001*** 
  actors non-actors 0.00672 0.002049 3.279 .013* 
 fear authentic actors 0.01057 0.002049 5.159 <.001*** 
  authentic non-actors 0.02029 0.002049 9.901 <.001*** 
  actors non-actors 0.00972 0.002049 4.743 <.001*** 
 joy authentic actors 0.00545 0.002049 2.661 .094 
  authentic non-actors 0.01795 0.002049 8.76 <.001*** 
  actors  non-actors 0.01250 0.002049 6.099 <.001*** 
 sadness authentic actors 0.00800 0.002049 3.902 .001** 
  authentic non-actors 0.00772 0.002049 3.769 .002** 
    actors non-actors -0.00027 0.002049 -0.133 1 
Emotion anger authentic actors -0.01111 0.002314 -4.8 <.001*** 
  authentic non-actors -0.00465 0.002314 -2.009 .535 
  actors non-actors 0.00646 0.002314 2.792 .063. 
 fear authentic actors 0.00116 0.002314 0.501 1 
  authentic non-actors 0.00405 0.002314 1.749 .964 
  actors non-actors 0.00289 0.002314 1.248 1 
 joy authentic actors 0.76010 0.002314 3.285 .012* 
  authentic non-actors 0.00464 0.002314 2.005 .539 
  actors  non-actors -0.00296 0.002314 -1.28 1 
 sadness authentic actors 0.00776 0.002314 3.353 .0096** 
  authentic non-actors 0.00886 0.002314 3.829 .0016** 
    actors non-actors 0.00110 0.002314 0.47 1 
Asterisks mark the significance level .<.1; *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001 
a
Based on arscine transformed data 
b









Acoustic structure of vowels. The variables in the analysis were affected by encoding 
condition, emotion, and gender (comparison of full models with null models; all χ² > 29.381, df = 
12, p < .01), except for the first formant (vowels “e” and “i”) (Chi-statistics lower than χ² = 12.713, 
df = 12, p = 1). We found no interaction between emotion and encoding condition in any of the 
acoustic parameters (Chi-statistics lower than χ² = 7.65, df = 6, p = .7). Figure 3.2 shows the 
pattern of the acoustic variables in the different conditions. The acoustic profiles of all three 




Results of the linear mixed models on the acoustic structure of vowels 
 
    Emotion
a







Parameter Vowel χ²(3) p
b
  χ²(2) p
b
  χ²(1) p
b
 Estimates ± SE
c
 
F0 a 15.34 .005**  0.42 1  43.56 <.001*** 70.49 ± 9.72 
 e 15.02 .005**  0.86 1  45.07 <.001*** 69.72 ± 9.30 
 i 14.48 .007**  3.41 .540  32.12 <.001*** 70.18 ± 11.46 
HNR a 1.35 1  1.28 1  21.15 <.001*** 0.046 ± 0.01 
 e 3.32 1  0.19 1  22.99 <.001*** 0.045 ± 0.009 
 i 11.91 .023*  2.59 .822  41.78 <.001*** 0.076 ± 0.010 
Amplitude ratio a 5.61 .397  52.07 <.001***  5.09 .072 -0.221 ± 0.099
d
 
 e 1.74 1  26.15 <.001***  27.61 <.001*** -0.651 ± 0.117
d
 
 i 11.65 .026*  3.79 .450  32.44 <.001*** -1.028 ± 0.164
d
 
Peak Frequency a 21.42 <.001***  24.22 <.001***  0.76 1 0.067 ± 0.0774
d
 
 e 8.13 .13  17.53 <.001***  6.99 .024* 0.169 ± 0.064
d
 
 i 0.55 1  24.58 <.001***  6.50 .032* 0.121 ± 0.048
d
 
First formant a 4.66 .198   19.08 <.001***   5.00 .025* 0.190 ± 0.086
d
 
Asterisks mark the significance level .<.1; *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001 
a
Statistical values are obtained from the model comparison (full model to reduced model excluding the respective 
predictor).  
b
p-value adjustments (Bonferroni correction) were done for the different vowels within one acoustic parameter and 
one predictor. 
c
Estimates for the predictor gender were gained from the LMM, with male speakers included in the intercept. Estimates 
refer to the female speakers in comparison to the male speakers. 
d







Notably, acoustic differences were putatively related to articulation. Specifically, 
amplitude ratio, peak frequency, and the bandwidth of the first formant (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2) 
varied between “authentic,” “actors,” and “non-actors” recordings. The professional actors’ 
speech tokens differed most strongly from the other two encoding conditions. The authentic and 
the non-actors’ recordings also varied between each other, although they deviated in a similar 
way from the actors’ speech tokens. For instance, professional actors had a lower amplitude ratio 
(referring to a pronounced F0 and a less intense third frequency band) and wider bandwidths of 
the first formant compared to the “authentic” and the “non-actor” expressions; “authentic” and 
“non-actors” did not differ in their formant bandwidths, but “non-actors” vowels possessed 
higher amplitude ratios than the “authentic” ones (see Table 3.3 for the results of the post-hoc 
analysis). To sum up, the acoustic structure varied between “authentic,” “actors,” or “non-actors” 
recordings, but encoding condition affected other variables than those affected by emotion (see 
below).  
The factor emotion influenced the parameters F0 and peak frequency, as well as to a 
lesser degree the harmonic-to-noise (for vowel “i”) and the amplitude ratios (for vowel “i”). Anger 
stimuli deviated most strongly from the other emotions by possessing higher F0 and peak 
frequencies (Figure 3.2). Speaker gender influenced the acoustic structure of vowels most strongly 
(Table 3.2). Women spoke with a higher F0 and peak frequency, increased bandwidths of the first 













Results of the post-hoc analyses on the influence of encoding condition on the acoustic structure of vowels  
 
Parameter Vowel Encoding condition Estimate SE z-value pa 
Amplitude Ratio a authentic  actor 0.552 0.115 4.949 <.001*** 
  authentic  non-actor -0.423 0.109 -3.895 <.001*** 
  actors  non-actors -0.975 0.123 -7.941 <.001*** 
 e authentic  actor 0.385 0.121 3.177 .004** 
  authentic  non-actor -0.323 0.125 -2.591 .029* 
  actors  non-actors -0.709 0.133 -5.323 <.001*** 
Peak frequency a authentic  actor 0.196b 0.077b 2.550 .0323 
  authentic  non-actor -0.231
b 0.075b -3.093 .006** 
  actors  non-actors -0.428
b 0.084b -5.077 <.001*** 
 e authentic  actor 0.103
b 0.567b 1.814 .209 
  authentic  non-actor -0.163
b 0.058b -2.798 .015* 
  actors  non-actors -0.266
b 0.063b -4.243 <.001*** 
 i authentic  actor 0.022
b  0.050b 0.450 1 
  authentic  non-actor -0.206
b 0.045b -4.555 <.001*** 
  actors  non-actors -0.229
b 0.052b -4.381 <.001*** 
First formant a authentic  actor -0.444b 0.105b -4.299 <.001*** 
  authentic  non-actor -0.052
b 0.102b -0.511 1 
    actors  non-actors 0.392b 0.114b 3.442  .002** 
Asterisks mark the significance level .<.1; *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001 
a
Adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) 
b















Speed of speech. Speech rate and articulation rate were not affected by the three 
encoding conditions, the four emotion categories, or their interaction (comparison of full with null 
model: speech rate χ² = 9.2631, df = 11, p = .598; articulation rate χ² = 5.797, df = 11, p = .887, 
Figure 3.3).  
 
 Pitch variability. Pitch variability (F0-SD) was affected by encoding condition (χ² = 13.48, 
df = 2, p = .001). The post-hoc comparison revealed a flatter prosody in authentic speech 
compared to both acting conditions (authentic – actors: estimates (log transformed data) ± SE = -
0.3114 ± 0.097, z = -2.879, p = .012; authentic – non-actors: -0.375 ± 0.109, z = -3.45, p = .002, 
non-actors – actors: 0.063 ± 0.116, z = 0.547, p = 1). Pitch variability for authentic speech was 
23.24 Hz (± 1.94 Hz SEM), while actors speech was characterized by a variability of 31.00 Hz (± 
2.41 Hz SEM), and non-actors speech by 33.07 Hz (± 2.36 Hz SEM).  
Figure 3.3 Speech tempo for the 
different encoding conditions and 
emotion categories. Mean ± SEM is 








In terms of their acoustic characteristics, vocal expressions of emotions delivered by 
professional actors were not more similar to authentic expressions than the ones by non-actors. 
Moreover, vocal expressions by professional actors and non-actors evoked similar recognition 
patterns. Thus, our findings do not support the hypothesis that compared to non-actors, 
professional actors have a superior ability to produce emotional portrayals that resemble 
spontaneous expressions (hypothesis 1). Our results furthermore do not support the view that 
play-acted expressions in general, and the ones by non-professional actors in particular, are 
necessarily stereotyped caricatures of authentic expressions. The lack of an interaction between 
encoding condition and emotion in the acoustic variables we analyzed indicates that emotions 
were expressed in a similar fashion in all of the three recording types (but see Spackman et al., 
2009 for contrasting results).  
Nevertheless, we found acoustic differences between the encoding conditions. Acting in 
general was distinguished from the authentic recordings by a more variable speech melody (see 
also Audibert et al., 2010; Williams & Stevens. 1972). Interestingly, high variability in pitch contour 
has been related to more aroused emotions, such as anger, while low variability characterize less 
aroused expressions such as sadness (Juslin & Laukka, 2003; K. R. Scherer, 1986). The different 
intonation may thus interact with emotion perception, which might explain the differences in 
emotion recognition for authentic speakers, actors and non-actors. The variable speech melody in 
play-acted expressions might be confounded with anger perception, affecting the high recognition 
rates for play-acted anger. Low variability on the other hand might be misinterpreted as sadness, 
and facilitates the sadness recognition for authentic speech tokens. 
As in previous studies, the recognition of encoding condition was rather low (Drolet et al., 
2012; Jürgens et al,. 2013; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). Listeners were thus unable to reliably 
recognize whether an expression was acted or not. Expressions by experienced actors were rated 





acted” above chance level. The differences in articulation supports this notion, as acoustic profiles 
of non-actors’ speech resembled the structure of authentic speech tokens, while the acoustic 
profiles of professional actors differed from the other two categories. The acoustic differences of 
vowels between the encoding conditions might be caused by variation in articulation, as a result 
of speech training, rather than on differences in emotion encoding between acting and 
spontaneous expression. These results indicate that acting training interacts with the perception 
of authenticity and supports hypothesis 2 (see also Krahmer & Swerts, 2008). 
Although listeners appear to process some of the acoustic variation between encoding 
conditions implicitly (Drolet et al., 2012, 2014), they appeared to be unable to use these cues for 
recognizing the encoding condition, as evidenced by the poor hit rates. One important open 
question is the source of variation in speech melody, specifically whether it is due to acting, or to 
variation between speaking styles, such as reading (Batliner, Kompe, Kießling, Nöth & Nieman, 
1995; Eskenazi, 1992; Laan, 1997). Considering that during the acting conditions the actors and 
non-actors were not asked to learn the sentences by heart, the differences may also reflect the 
reading and not the acting process. Future studies will be needed to clarify this issue. 
The effect of emotion on the acoustic structure is consistent with the literature 
(Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007; K. R. Scherer, 2003), although effect sizes (as well as the 
corresponding recognition rates) for both the acted and spontaneous expressions were weak 
compared to previous studies on vocal expressions (Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007; Laukka et 
al., 2005; K. R. Scherer, 2003). Our speech tokens were not preselected and were taken from long 
text sequences in which not all of the words were equally emotionally accentuated (in contrast to 
studies in which only one word was expressed emotionally). This procedure seems suitable for 
avoiding exaggerated portrayals and thus increasing realism of play-acted expressions. The low 
emotional content may reflect the actual emotionality transmitted via speech (in contrast to 
emotional outbursts) and emphasized the importance of studying realistic expressions to 





The fact that vocal expressions of emotions are so easily play-acted, without being 
detected as such, contributes to the discussion about the reliability of emotional expressions. The 
question is whether emotion expressions need to be tied to specific affective states including 
subjective feeling or physiological changes. (Dezecache et al., 2013; Fernández-Dols & Crivelli, 
2013; Mehu & Scherer, 2012). For facial expressions, the Duchenne smile (smiling including the 
zygomaticus major and the orbicularis oculi muscle) was suggested to signal felt happiness only, 
while smiles without activation of the orbicularis oculi were classified as faked (Ekman et al., 
1990). Recent studies, however, demonstrated the common use of Duchenne smiles in acted 
expressions (Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009, for discussion Riediger, Studtmann, Westphal, 
Rauers, & Weber, 2014). As noted above, we did not measure physiological state, or subjective 
feelings of our spontaneous speakers and do not claim to test coherence between feelings and 
expressions. However, the general similarity in expression patterns in the three encoding 
conditions is in keeping with the view that in humans, expressions of emotions can be successfully 
decoupled from subjective feelings (Fernández-Dols & Crivelli, 2013).  
As in every study using daily life data, our study does suffer from some limitations, mostly 
due to the nature of our authentic expressions being recorded by radio reporters. For this reason, 
we were unable to create fully comparable stimuli. The recording quality of real-life situations 
may be substantially worse compared to the play-acted ones. We did, however, try to obtain play-
acted recordings under a variety of acoustic conditions. If the higher recognition rates for 
authentic stimuli were simply explained by the recording quality, play-acted expressions would 
have had much higher recognition rates than they actually did (for other studies finding a bias to 
preferentially choose authentic see Gosselin et al., 1995; Jürgens et al., 2013; Levine et al., 1999). 
In any case, our current study aimed to compare play-acted expressions by trained professional 
actors and non-actors and these recording conditions were equivalent. Another limiting aspect is 
the fact that our sample of decoders consisted mainly of students, thus being rather 





authentic and professionally acted stimuli were rated by students from three different cultures 
(Germany, Romania, and Indonesia) (Jürgens et al., 2013). All three study populations showed 
highly similar rating patterns, suggesting that some of our findings may be generalizable. On the 
other hand, our sample of speakers was rather heterogeneous, with non-actors being older than 
the professional actors. Previous studies showed that decoders are generally more accurate in 
judging expressions from their own age category, while older encoders are supposed to express 
emotions less distinctly (Borod et al., 2004; Riediger, Voelkle, Ebner, & Lindenberger, 2011), both 
suggesting an advantage for the younger encoder group (“actors”). This effect does not appear to 
be strong in our sample, as both acting conditions were rated similarly, despite the age difference 
of the speakers. One advantage of our stimulus set is the high number of speakers, which 
minimizes the probability that our results are based on individual differences between speakers 
rather than on the group differences. Future studies should focus on individual differences in 
emotion encoding to disentangle the effects of age, gender, non-professional acting experience, 
voice use, and even current mood of speakers on the play-acting of emotion, factors that we 
could not consider in our analysis.  
In summary, our study centered on methodological issues that may have strong effects on 
the interpretation of previous results, and are relevant for the planning of future studies. We 
showed that compared to professional actors, non-actors are equally capable of transmitting 
emotional information via the voice when asked to portray an emotion; additionally non-actors’ 
expressions were perceived as more realistic. For future studies, recordings of daily life emotion 
expressions should clearly be preferred, but recording spontaneous emotion behavior is 
unfortunately rarely possible. As an alternative, our findings on vocal expressions speak for the 







3.1 Examples of transcripts and stimulus texts used for the play-acted recordings (taken from 
Jürgens et al., 2011, Appendix 1). 
Only the words in quotation marks were used for the rating study and the acoustic analysis. 
 
 Male Spoken Anger 
Context 
Two fighting dogs attacked 6-year-old V. in the schoolyard. He was bitten to death. Fighting dogs 
are a big problem in the area and people do not feel protected by the police. They are furious and 
are looking for a culprit. The anger is directed to the police. The people are shouting at a police 
officer, blaming him for being too late. 
Man: 
Original (German): Der Kiosk ruft vor Viertelstund an, “nach Viertelstund“ kommt ihr erst, oder 
was?” 
Translation: The kiosk called 15 minutes ago, you only come “after 15 minutes” or what? 
 
 Female Spoken Sadness 
Context 
The 73-year-old W. was attacked in his shop by two 16-year-old boys. He was robbed and stabbed 
to death. It is the date of the funeral. A weeping woman reports. 
Woman: 
Original (German): “Ich kenn den 43 Jahr.“ Und er war für uns alle ein Freund. Und ich finde das 
furchtbar, was da passiert ist. 
Translation: “I have known him for 43 years”. And he was a friend, for all of us. And I think what 





 Male Spoken Joy 
Context 
The Fall of the Berlin Wall. A citizen of the German Democratic Republic reports excitedly and 
happily about the border crossing. 
Man: 
Original (German): Vorhin haben sie noch einzeln durchgelassen. Dann haben sie das Tor 
aufgemacht, “und jetzt konnten wir alle“ so, wie wir waren, ohne vorzeigen, ohne alles, konnten 
wir gehen. 
Translation: Previously they let the people pass individually. Then they opened the gate and “now 
we could all”, as we were, without showing anything, without everything, we could go. 
 
 Female Spoken Fear 
Context 
The hundred year flood at the Oder threatens whole villages. The water is rising and an inhabitant 
of an especially low-lying house reports her fears. 
Woman: 
Original (German): Grade unser Haus liegt ziemlich tief. Also 1947 stand das Wasser da schon “bis 
zum Fensterkreuz“. Und wenn das noch schlimmer werden sollte, schätz ich, dass das Haus bald 
gar nicht mehr zu sehen ist im Wasser. Ja, ich hab ganz dolle Angst 
Translation: Especially our house lies pretty low. Well, 1947 the water was already “up to the 
window crossbar”. And if it should get worse, I guess, that the house won’t be visible anymore in 
the water. Yes, I am very much afraid. 
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Similarity between two individuals may immediately create a social connection that 
positively affects their interaction. Sharing this connection putatively leads to a more attentive 
processing of social signals and might increase empathic concern. This study addresses the 
question to which degree such social links have an effect on the recognition of emotions in human 
speech, to test the hypothesis that facilitated empathic concern induce more accurate emotion 
recognition. We aimed to investigate whether manipulated similarity in terms of biographical data 
between a fictive speaker and the participant, increases the recognition of vocal emotion 
expressions and intensifies emotional engagement. Experiment 1 concentrated on vocal emotion 
recognition, while Experiment 2 integrated autonomic measures (pupil size and skin conductance) 
to investigate emotional engagement. As a control, we additionally investigated the processing of 
affective sounds like dentist drills or baby cries. In experiment 3, we investigated the effect of 
cognitive load on emotion recognition. Surprisingly, we found no effect of similarity on emotion 
recognition. Autonomic reactions to angry and joyful vocal expressions were in general low 
compared to the processing of affective sounds. Pupil dilation however differed in response to 
emotion categories, for both vocal expressions and sounds. Our findings revealed that biographic 
similarity may not necessarily affect emotion processing and that brief excerpts of vocal 
expressions alone may not trigger perceptible autonomic reactions. Future studies should make 
use of a more holistic approach when investigating emotional engagement. 
 
  





Sharing attitudes, interests, and personal characteristics with another person may 
immediately create a social link (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004; Miller, Downs, & 
Prentice, 1998; Vandenbergh, 1972; Walton et al., 2012). Similarity, even with regard to such 
irrelevant pieces of information as the date of birth, increases the willingness to help (Burger, 
Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004), to cooperate (Miller et al., 1998), to adopt the goal 
and motivation of others (Walton et al., 2012) as well as to share their emotions (Cwir et al., 
2011). Even in narrative settings, our perception and evaluation of fictive characters is strongly 
influenced by perceived similarity (Maccoby & Wilson, 1957; Raney, 2004). As cognitive resources 
are limited, humans seem to selectively allocate their attention in interpersonal exchanges 
towards individuals of relevance (Ackerman et al., 2006). We here address the question whether 
this positive effect of social connectedness facilitates the recognition of emotion expressions in 
others and whether facilitation is caused by an attention-shift or by increased empathic concern. 
The recognition of emotions in others is an integral aspect of interpersonal exchange. We 
interact differently with people, in which we recognize anger or happiness, respectively. Emotions 
may be expressed by the face (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; K. R. Scherer & Ellgring, 2007), body 
postures (De Gelder & Van den Stock, 2011), or the voice (Banse & Scherer, 1996; 
Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007). Importantly, emotions are not only recognized in others, but 
are probably also shared between both interaction partners – humans “catch the emotion” of 
others (Hatfield et al., 2011). Attending to emotion expressions may induce congruent facial 
muscle movements (called facial mimicry, Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012), or 
influence subjective experience (Wild et al. 2001). This mirroring of someone else’s emotional 
state may be mediated via automatic processes of emotional contagion or via more deliberate, 
conscious processes of empathy (Preston & de Waal, 2002). Emotional contagion and empathy 
are presumed to be of importance for understanding the inner affective state of others (Goldman 




the link between facial mimicry, subjective experience, and the recognition of emotional 
expressions (Künecke et al., 2014; Sato et al., 2013, but see Blairy et al., 1999). While empathy 
might occur in a wide range of situations, it has been revealed that the strength of an empathic 
response is influenced by appraisal processes and is not just an automatic reaction (de Vignemont 
& Singer, 2006; Preston & de Waal, 2002). People do seemingly not empathize equally with 
everyone, but show increased reactions towards people that are more relevant for them, such as 
people that are more likable, more familiar, share group-member ship with them, or are similar 
(Cwir et al., 2011; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Mathur et al., 2010; Preis & Kroener-Herwig, 
2012; Singer et al., 2006). Cwir et al. (2011) for example recorded cardiovascular activity of people 
witnessing others preparing a public speech. Cardiovascular activity in the beholder, that indicates 
a shared stress reaction, was higher when both people had common interests than when both 
were not connected at all. Following this line of thought, social connectedness or relevance 
between speaker and listener might thus affect emotion recognition, either by an attention-shift, 
or by increased emotional engagement. 
Jürgens et al. (2013) demonstrated that vocal expressions of emotions in daily life 
situations are only poorly recognized by (socially unconnected) listeners, in contrast to the highly 
intense and stereotypical expressions commonly used in research (cf. K. R. Scherer et al., 2001). 
Assuming that vocal emotion transmission works in daily life, emotion communication might be 
based on the social link between interaction partners and is facilitated when signaler and the 
signal are more relevant. For group membership - a second factor that increases social relevance 
(Ackerman et al., 2006; Brown et al. 2006) - a positive effect on simple emotion recognition for 
facial expression was found. Emotions expressed by other in-group members are classified faster 
and more accurately in comparison to those of out-group members (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; 
Thibault et al. 2006; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008), even when the groups were only randomly 
created during the experiment (Young & Hugenberg, 2010). Group membership may also, 
however, elicit negative connotation like prejudices (Bijlstra et al., 2010; Hugenberg & 




Bodenhausen, 2003) that could cause additional effects concerning the recognition of emotional 
expressions. European Americans for example preferentially perceived anger in emotional faces 
by African Americans, while they did not have this bias in regard to other European Americans 
(Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). Anger might be more relevant to out-group members, while 
happiness for example might be perceived as more important in in-group members (Bijlstra et al., 
2010; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008). Similarity does presumably not trigger these negative 
connotations in contrast to group-membership and might hence be more adequate to investigate 
whether the perception of emotional expressions is directly influenced by social relevance 
between sender and speaker. 
The main aim of the present study is to investigate the impact of speaker-listener 
similarity on the recognition of vocal expressions of emotions. Vocal expressions are only scarcely 
studied in the context of empathic reactions or other context effects. Similarity is expected to 
increase the attention towards emotional stimuli or to facilitate empathic concern, which should 
both positively affect emotion recognition, although underlying autonomous reactions would be 
different. To create social connectedness, we manipulated the similarity of speakers by providing 
the listeners with (fictive) biographical information of the speaker, such as place of birth, 
education, age, or leisure activities. In the case that the processing of emotional expressions base 
on emotional engagement of the perceiver, we expected increased activation of the autonomic 
nervous system (ANS) to vocal expressions of emotion, which should be even enlarged under 
conditions of speaker-listener similarity (Brown et al., 2006; Cwir et al., 2011). 
In Experiment 1, we investigated the processing of prosodic information at the behavioral 
level and tested whether emotion recognition is facilitated when the protagonist of a short story 
is similar (that is more relevant) to the listener. Experiment 2 focused on the question whether 
emotional prosody elicits enhanced physiological responses in the listener, and whether these 
responses are modulated by similarity. In addition to emotional expressions, participants had to 




manipulation we aimed at controlling differences in physiological sensitivity to affective stimuli in 
the auditory modality. Experiment 3 serves as control experiment, in which we detailed the 
analysis of recognition performance for affective sounds and vocal expressions, in order to reveal 
the cognitive difficulties during emotion recognition. 
 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, we investigated the effect of simulated similarity between listener and 
fictive speaker on the recognition and perception of vocal expressions of emotion. Vocal 
expressions of five different emotion categories (anger, fear, joy, sadness, and neutral) were 
integrated in short acoustically-presented stories to allow the participant “to get into” the 
character. Every story ended with a vocal emotion expression. We hypothesized that emotion 
expressions by fictive characters resembling the perceivers in their biographical data were 
recognized more accurately and perceived as more intense. 
 
Methods 
Ethics. All experiments of the present study were approved by the local Ethics committee 
of the Georg-Elias-Müller Institute of Psychology at the Georg-August-University of Goettingen. All 
participants were fully informed about the procedure and gave written informed consent prior to 
the experiment. 
Participants. Thirty-eight German native speaker (20 women, aged 19 – 30 year, M = 
22.9) participated in this study. All of them were undergraduate or graduate students of the 
University of Goettingen. Participation was reimbursed by course credits or 8 Euro/hr. 
Stimuli. Stimulus material consisted of ten different short stories of neutral content which 
were followed by target sentences of different emotional prosody. The stories had a word count 
of about 150 words each and dealt with daily life situations, such as sitting in a cafeteria, going 
shopping or returning home (see Appendix 4.1 for an example) in third-person versions. Every 




story had one protagonist performing the respective actions and ended with the beginning of a 
direct speech, such as “then he/she says:” [German Original: ”dann sagt er/sie:”]. 
Each story was recorded from two different speakers (one male (28 years) and one female 
(25 years)) who read the texts with neutral prosody. The spoken versions of the texts did not 
differ in their mean duration, M = 48.4 sec (± 3.0 sec) for the female speaker and M = 47.8 sec (± 
1.9 sec) for the male speaker. We constructed ten different target sentences that were controlled 
for length (six syllables each) and, importantly, of neutral content semantically related to one of 
the stories, such as “What have you said?” [“Was hast du da gesagt?”] or “I have expected this 
one.“ [“Den hab’ ich erwartet.”]. The prosodic sentences were recorded from unprofessional 
speakers (students and members of the University of Goettingen; 14 female and 17 male, mean 
age 27.4 ± 4.9 years). During recording, the speakers were instructed to express the given 
sentence in a specific emotion category (anger, joy, fear, sadness, or neutral, respectively), and 
were allowed to repeat the sentence until they felt satisfied with their performance. To facilitate 
the emotion expression, we provided the speakers with short vignettes that described an emotion 
scenario (overlapping with the short stories used in the experiment). 
To select appropriate target sentences, we conducted a pre-experimental rating, in which 
the emotional content of each sentence was rated by N = 20 - 22 participants (balanced between 
women and men). Participants listened to a subset of sentences and specified whether the speech 
token was “anger,” “neutral,” “joy,” “fear,” or “sadness”. Stimuli were selected that revealed 
emotion recognition rates between 57 – 81% (mean 70%), to ensure emotion recognition above 
chance while avoiding ceiling effects. The final set consisted of 40 prosodic sentences (by 13 
women (M age 26.3 ± 3.9 years) and 14 men (M age 28.1 ± 6.3 years); four stimuli per emotion 
category per gender), with no repetition of a given speaker per emotion category or sentence. 
The sentences were connected to the stories in the following way: For each gender, we 
constructed two different stimulus sets. Each stimulus set included all of the ten stories, 




given set. The recognition rates for the two stimuli per emotion category in every stimulus set 
were comparable to each other according to the pre-experimental ratings (mean differences in 
%). 
On the basis of participants’ demographic data obtained prior the main experiment, such 
as first name, date and place of birth, field of study, place of domicile, living situation and 
hobbies, we constructed personal profiles of the fictive protagonists. They either resembled or 
differed from the participants’ profiles. Similarity was created by using the same gender, first 
name (or similar equivalents, e.g., Anna and Anne), same or similar dates and places of birth, 
same or similar study program, and same hobbies. Dissimilar characters were characterized by 
not being a student, being around 10 years older, not sharing the birth month and date, living in a 
different federal state of Germany, having a dissimilar first name, and being interested in different 
hobbies. Manipulations for every participant were done using the same scheme. 
Procedure. After arriving at the laboratory, participants filled out the informed consent 
and the demographic questionnaire that was introduced as being necessary to control for 
individual characteristics. Afterwards, participants had to fill out a set of questionnaires (that 
were not regarded further in the analysis) to give the experimenter time to conduct the similarity 
manipulation. Participants were then seated in front of a computer screen and listened to the ten 
stories in a randomized order. Prior to a given story, they were presented with one of the 
personal profiles on screen (for 7 seconds) of the story’s main character (similarity manipulation). 
Every emotion category of the target sentences was once connected to a similar profile and once 
to a dissimilar profile. Participants were instructed to read the profiles carefully and to vividly 
imagine the character and the situation described by the short story and finalized by an utterance 
spoken by the fictive character in specific emotional prosody. After the target sentence, 
participants had to specify the expressed emotion (forced choice options “anger,” “fear,” 
“sadness,” “joy,” “neutral”) via mouse selection and to rate the intensity of the expression on a 1-
5-likert scale. The experiment lasted about 20 minutes. 




Statistical analysis. Statistical analyses were done in R (R Developmental Core Team, 
2012). Correct emotion recognition was analyzed using a Generalized linear mixed model with 
binomial error structure (GLMM, lmer function, R package lme4 Bates et al., 2011). We included 
emotion category (anger, joy, fear, sadness, neutral), similarity (similar, dissimilar) and their 
interaction as fixed factors into the model, and added participant-ID as random effect. Intensity 
ratings were analyzed using a cumulative link mixed model for ordinal data (package ordinal, 
Christensen, 2012) that also included emotion category, similarity and the interaction as fixed 
effect, and participant-ID as random effect. Models were compared to the respective null models 
only including the random effects via likelihood ratio test (function anova). In addition, model 
comparisons were conducted to test for interaction or for an effect of similarity on the model. 
Post-hoc tests were conducted using the glht function of the multcomp package (Hothorn et al., 
2008) with Bonferroni correction. 
 
Results 
We established the full model for emotion recognition (χ² = 26.47, df = 9, p = .002) and 
intensity ratings (LR.stat = 21.89, df = 9, p = .009). However, neither the interaction (emotion 
recognition: χ² = 6.57, df = 4, p = .160; intensity rating: LR.stat = 5.25, df = 4, p = .262) nor the 
similarity (emotion recognition: χ² = 0.9, df = 1, p = .343; intensity rating: LR.stat = 0.87, df = 1, 
p = .351) had a significant effect on emotion recognition and intensity rating. Both emotion 
recognition (χ² = 19.04, df = 4, p < .001) and intensity ratings (LR.stat = 15.911, df = 4, p = .003) 
only differed with regard to emotion category (Figure 4.1). Specifically, neutral prosody was 
recognized less accurately and perceived as less intense in comparison to other emotional 











Results of the post-hoc tests for emotion recognition and intensity perception 
 





fear anger 0.054 ± 0.33 0.165 1 
joy anger 0.054 ± 0.33 0.165 1 
 
neutral anger -1.156 ± 0.34 -3.385 .007** 
 
sadness anger -0.319 ± 0.33 -0.977 1 
 
joy fear 0.000 ± 0.33  0.000 1 
 
neutral fear -1.210 ± 0.34 -3.537 .004** 
 
sadness fear -0.374 ± 0.33 -1.140 1 
 
neutral joy -1.210 ± 0.34 -3.537 .004* 
 
sadness joy -0.373 ± 0.33 -1.140 1 
  sadness neutral 0.837 ± 0.34 2.465 .137 
Intensity 
rating 
fear anger 0.434 ± 0.30 1.441 1 
joy anger -0.113 ± 0.30 -0.375 1 
 
neutral anger -0.735 ± 0.30 -2.408 .160 
 
sadness anger 0.061 ± 0.30  0.198 1 
 
joy fear -0.547 ± 0.29 -1.881 .599 
 
neutral fear  -1.169 ± 0.34 -3.441 .006** 
 
sadness fear  -0.372 ± 0.26 -1.460 1 
 
neutral joy  -0.621 ± 0.37 1.674 .942 
 
sadness joy 0.175 ± 0.304 0.574 1 
  sadness neutral 0.796 ± 0.35 2.273 .230 
Note: 
a
Adjusted p-values (Bonferroni correction) 
 
Figure 4.1 Correct emotion 
recognition (A) and intensity 
ratings (B) for Study 1. Given 
are the mean values ± 95 % CI. 
d = dissimilar, s = similar. 





Similarity did not affect the recognition of emotion or intensity ratings. The lack of 
similarity effects on both recognition performance and intensity ratings in our data might be 
caused by several (methodological) reasons and does not necessarily imply that personal 
similarity is irrelevant for processing emotional information in the voice. The context stories might 
have interacted not only with the emotion recognition, but also with the similarity manipulation. 
A participant, listening to a story of a character drinking coffee, while he himself detests coffee, is 
most likely to be disrupted in his similarity illusion. Further, the stories in combination with the 
high number of emotion categories might have complicated the study, restricted the 
interchangeability of prosodic stimuli and limited possible repetition within participants. 
Overall, both emotion recognition and perceived intensity of emotional expressions were 
reduced here in comparison to our pre-experimental ratings in which the same target sentences 
were presented but in isolation. Particularly the recognition of utterances spoken with neutral 
prosody suffered from the context condition, even though all stories were of both neutral content 
and prosody. Presumably, the stories led participants to expect emotional endings, which seems 
plausible considering the typical emotionality in human interactions (Vrana & Rollock, 1998). 
These expectations might strongly depend on individual differences, such as moods or knowledge 
(Halberstadt, Dennis, & Hess, 2011; Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010). 
 
Experiment 2 
The main aims of this experiment were twofold: First, we wanted to optimize the 
experimental design of Experiment 1. Therefore, we reduced the number of emotion categories 
to three, namely anger, joy, and neutral. Furthermore, we replaced the context stories with short 
context sentences to allow an increase in repetitions and to diminish the uncontrollable effects of 
the stories. In order to elicit strong emotional engagement in the listeners and to increase the 




taken from a database of professional and intensely acted stimuli (Burkhardt, Paeschke, Rolfes, 
Sendlmeier, & Weiss, 2005). Additionally, we restricted the sample to female participants only. 
That was done for the practical reason to only need one stimulus set by female speakers. Beyond 
that, men and women are found to vary in their emotional reactivity (Bradley, Codispoti, 
Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001; Kret & De Gelder, 2012). Second, we included peripheral measures 
(pupil dilations and electrodermal responses), which are known to reflect even very subtle 
emotion-related physiological chances and to be mainly robust against conscious evaluative 
appraisals. 
Reactions of the autonomic nervous system, related to emotional episodes, include 
changes in the cardiovascular system, respiration and perspiration (Kreibig, 2010; Moors et al., 
2013). Attending emotions in others is thought to elicit reflections of the emotional states in the 
listeners, including the corresponding autonomic reactions (Hatfield et al., 2011; Preston & de 
Waal, 2002). To investigate this emotional engagement and to reveal possible modulations by 
similarity, we recorded two peripheral physiological measures. Skin conductance response (SCR) is 
one of the most often used peripheral physiological markers; it cannot be induced voluntarily and 
is exclusively activated by the sympathetic nervous system, making it an ideal measurement for 
arousal (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). Another promising maker for detecting unconscious or 
subtle effects during stimulus processing is pupil size (Laeng et al., 2012). Pupil size is triggered 
both by the sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous system and is voluntarily affected only 
under effort (Sirois & Brisson, 2014). Changes of pupil diameter can be caused by variation on 
luminance, but also by emotional arousal (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Hess & Polt, 
1960) and cognitive load (Kuchinke, Schneider, Kotz, & Jacobs, 2011; Laeng et al., 2012; Stanners, 
Coulter, Sweet, & Murphy, 1979). Stronger attention towards stimuli, as predicted in this 
experiment when participants were confronted with similar (fictive) speakers, leads for example 
to pupil dilation (see Sirois & Brisson, 2014). The interplay of the listeners’ emotion recognition, 
SCRs and pupil size provides insight into the cognitive and affective reaction during processing of 




the prosodic information. We hypothesized that listeners showed stronger physiological 
responses towards vocal expression by similar characters compared to dissimilar characters. 
Responses of autonomic reactions (SCRs and pupil size) to arousing stimuli have been 
established for affective pictures and sounds rather than for emotional expressions (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Bradley & Lang, 2000). Affective pictures or sounds of high 
arousal, mainly representing violence and erotica, have been shown to induce subjective feelings, 
emotion-congruent facial expressions, increased SCRs, and pupil dilation in the beholder (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Cuthbert, et al., 2001; Bradley et al., 2008; Lithari et al., 2010; Partala & Surakka, 2003). 
The evidence for reactions to emotional expressions, is however less clear (Alpers et al., 2011; 
Aue et al., 2011; Wangelin et al., 2012).  
To relate our results on the processing of emotional expressions with the processing of 
acoustic affective stimuli, we added a second task, in which positive, negative and neutral 
affective sounds were presented and had to be categorized regarding their emotional meaning by 




Participants. Twenty-eight female German native speakers, ranging in age between 18 
and 29 years (M = 22.8), participated in the study. The majority of participants (23 out of 28) were 
undergraduates at the University of Goettingen, three just finished their studies and two worked 
in a non-academic profession. Due to technical problems during recordings, two participants had 
to be excluded from the analysis of pupil data.  
 
Stimuli. 
Spoken utterances with emotional prosody. The emotional voice samples were selected 




consists of 500 acted emotional speech tokens of ten different sentences. These sentences were 
of neutral meaning, such as “The cloth is lying on the fridge” [German original “Der Lappen liegt 
auf dem Eisschrank”], or “Tonight I could tell him” [“Heute abend könnte ich es ihm sagen”]. From 
this database we selected 30 anger, 30 joyful, and 30 neutral utterances, spoken by five female 
actors. Each speaker provided 18 stimuli to the final set (6 per emotion category). The stimuli had 
a mean duration of 2.48 ± 0.71 s (anger= 2.61 ± 0.7, joy= 2.51 ± 0.71, and neutral = 2.32 ± 0.71), 
with no differences between the emotion categories (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.893, df = 2, p 
= .24). Information about the recognition of indented emotion and perceived naturalness were 
provided by Burkhard and colleagues (2005). We only chose stimuli that were recognized well 
above chance and perceived as convincing and natural (Burkhardt et al., 2005). Recognition rates 
did not differ between emotion categories (See Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics, Kruskal-Wallis 
chi-squared = 5.0771, df = 2, p = .079). Anger stimuli were however perceived as more convincing 
than joyful stimuli (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 11.1963, df = 2, p = .004; post-hoc test with 
Bonferroni adjustment for anger – joy p = .003). During the experiment, we presented prosodic 
stimuli preceded by short context sentences that were presented in written form on the 
computer screen. With this manipulation we aimed at providing context information in order to 
increase the plausibility of the speech tokens. These context sentences were semantically related 
to the prosodic target sentence and neutral in their wording, such as “She points into the kitchen 
and says” [German original: “Sie deutet in die Küche und sagt”] followed by the speech token 
“The cloth is laying on the fridge” [“Der Lappen liegt auf dem Eisschrank”] or “She looks at her 
watch and says” [German original “Sie blickt auf die Uhr und sagt”] followed by the speech “It will 



















   Sound
b
 
  Recognition Naturalness     Pleasantness Arousal 
Anger 96.17 ± 7.39 84.55 ± 10.61   Negative arousing 2.8 ± 1.76 6.9 ± 1.86 
Neutral 93.52 ± 6.46 80.08 ± 11.16   Neutral 4.91 ± 1.75 4.46 ± 2.04 
Joy 93.19 ± 8.85 72.51 ± 15.98   Positive arousing 7.23 ± 1.78 6.75 ± 1.81 
Note: 
a 
Burkhardt et al., 2005;
b
 Bradley & Lang, 2007 
 
Similarity manipulation was done equivalently to Study 1, resulting in four personal 
profiles of (fictive) characters that resembled the respective participant in her data, and four 
profiles that differed from the participant’s profile. To detract participants from the study aim, we 
included trait memory tasks between acquiring the biographical information and the main 
experiment. Additionally, we instructed the participants to carefully read every profile that was 
presented during the experiment, as they later should respond to questions regarding 
bibliographic information. 
Sounds of emotional content. Forty-five affective sounds (15 arousing positive, 15 
arousing negative, 15 neutral4) were selected from the IADS database (International Affective 
Digital Sounds, Bradley & Lang, 1999). All of them had a duration of 6 s. Erotica were not used in 
our study as they have been shown to be processed differently compared to other positive 
arousing stimuli (Partala & Surakka, 2003; van Lankveld & Smulders, 2008). The selected positive 
and negative stimuli did not differ in terms of arousal (see Table 4.2 for descriptive statistic; 
t(27) = -0.743, p = .463) and were significantly more arousing than the neutral stimuli 
(t(25) = 12.84, p < .001). In terms of emotional valence, positive and negative stimuli differed both 
from each other (t(24) = 21.08, p < .001) and from the neutral condition (positive-neutral t(19) = 
11.99, p < .001, negative-neutral t(25) = 15.15, p < .001), according to the ratings provided in the 
IADS database. Positive and negative sounds were controlled for their absolute valence value 
                                                          
4
 Stimulus selection (taken from Bradley & Lang, 1999):  
Positive sounds: 110, 311, 352, 353, 360, 363, 365, 367, 378, 415, 704, 717, 813, 815, 817 
Negative sounds: 134, 261, 281, 282, 289, 380, 423, 501, 626, 699, 709, 711, 712, 719, 910 




from the neutral condition (t(24) = 0.159, p = .875). Note that this stimulus selection was based on 
ratings by female participants’ ratings only, provided by Bradley and Lang (2007). 
As the affective sounds were relative diverse in their content, we controlled for 
differences in specific acoustic parameters that might trigger startle reactions or aversion and 
thus influence the physiological indicators used in the present study in an unintended way. These 
parameters included intensity, intensity onset (comprising only the first 200 ms), intensity 
variability (intensity standard deviation), noisiness, harmonic-to-noise ratio (HNR), and energy 
distribution (frequency at which 50 % of energy distribution in the spectrum was reached). 
Intensity parameters were calculated using Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2009), while noisiness, 
energy distribution and HNR were obtained by using LMA (Lautmusteranalyse developed by K. 
Hammerschmidt; Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007; Schrader & Hammerschmidt, 1997). We 
calculated linear models in R to compare the parameter values across the three emotion category 
(Table 4.3). We conducted post-hoc analysis even when the general analysis was only significant 
at trend level. We found differences at trend level for intensity and intensity variability, and 
significant effects for energy distribution across the emotions. Differences were marginal and 
unsystematically spread across the categories, meaning that no emotion category accumulates all 
aversion related characteristics. Differences depict the normal variation when looking at complex 
sounds. The probability that acoustic structure confounds the physiological measure is thus low. 
 
Table 4.3 
Acoustic parameter values for the emotional sounds grouped by emotion. 
 
Parameter negative neutral positive 
Intensity [db] 65.66 ± 13.07 64.57 ± 9.33 a  71.50 ± 6.62 a 
Intensity onset [db] 61.28 ± 18.64 62.44 ± 9.04 68.36 ± 7.20 
Intensity variability [db] 12.66 ± 7.66 a  8.48 ± 4.07 7.83 ± 7.64 a 
% noise 68.07 ± 34.13  80.33 ± 24.94 58.73 ± 33.03 
harmonic-to-noise ratio 390.50 ± 469.72 369.80 ± 235.05 665.09 ± 638.37 
50% Energy distribution [Hz] 1802.40 ± 961.37 b 1046.67 ± 868.05 b 1231.67 ± 389.62 
Note: Differences in one parameter across emotion are indicated by uncapitalized letters 
(a: p < .1, b: p < .05)  
 




Procedure. First, participants filled out questionnaires regarding their demography and 
their handedness (Oldfield, 1971). After completing the questionnaires, participants were asked 
to wash their hands and to remove eye make-up. Participants were then seated in a chin rest 72 
cm in front of a computer screen. Peripheral physiological measures were recorded from their 
non-dominant hand, while their dominant hand was free to use a button box for responding. 
Stimuli were presented via headphones (Sennheiser, HD 449) at a volume of around 55 db. During 
and shortly after auditory presentation, participants were instructed to fixate a green circle 
displayed at the center of a screen in order to prevent excessive eye movements. The circle 
spanned a visual angle of 2.4° x 2.7° and was displayed on an equi-luminant grey background. 
Additionally, participants were asked not to move and to avoid blinks during the presentation of 
target sentences.  
The experiment consisted of two parts. Figure 4.2 gives an overview about the procedure 
of the stimulus presentation. Within the first part, prosodic stimuli were presented. Stimuli were 
presented twice (once in the similar / once in the dissimilar condition), resulting in a total number 
of 180 stimuli. The stimulus set was divided into 20 blocks of 9 stimuli (three stimuli per emotion 
category that is anger, neutral, joy). All Stimuli within one block were spoken by the same speaker 
and were presented in random order within a given block. Prior to every prosodic stimulus, a 
context sentence was presented for three seconds. The personal profile, which manipulated the 
similarity, was shown prior to each block for six seconds. Every second block was followed by a 
break. Rating was done six seconds after stimulus onset. Participants had to indicate the valence 
of each stimulus (positive, negative, neutral) by pressing one of three buttons. In order to avoid 
early moving and thus assuring reliable SCR measures, the rating options appeared not until six 
seconds after stimulus onset and valence-button assignment changed randomly for every trial. 
Participants were instructed to carefully read the personal profiles and to feel into the speaker 
and the situation respectively. This part lasted for about 40 min. At the end of this part, 




After a short break, the second part started, in which the 45 affective sounds were 
presented. Every trial started with a fixation cross in the middle of the screen for 1 s. The sound 
was then replayed for 6 s each, while a circle was displayed on screen. When the sound finished, 
the response options (neutral, positive, negative) were provided on the screen. The order of the 
response options was random for every trial; thus, button order was not predictable. The 45 
affective sounds were presented twice in two independent cycles, each time in randomized order. 
In analogy to the prosodic part, participants were instructed to listen carefully and to indicate the 
valence they associate most with the sounds without thinking about the sound’s meaning. Short 
breaks were included after every 15th trial. This part of the experiment lasted for about 20 
minutes. The experiment took approximately 60 min in total. 
 
Psychophysiological data recording, pre-processing, and analysis. 
Pupil diameter was recorded from the dominant eye using the EyeLink 1000 (SR Research 
Ltd.), at a sampling rate of 250 Hz. The head position was stabilized via a chin and forehead rest 
that was secured on the table. Prior to the experiment, the eyetracker was calibrated with a 5-
point calibration, ensuring correct tracking of the participant’s pupil. Offline, blinks and artefacts 
Figure 4.2 Overview of stimulus 
presentation procedure. A) One of the 
20 presentation blocks created for the 
prosodic stimuli. All nine stimuli of one 
block were spoken by the same 
speaker, and included in randomized 
order three neutral, three anger and 
three joy sentences; B) Stimulus 
presentation of sounds. 




were corrected using spline interpolation. Data was then segmented around stimulus onset (time 
window: -1000 ms to 7000 ms) and referred to a baseline 500 ms prior to stimulus onset. Data 
was analyzed in consecutive time segments of 1 s duration each. We started the analysis 500 ms 
after stimulus onset, to allow a short orientation phase, and ended 5500 ms afterwards. 
Skin conductance was recorded at a sampling rate of 128 Hz using ActivView and the 
BioSemi AD-Box Two (BioSemi B.V.). The two Ag/AgCl electrodes were filled with skin 
conductance electrode paste (TD-246 MedCaT supplies) and were placed on the palm of the non-
dominant hand approximately 2 cm apart, while two additional electrodes on the back of the 
hand served as reference. Offline, data was analyzed using the matlab based software LedaLab 
V3.4.5 (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010a). Data was down-sampled to 16 Hz and analyzed via 
Continuous Decomposition Analysis (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010a). Skin conductance (SC) is a 
slow reacting measure based on the alterations of electrical properties of skin after sweat 
secretion. SC has long recovery times leading to overlapping peaks in the SC signal when skin 
conductance responses (SCR) are elicited in quick succession. Conducting standard peak 
amplitude measures is thus problematic, as peaks are difficult to differentiate and subsequent 
peaks are often underestimated. Benedek and Kaernbach (2010a) developed a method that 
separates the underlying driver information, reflecting the sudomotor nerve activity (and thus the 
actual sympathetic activity) from the curve of physical response behavior (sweat secretion causing 
slow changes in skin conductivity) via standard deconvolution. Additionally, tonic and phasic SC 
components are separated, to allow a focus on the phasic, event-related activity only. The phasic 
driver subtracted by the tonic driver is characterized by a baseline of zero. Event-related 
activation was exported for a response window of 1 to 6 sec after stimulus onset, taking into 
account the slow signal (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010b). Only activation stronger than 0.01 μS was 
regarded as an event-related response (Bach, Flandin, Friston, & Dolan, 2009; Benedek & 
Kaernbach, 2010a). We used averaged phasic driver within the respective time window as 




Statistical analysis. To test the effects of emotion category and similarity on recognition 
accuracy we built a generalized linear mixed model with binomial error structure (GLMM, lmer 
function, R package lme4, Bates et al., 2011). Effects on SCRs and pupil size were analyzed using 
linear mixed models (LMM, lmer function). Models included emotion category, similarity, and the 
interaction between these two as fixed factors and participant-ID as random factor. All models 
were compared to the respective null model including the random effects only by likelihood ratio 
tests (function anova). Additionally, we tested the interaction between emotion category and 
similarity by comparing the full model including the interaction with the reduced model excluding 
the interaction. We used the model without interaction when appropriate. Models for the 
affective sounds included only emotion category as fixed factor and participant-ID as random 
effect. The models were compared to the respective null models by likelihood ratio tests. Normal 
distribution and homogeneity of variance for all models were tested by inspecting Quartile-
Quartile-Plots (QQ-plots) and residual plots. SCR data deviated from normal distribution and were 
log transformed. Pairwise post-hoc tests were conducted using the glht function of the multcomp 




Spoken utterances with emotional prosody. Overall, emotional prosody was recognized 
relatively well, at around 92% (Figure 4.3). The comparison to the null model established an 
overall effect of the predictors on emotion recognition (χ² = 138.44, df = 5, p < .001), while the 
interaction between similarity and emotion category was not significant (χ² = 4.53, df = 2, p = 
.104). Similarity influenced the emotion recognition at trend level (χ² = 3.21, df = 1, p = .073, 
Figure 4.3), while emotion category had a strong influence on recognition (χ² = 130.81, df = 2, p < 
.001). Post-hoc tests revealed differences in every pairwise comparison (anger – joy: z = 6.117, 




p < .001; anger – neutral: z = 10.176, p < .001; joy = neutral z = 5.088, p < .001). Anger was 
recognized most frequently, followed by joyful and neutral prosody (Figure 4.3).  
 
Sounds of emotional content. The emotional content of sounds was recognized to a 
lesser degree than the emotionality of prosody, with a recognition accuracy of around 65% (Figure 
4.3). Emotion had a clear influence on the recognition (comparison of full model and null model: 
χ² = 167.52, df = 2, p < .001). With a recognition accuracy of about 52%, neutral sounds were 
recognized least accurately (negative – neutral: z = 12.972, p < .001; negative – positive: z = 8.397, 
p < .001; positive - neutral: 4.575, p < .001).  
 
Skin conductance. 
Spoken utterances with emotional prosody. Skin conductance response (Figure 4.4) 
represented by the phasic driver activity was not affected by any of the predictors (comparison to 
null model χ² = 1.605, df = 5, p = .9). 
Sounds of emotional content. We did, however, find an effect of the emotional sounds on 
SCR (Figure 4.4; comparison to null model χ² = 15.828, df = 2, p < .001). Consistent with the 
prediction, more arousing sounds elicited stronger SCRs than neutral sounds (Figure 4.4, post-hoc 
tests: negative – neutral: estimates on log transformed data = 0.336 ± 0.081, z = 4.129, p < .001; 
Figure 4.3 Emotion recognition for 
prosody (A) and sounds (B). Given 
are the mean values ± 95% CI. 
Asterisks mark the significance 





positive – neutral: estimates on log data = 0.222 ± 0.081, z = 2.723, p = .019). Negative and 
positive sound elicited SCRs of similar size (negative – positive: estimates on log data = 0.114 ± 
0.0814, z = 1.406, p = .479). 
Pupil dilation. 
Spoken utterances with emotional prosody. We found an effect of the predictors on pupil 
size for the time windows 2.5 – 3.5 and 3.5 - 4.5 seconds after stimulus onset (comparisons to null 
models, see Table 4.4). There was no interaction between emotion category and similarity on 
pupil size (Table 4.4). Pupil size was affected by emotion category of speech samples (Figure 4.5, 
Table 4.4). Interestingly, increases of pupil size dynamically differed between prosodic conditions: 
Pupil size increased fast in response to angry stimuli, while responses to joyful stimuli were 
delayed by about one second (see Figure 4.5 and Table 4.5). Neutral stimuli triggered the weakest 
pupil response in comparison to anger and joy (Figure 4.5, Table 4.5). The similarity condition had 
no effect on pupil size for the respective time windows (model comparisons χ² < 1.16, df = 1, p > 
.28). 
Sounds of emotional content. The pupil size was affected by emotional content of sounds 
in three time windows (Table 4.4, Figure 4.5). Post-hoc tests revealed that negative sounds 
elicited a stronger pupil size response compared to positive sounds (Table 4.5). Differences 
Figure 4.4 Skin conductance 
response for the prosodic stimuli 
(A) and the sounds (B). Given is 
the mean ± SEM phasic driver 
activity within the response 
window of 1-6 sec after stimulus 
onset. Asterisks mark the 
significance levels of the post- hoc 
tests * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001. 




between negative and neutral sounds almost reached significance. Our results indicate that pupil 
dilation does not purely reflect arousal differences.  
 
Table 4.4 
Effects on pupil sizes for prosody and sounds. Presented are the results of the model comparison for each 
time segments. 
 
    null model comparison
a
 interaction emotion 
Stimulus  time steps χ² df p χ² df p χ² df p 
Prosody 0.5-1.5 9.86 5 .079. 
 
2 
    
 
1.5-2.5 5.56 5 .351 
      
 
2.5-3.5 11.56 5 .041* 0.786 2 .675 10.66 2 .005** 
 
3.5-4.5 11.82 5 .037* 1.63 2 .444 9.108 2 .011* 
  4.5-5.5 7.722 5 .172             
Sounds 0.5-1.5 1.74 2 .419 
      
 
1.5-2.5 4.29 2 .117 
      
 
2.5-3.5 6.95 2 .031* 
      
 
3.5-4.5 12.81 2 .002** 
        4.5-5.5 6.07 2 .048*             
Note: 
a




Emotion effects on pupil size for prosody and sounds. Presented are post-hoc tests for the respective time 
segments 
 
Stimulus  time step Emotion Estimates z-value p
a
 
Prosody 2.5-3.5 joy neutral 0.025 ± 0.0143 1.72 .258 
  
anger joy 0.023 ± 0.0143 1.58 .345 
  
anger neutral 0.047 ± 0.143 3.29 .003** 
 
3.5-4.5 joy neutral 0.041 ± 0.017 2.58 .03* 
  
anger joy 0.001 ± 0.017 0.1 1 
    anger neutral 0.047 ± 0.017 2.67 .023* 
Sounds 2.5-3.5 positive neutral 0.036 ± 0.025 1.43 .458 
  
negative positive 0.067 ± 0.025 2.67 .023* 
  
negative neutral 0.031 ± 0.025 1.24 .646 
 
3.5-4.5 positive neutral 0.032 ± 0.025 1.29 .592 
  
negative positive 0.092 ± 0.025 3.68 <.001*** 
  
negative neutral 0.06 ± 0.25 2.39 .051. 
 
4.5-5.5 positive neutral 0.001 ± 0.024 0.06 1 
  
negative positive 0.053 ± 0.024 2.18 .087. 
    negative neutral 0.052 ± 0.024 2.12 .102 
Note: 
a





Figure 4.5 Pupil dilation during presentation of prosodic stimuli (A, B) and sounds (C, D). Figure parts B, D base on mean values ± 
SEM for the analyzed time steps. Stimulus onset happened at time point 0. Asterisks mark the significance levels of the post-hoc 
tests: . p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  





In accordance with Experiment 1, manipulated similarity between (fictive) speaker and 
listener did not influence the affective processing of vocal prosody. Similarity failed to draw more 
attention to the vocal expressions – as would have been indicated by modulations of the pupil 
size and improved recognition performance – or to boost physiological responses in terms of 
increased arousal. Considering previous findings, this result seems surprising (Burger et al., 2004; 
Cwir et al., 2011; Walton et al., 2012). Nevertheless, our study does imply that similarity has no 
effect on vocal emotion processing, but that our manipulation using biographical similarity in a 
laboratory setting does not seem to be sufficiently potent to induce effects (see General 
discussion). 
Interestingly, the peripheral physiological data indicate that listening to vocal expressions 
of emotions did not trigger a marked activation of the sympathetic nervous system, as indicated 
by the null-findings on SCRs in the present experiment. These results are in accordance with 
previous studies on facial expressions of emotions (Alpers et al., 2011; Wangelin et al., 2012) that 
also failed to show increased SCRs to emotional expressions. However, in contrast to the spoken 
utterances, affective sounds elicited the hypothesized arousal effects in SCRs, confirming previous 
results (Bradley & Lang, 2000). Together, the SCR findings imply that emotional prosody is of 
generally lower arousal in comparison to affective sounds, which is supported by overall 
decreased SCR magnitudes to prosodic stimuli compared to sounds. However, emotional prosody 
differentially affected pupil size with larger dilations for utterances spoken with angry or joyful 
prosody, which is in line with a recent study reported by Kuchinke and colleagues (2011). Since 
pupil responses have been demonstrated to reflect the dynamic interplay of emotion and 
cognition and are thus not simply related to arousal (cf. Bayer, Sommer, & Schacht, 2011), our 
finding is not surprising. Instead, it provides additional evidence that SCRs and pupil responses 




Another finding supports the idea that pupil dilation reflects cognitive effects on 
emotional processing. In a study by Partala and Surakka (2003), affective sounds, taken from the 
same data base as in our study, triggered stronger pupil dilations for both negative and positive 
compared to neutral sounds. In our study, however, emotionally negative sounds elicited larger 
dilations compared to positive sounds, with neutral in between. While participants in our study 
had to overtly judge the emotional content of sounds, no explicit task had to be performed in the 
study by Partala and Surakka (2003). These processing differences due to task demands might 
explain the inconsistencies between studies. Similar arguments have been made by Stanners and 
colleagues (1979) suggesting that changes in pupil size only reflect arousal differences under 
conditions in which no cognitive effort is required. For both domains – affective sounds and 
prosodic utterances – participants had to explicitly categorize the emotional content or prosody 
of each stimulus. Since accuracy rates provide rather unspecific estimates of cognitive effort, we 
conducted another experiment in which we collected reaction times and confidence ratings in 
addition to accuracy rates. This allowed us to further investigate the cognitive load during 
recognition of both prosodic stimuli and affective sounds. To be able to apply the results with the 
measures of Study 2, we used a subset of the participants form Study 2. 
 
Experiment 3 
 In Experiment 3 we explored the cognitive difficulties for recognizing vocal expressions 
and affective sounds in more detail. In light of the previous recognition rates in Experiment 2 and 
the respective pupil data, we predicted that neutral prosody and especially neutral sounds would 
be most difficult to recognize. 
 
Methods 
Participants. The sample consisted of 20 (female, aged 21-30 years, M = 24.45) 
participants from the 28 participants of study 2. 




Stimuli. Stimuli were identical to Experiment 2 but both the context sentences and the 
similarity manipulation were omitted. 
Design and procedure. The experiment took place 6 month after Experiment 2. 
Participants sat in front of a computer screen, and listened to the acoustic stimuli via headphones. 
They were first confronted with the affective sounds (first part) in a randomized order and were 
instructed to stop the stimulus directly as fast as they had recognized the emotion within a critical 
time window of 6 seconds. The time window was in accordance to the one in Experiment 2 and 
corresponded to the duration of the sounds. After participants pushed a button, reflecting the 
time needed for successful emotion recognition, they had to indicate which emotion they 
perceived (positive, negative, neutral) and how confident they were in their recognition (likert-
scale 1-10), both by paper-pencil. The next trial started after a button press. In the second part, 
they listened to the prosodic stimuli that had to be classified as expressing joy, anger, or neutral, 
respectively, within the same procedure as in the first part. The critical time window was again 6 s 
after stimulus onset. 
Statistical analysis. We did not compare prosody and sounds statistically, knowing about 
the differences in stimulus length, quantity of stimuli and, regarding the broader perspective, the 
stimulus structure overall (Bayer & Schacht, 2014). Reaction time data was not normally 
distributed and was thus log transformed prior to the analysis. Recognition accuracy and reaction 
time data were only calculated for those stimuli that were responded to within the time window 
of 6 s, whereas certainty ratings were analysed for all stimuli in order to not overestimate the 
ratings. We tested the effect of emotion category on recognition accuracy (using GLMM), reaction 
time (using a LMM), and certainty ratings (using a cumulative link mixed model for ordinal data, 
package ordinal, Christensen, 2012) for both prosodic stimuli and affective sounds. The models 
included emotion category as fixed factor and participant-ID as random effect. The models were 
compared to the respective null models by likelihood ratio tests. Pairwise post-hoc tests were 




reaction time. As cumulative link models cannot be used in the glht post-hoc tests, we used the 
single comparisons of the model summary, and did the Bonferroni correction separately. 
 
Results 
Spoken utterances with emotional prosody. Participants responded within the specified 
time window in 90% of all cases (anger: 91%, neutral: 90%, joy: 89%). We calculated recognition 
accuracy and reaction time only for these trials. Emotion category had a clear influence on 
emotion recognition accuracy (comparison to null model χ² = 26.39, df = 2, p < .001), reaction time 
(χ² = 42.29, df = 2, p < .001), and the certainty ratings (LR.stat = 21.50, df = 2, p < .001). With a 
recognition rate of 91 %, joy was recognized significantly less accurately, and more slowly 
(Reaction time: M = 2022 ms, Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6). In the certainty ratings, however, joy 
resembled anger expressions. 
Sounds of emotional content. Participants responded within the specified time window 
in 81% of all cases (negative: 85%, neutral: 74%, positive: 83%). The recognition varied between 
emotion categories for recognition accuracy (comparison to null model χ² = 41.41, df = 2, p < 
.001), reaction time (χ² = 19.97, df = 2, p < .001), and certainty ratings (LR.stat = 26.39, df = 2, p < 
.001). These results indicate difficulties in the categorization of neutral sounds, as reflected in 
lower accuracy (57% correct), prolonged reaction times (2988ms), and lower certainty ratings 













Post-hoc comparisons for emotion recognition, reaction time and confidence ratings for emotional prosody 
and affective sounds 
 




Prosody neutral anger 0.345 ± 0.379 0.909 1 
 
joy anger -1.110 ± 0.304 -3.646 <.001*** 
  
joy neutral -1.455 ± 0.337 4.321 <.001*** 
 
Sounds neutral negative -1.327 ± 0.217 -6.109 <.001*** 
  
positive negative -0.454 ± 0.224 -2.026 .128 
    positive neutral 0.873 ± 0.202 4.315 <.001*** 
Reaction 
time 
Prosody neutral anger -0.586 ± 0.023 -2.543 .033* 
 
joy anger 0.092 ± 0.023 3.976 <.001*** 
  
joy neutral 0.151 ± 0.023 6.495 <.001*** 
 
Sounds neutral negative 0.181 ± 0.403 4.494 <.001*** 
  
positive negative 0.083 ± 0.039 2.138 .098 
    positive neutral -0.097 ± 0.040 -2.417 .047* 
Confident 
ratings 
Prosody neutral anger 0.332 ± 0.118 2.81 .015* 
 












positive negative -0.161 ± 0.152 -1.057 0.6
 
 


























Figure 4.6 Emotion recognition. 
The first column (A, C, E) depicts 
the results of the emotional 
prosody with the emotion 
categories “anger”, “neutral” and 
“joy”, the second column (B, D, F) 
represents the sounds with the 
categories “negative”, “neutral” 
and “positive”. A), B) Correct 
emotion recognition (mean ± 95% 
CI) was calculated using stimuli 
that were responded to within the 
time window of 6 seconds. C), D) 
Reaction time measures (mean ± 
SEM) on stimuli that were 
responded to with the critical time 
window. E, F) Certainty ratings 
(mean ± 95% CI) obtained from the 
10 point likert-scale (ranging from 
1 uncertain to 10 completely 
certain) were calculated for every 
stimulus. Asterisks mark the 
significance level: . p < 0.1, * p < 
.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  





Recognition of emotional prosody was quick and accurate, and participants were 
relatively confident about their decisions when the utterances were presented without any 
context information. Overall, the recognition of emotional content of affective sounds appeared 
to be more difficult as predicted. Importantly, we replicated the ambiguity participants 
experienced when being presented with neutral sounds that had to be categorized in terms of 
emotional meaning. Neutral prosody, however, was classified most accurately, which contrasts 
the behavioral data in Experiment 2 (in which the same stimuli were used) and Experiment 1. 
These contrasting findings indicate that embedding prosodic stimuli into context situations 
diminishes the subjective probability that they were perceived as neutral (see also Vrana & Gross, 
2004). 
The detailed analysis of participants’ recognition ability in this experiment suggests that 
the recognition of vocally expressed emotions does not require large cognitive resources in 
general. In this case, the impact of emotion on pupil size might be basically caused by arousal 
(Stanners et al., 1979), even though the arousal level might not have reached a sufficient level to 
elicit SCRs. The temporal recognition pattern, with neutral and anger classified quickly and joy 
classified after a longer delay, fit to the timing data by Pell and Kotz (2011) and might also explain 
the delay in pupil dilation to joyful prosody in Experiment 2. The putative higher cognitive load 
caused by the emotion judgment task for sounds - and neutral sounds in particular - might explain 
the surprising pattern of pupil responses to sounds, obtained in Experiment 2, where neutral 
sounds elicited similar pupil dilations compared to negative sounds.  
 
General Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate the influence of biographical similarity on the 
recognition of vocal expressions as well on emotional engagement during their processing. We did 




expressions were generally weak, as only pupil size differentiated emotional and neutral stimuli, 
speaking against the notion that emotional engagement is necessary for the understanding of 
emotions in others. 
Personal similarity between speaker and listener, which manipulates social relevance, did 
not improve the processing of prosody. Neither emotion recognition and perception nor the 
peripheral physiological measures indicated any influence. This might be explained by several, not 
mutually exclusive, reasons. First, vocal emotion expressions might be perceived in a general way, 
in which case emotions are recognized without differentiating between speakers’ relevance. 
Whether an empathic reaction or prosocial behavior is triggered afterwards, may thus underlie 
further appraisal processes (see Cwir et al., 2011; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). Considering 
emotion recognition for Experiment 2, a ceiling effect, however, might have simply prohibited 
further improvement of recognition accuracy. The missing effect of similarity on the autonomic 
measures indicates on the other hand that the processing of an expression is not affected by 
social connectedness overall. Second, the lack of effects might be explained by the fact that 
similarity unfolds its beneficial effect only in more realistic settings, in which an actual link 
between both interaction partners can be developed (see Burger et al., 2004; Cwir et al., 2011; 
Walton et al., 2012). Our manipulation might remain artificial and hence not affect the listeners in 
the intended way. Superficial manipulation of sharing group-membership, however, has been 
demonstrated to increase the ability to recognize emotions (Young & Hugenberg, 2010). Group 
membership is probably more relevant (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008). Actually, recent findings 
indicated that group membership and similarity have different effects on human behavior 
(Mussweiler & Ockenfels, 2013). There might be a third explanation why personal similarity does 
not improve emotion processing in general. Todd, Hanko, Galinsky, and Mussweiler (2011) 
described that similarity leads to an egocentric perspective. People thus strongly include their 
own knowledge, norms, and beliefs into their situational appraisal (see also Mussweiler & 
Ockenfels, 2013). Following this line of thought, participants in the similar condition might 




incorporate personal tendencies, moods, or perspectives into their emotion perception, leading 
to a more complex influence of similarity than simply boosting attention or emotional 
engagement. Further studies, using a more realistic approach and allowing for analysis of 
individual differences are therefore needed. 
Regarding the assumed relevance of mirroring others emotions (Hatfield et al., 2011; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002), it is rather striking that we found only weak responses in the 
autonomic nervous system towards prosodic stimuli (for similar results concerning facial 
expressions see Alpers et al., 2011; Wangelin et al., 2012). Presumably, the emotional responses 
elicited by prosodic information were too subtle to be reflected in changes of electrodermal 
activity (cf. Levenson 2014). Emotional expressions are highly relevant social stimuli and might not 
function as emotion elicitors in socially irrelevant situation such as lab experiments (see Hess & 
Fischer, 2013). In our study, we aimed at improving the social relevance of speech tokens by 
embedding them into context and by providing biographical information about the fictive 
speaker. As mentioned above, this setting remained artificial and future research is needed to 
investigate whether more relevant social stimuli, such as direct second-person messages, avatars 
looking directly at the participants while speech tokens are presented, or utterances spoken by 
personally familiar people would increase physiological responsiveness to emotional prosody. 
However, it might also be possible that vocal expressions alone do not elicit sufficiently strong 
affective or empathic responses - in this context it is not surprising that emotion processing is not 
affected by our similarity manipulation. Vocal expressions in daily life are seldom expressed 
without the appropriate verbal content. Regenbogen and colleagues (2012) for example 
demonstrated that empathic concern is reduced when speech content is neutralized. Similarly, 
there is evidence that although emotional prosody can be recognized irrespectively of the actual 
semantic information of the utterance (Pell, Jaywant, Monetta, & Kotz, 2011), semantics seem to 
outweigh emotional prosodic information when presented simultaneously (Kotz & Paulmann, 




but semantics and context might be more important than the expression alone. Future studies on 
multimodal stimuli in more realistic situations are promising to enlighten the discussion about 
how and when we share the emotions of our social partner. 
It is noteworthy that processing affective sounds presumably triggers much stronger 
affective and thus autonomous reactions, while the recognition of their emotional content is poor 
compared to prosodic stimuli. Autonomic reactions to acoustic stimuli can thus be evoked in 
laboratory settings (Bradley & Lang, 2000). The variation in affective processing of sounds and 
vocal expressions might be explained by overall differences between the two stimulus domains. 
Bayer and Schacht (2014) described two levels of differences between the domains which render 
a comparison almost impossible, namely physical and emotion-specific features. Firstly, at the 
physical level, affective sounds are more variable in their acoustic content than the vocal 
expressions, and hence more diverse, while emotional expressions vary only in subtle acoustic 
differences (Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007). Secondly, there are strong differences in their 
overall emotion-specific features. While pictures and sounds have a direct emotional meaning 
(thus depicting the complete emotional situation), an emotional expression primarily depicts the 
expresser’s emotional appraisal of a situation, rather than the situation itself. In contrast to 
stimuli with a direct emotional meaning, Walla and Panksepp (2013) described emotional 
expressions as possessing indirect meaning. Emotional sounds used in our study, such as baby 
cries, explosions, applause, and baby babble, require quick responses for which an explicit 
knowledge of the situation might be less important. For emotional expressions, in contrast, 
explicit knowledge may be vital. To behave adaptively, the context has to be analyzed as well, 
which might prevent immediate emotion responses (Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011). 
Attending to emotional stimuli such as pictures or sounds seemingly evokes emotional responses 
in the beholder while attending to pure emotion expressions rather elicits recognition efforts (see 
Britton et al., 2006 for similar conclusion) than emotional engagement. As stated above, 




emotional engagement or empathic reactions in form of autonomic responses, might follow 
emotion recognition after further evaluation, but are not involved in emotion recognition per se.  
To sum up, our study revealed that listening to vocal expressions of emotions did not 
evoke strong emotion-congruent autonomic responses in the listener, and that neither emotion 
recognition nor emotional engagement was affected by biographical similarity between sender 
and listener. Our findings indicate that the recognition of vocal expressions does not depend on 
social connectedness or emotional engagement. The formation of empathic concern requires a 
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4.1 Example of a short story (Experiment 1) 
Today is Monday and he wants to work calmly from home. He planned to start working 
directly after breakfast, but instead he first finishes his housework that he left undone during the 
week. He takes care of his dirty cloths, vacuums and tidies up. It is half past ten, when he finally 
turns on his PC and fetches his documents. He spends the next two hours in front of his notes. He 
works focused and only leaves the desk to get fresh coffee from out of the kitchen. Suddenly, the 
doorbell rings. As nobody else is at home, he gets up, goes to the door and opens it. There is the 
postman, who hands him a certified letter and asks for a signature. He examines the addressor of 
the letter and the date of the postmark. He looks up and says:  
“I have expected this one” [Target sentence] 
 
German original: 
Heute am Montag will er in Ruhe von zu Hause aus arbeiten. Doch anstatt sich sofort nach 
dem Frühstück an den Schreibtisch zu setzen, wie er sich das vorgenommen hatte, erledigt er 
zunächst den Haushalt, der die Woche über liegen geblieben ist, Er kümmert sich um seine 
dreckige Wäsche, saugt Staub und räumt ein wenig auf. Es ist halb elf als er schließlich seinen 
Rechner hochfährt und seine Unterlagen hervorholt. Die nächsten zwei Stunden verbringt er vor 
seinen Aufzeichnungen. Er arbeitet konzentriert und verlässt den Schreibtisch nur um sich 
frischen Kaffee aus der Küche zu holen. Plötzlich klingelt es an der Tür. Da niemand sonst zu 
Hause ist, steht er auf geht zur Tür und öffnet sie. Es ist der Postbote, der ihm ein Einschreiben in 
die Hand drückt und nach einer Unterschrift verlangt. Er betrachtet den Absender des Briefes und 
das Datum des Poststempels. Dann schaut er auf und sagt: 
„Den hab ich erwartet.“  
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5 General Discussion 
 
In this thesis I investigated the impact of vocal expressions on understanding emotional 
states in other people. I found that vocal expressions of emotions could be convincingly play-
acted, both by professional actors (Chapter 2 and 3), and by acting inexperienced people (Chapter 
3). However, there was a notable interaction between emotion category and encoding condition 
for sadness and anger, which was consistent across cultures. The cross-cultural comparison 
(Chapter 2) revealed a comparable emotion recognition pattern for German, Romanian, and 
Indonesian participants with a slight in-group-effect for German listeners, which was independent 
of the encoding condition. The recognition of acted expressions was not more strongly affected 
by culture than the recognition of spontaneous expressions. Cultural differences became mainly 
apparent in decoding biases. Recognition rates for acting-inexperienced people closely resembled 
the rates for spontaneous expressions and only showed lower values for sadness (Chapter 3). 
Notably, emotion portrayals by professional actors were more consistently recognized as being 
play-acted than the ones by inexperienced people, which contradicted the hypothesis that actors 
were especially suited to produce credible emotional expressions. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated 
that biographical similarity that was experimentally manipulated between a fictitious speaker and 
the listener in a rating study did not improve emotion recognition, in contrast to the prediction. 
Additionally, listening attentively to the vocal emotion expressions did not trigger skin 
conductance responses (SCR), but affected pupil size. None of the autonomic reactions was 
affected by similarity manipulation. Listening to sounds with emotional content, in contrast, 
evoked arousal-related SCRs in the participants, showing that the methodological approach 
chosen was suitable to detect such effects when occurring. In the following chapters I will discuss 






5.1 Relation between play-acted and spontaneous expressions  
“All the world’s a stage” 
(Shakespeare, from As you like it, Act II Scene VII) 
 
5.1.1 Authenticity - The complete picture 
Can we infer the inner affective states of our social partners by listening to their voices? It 
is assumed that this is the case (i.e., Mier et al., 2010), considering that emotional expressions rely 
on peripheral physiological reactions during emotional episodes (i.e., Moors et al., 2013; Mulligan 
& Scherer, 2012; K. R. Scherer, 1986). Although emotional expressions can be masked, feigned, 
suppressed, or intensified due to cultural display rules or social requirements (U. Scherer et al., 
1980), considering their predictive value, “true” expressions should be distinguishable from 
deliberately produced ones. My study revealed that listeners could not consistently distinguish 
whether the emotional expressions were spontaneous or play-acted. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of 
this thesis were part of a larger set of studies on the comparison of spontaneous and play-acted 
expressions. In the following section I summarize the complete findings so far. 
Play-acted emotion expressions differed acoustically from spontaneous ones, namely by 
their less monotonous speech and their voice quality that mark articulation differences, but these 
acoustic variations did not affect emotion encoding specifically (Jürgens et al., 2011). In Chapter 3, 
I showed that speech melody consistently depicts acted expressions, but that voice quality does 
not, leaving merely one acoustic parameter for differentiation (cf. Williams & Stevens, 1972). 
From the receivers’ point of view, whether speech tokens were authentic or play-acted was 
recognized infrequently, with authentic expressions recognized correctly more often (an effect 
called veracity effect or truthful bias, see Ekman, 1996; Levine et al., 1999). Response behavior 
during emotion recognition, however, varied depending on acting and this effect was stable 
across different cultures. Anger was more accurately recognized when professionally acted, while 
sadness was recognized less accurately when acted either by actors or by inexperienced speakers 
(see Chapter 2 and 3, Drolet et al., 2012). This effect on emotion recognition seems to be based 
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on stimulus-inherent features, as participants primed with “acted” and “authentic” cues prior to 
stimulus presentation, did not show any behavioral differences (Drolet et al., 2013). German 
participants were in general more accurately in their recognition and cross-cultural difference 
mainly became apparent by attributional biases, such as a disposition against judging authentic 
stimuli as anger in Romanian and Indonesian listeners. While the explicit question whether a 
recording was play-acted or not could only poorly be answered by listeners, Drolet et al. (2012) 
found that listening to authentic stimuli increased neural activity of the Theory of Mind network 
(U. Frith & Frith, 2003). Thus both stimuli groups were perceived differently, and this difference 
was linked to mentalizing. Further analyses showed that the activation of the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC, belonging to the ToM network) during an explicit authenticity discrimination task 
was related to the variability of fundamental frequency, the acoustic parameter discriminating 
play-acted and spontaneous emotional speech (Drolet, Schubotz, & Fischer, 2014). Summing up, 
our studies indicate that vocal emotional expressions can be play-acted convincingly, even more 
from people that did not received acting training. Yet, specific effects on emotion recognition 
across encoding conditions were found. One parameter, the more variable speech melody, 
characterizes acted expressions, which might affect the mentalizing process.  
 
5.1.2 Emotion-specific recognition of vocal expressions 
The presented data on emotion recognition demonstrated that anger, fear, joy, and 
sadness were not equally well recognized and that acting influenced the recognition of emotions 
specifically. Emotion-specific differences in expression and recognition have been studied for 
disgust, an expression that is clearly depicted in the face but not in the voice (T. Johnstone & 
Scherer, 2000; K. R. Scherer, 2003). This observation was explained by the function of disgust, 
which is to warn people in proximity not to eat rotten food. The ability to transmit disgust over 
longer distances was not necessary and did therefore not evolve in the acoustic domain (K. R. 




generally low (see Chapter 3, and Jürgens et al., 2011 for weak emotion effects in the acoustic 
structure, indicating a low emotional content in general), which highlights that previous studies 
that used preselected stimuli overemphasized the informative value of expressions by the vocal 
domain (e.g., Scherer et al., 2001). Vocal expressions can be distinct and intense, but seemingly in 
daily life they are used more ambigous. 
Participants were especially inconsistent in classifying fear expressions. Yet, recognition 
was above chance level (Chapter 3). Regarding its function to give warnings about an approaching 
threat, the ability to reach more distant individuals by using the vocal channel would be of 
advantage, (K. R. Scherer, 2003). In case of our stimulus set, the question arises why fear is not 
recognized strongly by the participants (see also K. R. Scherer, Banse, Wallbott, & Goldbeck, 
1991), especially while other studies did find high recognition accuracies (Pell et al., 2009; K. R. 
Scherer et al., 2001). The label fear often comprises a high aroused version – panic - or 
alternatively a less aroused version – anxiety (cf. Banse & Scherer, 1996) and is thus not 
consistent (see also Russell, 2003). It seems plausible that panic is more frequently expressed in 
short exclamations such as single words, short phrases or by nonverbal affect bursts (such as 
screams, see Sauter et al., 2010) than by longer texts as used in our studies. The fear stimuli 
included in our stimulus set were recorded in social interactions. As fear is characterized by a lack 
of control and power (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), it seems plausible that people did not want to 
communicate this inner state to people other than their intimates. Considering that even in the 
acted conditions fear was inconsistently recognized, anxiety is seemingly not only suppressed in 
social situation, but is generally transmitted weakly via the vocal channel. 
The recognition of joy was inconsistent in our studies and generally low for both 
conditions (i.e., Drolet et al., 2012, see also Pell et al., 2009; K. R. Scherer et al., 2001). Considering 
the use of social smiles and other situations in which humans express happiness, although they 
might feel different (e.i., Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1995), it is interesting that our findings 
result in such a low recognition of play-acted joy. I would assume that the face, with the smile as 
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clear expression pattern, is much more important when expressing, or play-acting joy than the 
voice.  
Anger and sadness are of special interest, as they are consistently perceived differently in 
our studies when being play-acted or spontaneous respectively. The encoding condition was not 
more frequently recognized for anger and sadness compared to the other emotion categories 
(Chapter 3). The function of anger might explain the high recognition rates for this emotion 
(Banse & Scherer, 1996; K. R. Scherer, 2003), which includes threatening opponents as well as 
signaling dominance and power (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; K. R. Scherer, 2003). Being able to 
threat people from a distance as well as to recognize the threat in time is an advantage, 
promoting the evolution of anger vocal expressions (K. R. Scherer, 2003). Anger stimuli in general 
attract high attention (cf. Bayer & Schacht, 2014; see also the quick and distinct pupil increase 
towards angry speech in Chapter 4), possibly caused by the importance for the individual’s well-
being to recognize a possible threat. Display rules might reduce the intensity of anger in 
spontaneous situations, as its expression can have strong negative effects on social relations 
(Fischer & Manstead, 2008). In daily life, people might supress their anger, which results in mild 
versions that are recognized infrequently. When professional actors are asked to play-act anger, 
this social control is not necessary and they might produce a more intense expression that is 
easier to recognize. It could be speculated that non-actors cannot abandon the social constriction 
while acting. The ambiguity of spontaneous anger is seen in the recognition bias against judging 
authentic expressions as anger by participants from collectivistic societies. As proposed by 
Elfenbein et al. (2002), cultural biases might only be effective when the expression is less distinct. 
Expressions of sadness frequently showed high recognition rates (K. R. Scherer, 2003), 
which is not surprising considering that it is the only low aroused negative emotion (with the 
excepion of low aroused fear; Laukka et al., 2005; Russell, 1980). The social function of sadness is 
to call for help and support (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Hendriks & Vingerhoets, 2006), and while 




(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Instead of suppressing, people might rather express this emotion to 
gain support. Play-acting sadness includes actively reducing arousal and activity, which might 
simply be difficult to obtain. 
However, since these explanations are done post-hoc empirical support is still needed. 
Additionally, rating studies reveal the ability of the listener to judge a stimulus, and they only 
allow a restricted inference about the production. To account for production differences, an 
analysis of the acoustic structure is necessary. In my acoustic analysis, I found no interaction 
between emotion and encoding condition to support the assumptions that play-acted anger 
expressions were more intense than spontaneous ones or that spontaneous sadness is encoded 
differently than acted sadness (Chapter 3, Jürgens et al., 2011). Differences in the acoustic 
structure should exist as the recognition accuracies are stimulus-based (Drolet et al., 2013); these 
might be too subtle to be detected in the acoustic analysis, or are found in different parameters 
other than speech rate, fundamental frequency, energy distribution, and harmonic-to-noise ratio 
(Jürgens et al., 2011). 
Alternatively, the speech melody might interact with emotion recognition. More aroused 
expressions (e.g. anger) are characterized by more vivid intonation while low aroused emotions 
possess a more monotonous speech melody (Drolet et al., 2014; Juslin & Laukka, 2001). In line 
with these observations acted expressions might be perceived as anger, while spontaneous 
expressions are more strongly associated with sadness. This is in line with the observation that 
people generally were biased to judge professionally acted expressions as anger (Chapter 2). 
Last, individual variation in expressivity of our speakers should also be taken into account 
(Hildebrandt, Olderbak, Sommer, & Wilhelm, 2014; Spackman, Brown, & Otto, 2009). Our 
stimulus set consisted of recorded by a high number of speakers (78 for the authentic stimuli, 41 
for the professionally acted and 39 for the non-professional expressions). Nevertheless, to 
confirm our findings and to ensure that the emotion recognition pattern is caused not by 
individual differences in encoding ability (cf. Ekman & Oster, 1979; Hildebrandt et al., 2014), but 
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by the process of acting in general, a replication using a second, independent stimulus set of 
spontaneous expressions would be helpful. 
 
5.1.3 Reliability of vocal expressions 
Do emotional expressions reliably indicate the affective state of the sender? In my 
studies, I showed that acting-inexperienced people were able to produce convincing vocal 
expressions. This finding is in conflict with reliability and suggests that play-acting emotional 
expressions (via the voice) is a common human ability. Following the argumentation of Goffman 
(1959), people play-act their emotions every day. He described human interactions as a theatre 
analogy and according to his approach, humans are social actors, who play a role and who adapt 
their behavior and their appearance according to the situation and the social expectations. This 
speaks for the exceeding use of deliberate expressions in daily life. Studies on emotion regulation 
also demonstrated the ability to change expressive behavior to adapt to social necessities (Gross, 
1998; Kappas, 2013). Getting back to the model proposed by U. Scherer et al. (1980), explaining 
expressions of emotions by push and pull factors, this result should not be surprising (see also K. 
R. Scherer & Bänziger, 2010). It is however surprising considering that the lack of underlying 
emotion is not recognized, in light of the importance of deception detection in stable 
communication systems. 
In the case that emotional expressions have a predictive value for the receiver, deception 
should be minimized (R. A. Johnstone & Grafen, 1993). As summarized in Chapter 5.1.2, there is 
only evidence that sadness might be difficult to produce deliberately. For the other emotions, 
although listeners cannot explicitly name the level of authenticity or showed difficulties in 
recognizing the play-acted versions, mental processes are at least different when attending to 
acted or spontaneous expressions (Drolet et al., 2012), which in a next step might lead to 
different behaviors in response to the authenticity. Speech melody (pitch variability), might be 




interesting that trained actors are not more capable of adjusting their behavior and not more 
convincing than non-trained people, as would be assumed when play-acted expressions would 
need specific attention or effort during production (Mehu et al., 2012; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001)  
I advance the view that pitch variability might be a misleading marker for detecting acted 
expressions and that under certain conditions expressions are not distinguishable in terms of their 
authenticity. A look at word stress and the use of pitch variability for differentiating sentence 
types (such as exclamatory, or interrogative sentence) (Kent & Read, 1992; Lehiste & Peterson, 
1961) demonstrates the ability to deliberately manipulate this marker quite precisely. 
Additionally, if this parameter would represent a common differentiation between spontaneous 
and play-acted expressions, listeners should be more attentive to it and make use of this 
parameter, but recognition rates do not indicate this. Pitch variability has been proposed to be 
positively related to arousal and intensity (Laukka et al., 2005; K. R. Scherer, 2003). Higher pitch 
variability, that is more vivid speech, in play-acted expressions might be explained by acted 
expressions being more intense (K. R. Scherer et al., 2011), but interestingly this intensity effect is 
not consistent in the other acoustic parameters (Jürgens et al., 2011). The origin of the differences 
in pitch contour is thus still unknown. Notably, both acted conditions deviated from the 
spontaneous recordings in the fact that actors did not learn the sentences by heart, but read 
them aloud from a sheet of paper. Acting was thus not the only difference between the speech 
samples. Speech melody is influenced by reading, although the literature is not consistent on the 
direction of this effect, namely whether reading increases or diminishes variability of the 
fundamental frequency (Batliner et al., 1995; Laan, 1997). The differences in pitch variability 
might therefore not be caused by acting but by reading. This line of thought is however purely 
speculative. The necessary next step should be to disentangle the effect of reading and acting. A 
comparison between script-based and improvised acting might uncover which acoustic 
characteristics are caused by reading and whether improvised portrayals influence response 
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behavior similarly to spontaneous expressions. A study focusing on this effect is currently under 
preparation. 
Independent of the implicit perception and the acoustic differences, the response on the 
behavioral level is puzzling. Why are people so capable in play-acting vocal expressions or so poor 
in detecting the deception respectively (see Dezecache et al., 2013; R. A. Johnstone & Grafen, 
1993)? For listeners it should always be of importance to be able to detect emotional deception, 
not only in the case of sadness. Be taken in by false sadness and supporting the wrong individual 
might cost important resources, but detecting false anger might also be of advantage. Authentic 
anger indicates an actual threat and a more powerful opponent, while play-acted anger does not. 
One explanation for this lack of deception detection might be that it is more costly to miss 
an authentic emotion than to mistakenly attend to a faked one (Ekman, 1996). I would state that 
this explanation is not sufficient, as even attending to false emotional expressions has negative 
consequences, like mentioned above. Understanding whether an expression is used deceptively 
or not, might comprise attending to the whole body, including face, voice, body posture and 
speech content (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 2006; Mortillaro et al., 2013). The synchronization between 
all expressive channels might be more unmasking than a single channel (Mortillaro et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, the ability to detect lies on the basis of whole body shots and verbal content has 
been found to be poor as well (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Warren et al., 2008; Zuckerman, 
Koester, & Colella, 1985). A compelling explanation comes from Schmidt and Cohn (2001), who 
proposed that the detection of faked emotional expressions might be most operative within close 
social entities, such as friends or romantic partners. Familiar people are of highest significance 
and so is their deceptive behavior. In these social entities, individuals have a clear knowledge on 
the emotional expressivity of their partner and might be more attentive (Young & Hugenberg, 
2010; Zhang & Parmley, 2010). Familiarity with the expressive pattern of others may be necessary 
for a successful evaluation of deceptive behavior (but see Levine et al., 1999). However, I could 




experimentally manipulated similarity did not improve the recognition of vocal emotional 
expressions (see Chapter 4). In less experimental settings, social connection might have a positive 
effect (see 5.2.1). 
 C. D. Frith and Frith (2007) stated that human communication emerge “when both sender 
and receiver are aware that they are exchanging signals” (p. R724). This knowledge and the ability 
to mentalize others’ internal states make human emotion communication - although evolutionally 
rooted (Scheiner & Fischer, 2011) - more complex than any non-human communication. Humans 
do not base their behavioral responses on the perception of expressions alone, but also include 
situational appraisal, own experience, prior behavior as well as knowledge on intentions and 
beliefs of the other person in their decisions (cf. for involvement of mentalizing during 
authenticity perception Drolet et al., 2012; Drolet et al., 2013). Additionally, the act of emotional 
deception is also done intentionally (for involvement of the mentalizing network during 
deception, see Lisofsky, Kazzer, Heekeren, & Prehn, 2014), which – in combination with being 
aware of the production and the effect of emotional expressions - might allow humans to imitate 
these signals precisely. Single channels, like the voice, might have lost their predictive value. For 
our study set, I can at least summarize that the voice alone is not sufficient to reliably predict 
whether an individual undergoes an emotional episode, or not. To strengthen this finding, we 
need, however, knowledge on the speaker’s autonomic reactions to fully reveal his/her affective 
state during voice recording. Studies on the coherence of emotional components should be of 
priority in emotion research, as they are essential to understand the nature of emotions and 
might answer the question about what is being communicated (see Fernández-Dols & Crivelli, 
2013; Reisenzein et al., 2013). 
 
5.1.4 Implications for using acted expressions in research 
Play-acted emotional expressions are the common stimulus material in emotion research. 
Barrett (2011) stated the question, whether these (facial) emotion portrayals do represent facial 
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behavior in daily situations, or whether they are merely symbols of emotional expressions. The 
same question applies for commonly used vocal recordings. Although K. R. Scherer and Bänziger 
(2010) pointed out that actors’ portrayals are not studied to gain knowledge about spontaneous 
behavior but about expressive codes, implications for daily expressions are nevertheless made on 
the basis of this research. 
I argued that vocal emotional expressions can be play-acted in a realistic fashion, perhaps 
with the exception of sadness. However, this assumption of realism does not hold for the 
commonly used emotion portrayals that are produced by the standard recording procedure, in 
which speakers are asked to express one word (Hammerschmidt & Jürgens, 2007; Leinonen, 
Hiltunen, Linnankoski, & Laakso, 1997) or one sentence (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Juslin & Laukka, 
2001) in a given emotion. Afterwards, speech tokens are preselected for being highly recognizable 
and thus rather represent a particular set of expressions that overestimates the emotional 
content of speech recordings. Our studies indicate that acted expressions can be regarded as 
similar to spontaneous ones, but only under specific recording conditions. We achieved realistic 
expressions by using longer texts, providing context information, and abstaining from pre-
selection (see Enos & Hirschberg, 2006 for their call for more realistic recording conditions). This 
procedure reduced the recognition accuracies of stimuli compared to other studies (Banse & 
Scherer, 1996; K. R. Scherer et al., 2001; Van Bezooijen et al., 1983), but just because of this, 
increased similarity to spontaneous expressions. The assumption that acted expressions are more 
stereotypical and intense (i.e., K. R. Scherer et al., 2011), is most likely true for all play-acted 
stimulus sets that were created using preselected recordings. The stereotypy and high intensity is 
merely founded by the recording conditions than by acting per se. Our emotion portrayals clearly 
do not reflect the majority of existing stimulus sets, and might be regarded as an example how 
realistic stimulus corpora can be produced, namely by recording longer text segments, by 




The idea of adapting recording conditions for producing more realistic expressions, without 
accessing daily life recordings, is not new (see Enos & Hirschberg, 2006; K. R. Scherer & Bänziger, 
2010). Moreover, the importance of realistic data sets has recently been pointed out (Schuller, 
Batliner, Steidl, & Seppi, 2011). In this context, it has been assumed that the use of specific acting 
techniques, in which the actor creates actual emotions during his performance, improves 
authenticity of emotion depiction (Gosselin et al., 1995; K. R. Scherer & Bänziger, 2010). These 
techniques go back to Stanislavskij (1989) and Strasberg (1987), who highlight the importance of 
creating inner affective states via recollection of experienced emotional situations (see also 
Goldstein & Winner, 2010). However, whether these techniques actually are responsible for more 
realistic acting is still under debate and empirical evidence is lacking (Goldstein & Bloom, 2011; 
Goldstein & Winner, 2010; Konijn, 1995). The recognition of emotion expressions by acting-
inexperienced people closely resembled the spontaneous expressions, indicating that specifically 
trained actors are not necessary in emotion research. On the contrary, acting- and speech training 
seems to have even negative effects on the credibility of emotion portrayals. This conclusion does 
not hold for acting in general, but only for the transmission of (vocally expressed) emotions. 
 
5.2 Processing of emotional expressions 
5.2.1 Influences on emotion recognition 
Emotion recognition was supposed to be altered by the social connection between 
interaction partners (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008). In Chapter 2, I found a positive effect of group-
membership on both emotion and authenticity recognition. This in-group effect might be 
explained by the fact that German participants understood the language and felt more secure in 
their judgments. However, the stimuli might also have more social relevance for the German 
participants, and cause an attention-shift or an increase in empathic concern (Thibault et al., 
2006; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008). In Chapter 4, social relevance of the vocal expressions was 
increased by biographical similarity manipulation that was thought to create a fictitious social link 
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between speaker and receiver (cf. Burger et al., 2004; Guéguen & Martin, 2009). However, 
similarity did not alter emotion recognition in the predicted way or intensified emotional 
engagement. Additionally, vocal expressions in the similar condition did not attract more 
attention as was assumed (Ackerman et al., 2006; Thibault et al., 2006), which was indicated by 
the unaffected pupil size. It is possible that the manipulation was not realistic or strong enough to 
affect the listeners, indicating that an actual social link between both partners is necessary for a 
similarity manipulation to function, as for example when interacting with one another in person 
(i.e., Walton et al., 2012). The fact that group membership improved emotion recognition while 
similarity did not, might be caused by cultural group-membership being more realistic or credible 
compared to the similarity manipulation in Chapter 4. People speaking an unintelligible language 
obviously belong to an out-group, while the similarity manipulation via fictitious biographical 
profiles was apparently constructed. 
One interesting explanation why similarity did not result in improved emotion recognition 
comes from Todd and colleagues (2011). They described that similarity triggers an egocentric 
perspective. Accordingly, listeners might incorporate their own expectations, situational 
evaluations and moods into their ratings when listening to expressions by more similar speakers. 
The emotion recognition would in this case be individually affected. Similarity and group-member 
ship might have very different influences on human behavior other than increasing social 
relevance (see Bijlstra et al., 2010; Mussweiler & Ockenfels, 2013). 
 
5.2.2 Sharing emotions 
Attending to others’ emotions is thought to evoke congruent affects in the receiver 
(Hatfield et al., 2011; Magnée et al., 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002). This process has been 
explained to be of importance for understanding the inner affective states of others (Carr et al., 
2003; Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Niedenthal & Maringer, 2009; Stel & van Knippenberg, 2008). 




listening to vocal expressions did not trigger strong autonomic reactions at all, speaking against an 
evocation of emotional episodes during emotion recognition (for similar results concerning facial 
expressions see Alpers et al., 2011; Wangelin et al., 2012). Vocal expressions are thus not 
processed and understood via – measurable - bodily sensations. Autonomic reactions as 
responses to emotional states in others were found in lifelike situations, namely when a real 
interaction between both sender and receiver existed (Cwir et al., 2011; Hein et al., 2011; 
Levenson & Rueff, 1992), but seemingly not when a single expression channel is attended to. The 
similarity manipulation in Chapter 4 presumably did not strengthen social relevance of the 
stimulus sufficiently for an effective emotional engagement. It would be a promising experimental 
approach to look at emotional engagement of naїve participants during manipulated phone calls. 
In these cases participants would also listened to only one expression channel, but the situation 
would be more socially relevant. I would additionally assume that biographical similarity in this 
example would affect emotion processing. 
Moreover, the stimulus selection might diminish realism of the experiment additionally as 
I used intense and preselected emotion expressions to investigate affect sharing. This was done to 
evoke strong and controllable effects (see K. R. Scherer & Bänziger, 2010). I summarized in 
Chapter 5.1.4 that emotional expressions can be convincingly play-acted, but that this is most 
often not the case. Stel and Vonk (2009) demonstrated that whether an emotional situation was 
perceived as real or not at least facilitated perspective taking, although every emotion in this 
study was play-acted and only participants’ believes varied. There is the possibility that emotional 
expressions used to investigate affective processing are simply not believed in and thus do not 
cause any necessity to involve. A follow-up study using real life expressions or realistically acted 
expressions (see Chapter 3), would disclose this issue. 
Emotional expressions did not trigger affective responses when presented in isolation. 
This result is difficult to bring in line with studies on facial mimicry that are conducted on context 
free facial expressions or voices (Dimberg et al., 2011; Künecke et al., 2014; Magnée et al., 2007; 
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Sato et al., 2013; Sonnby-Borgström, 2002). Thus, the question is whether mimicry is an actual 
indication of emotional episodes during emotion perception (Dimberg, 1997) or a “cognitive 
mechanism that is not associated with or dependent on any particular affective or emotional 
state” (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999, p. 904). Moody, McIntosh, Mann, and Weisser (2007) 
demonstrated that emotion induction in the receiver influenced facial mimicry, which they 
interpreted as an indication for underlying affective processes during mimicry (Blairy et al., 1999). 
Emotion-congruent facial reactions to vocal expressions (Hawk, Fischer, & Van Kleef, 2012; 
Magnée et al., 2007), to affective sounds (Bradley & Lang, 2000) or a boosted mimicry effect 
when attending to facial expressions of friends (McIntosh, 2006), also contradicts a pure motor 
mimicry behavior. Chapter 4 of this thesis did not include analyses of facial mimicry, but the 
absence of arousal-related skin conductance responses when listening to vocal expressions (or 
looking at facial expressions, see Alpers et al., 2011) speaks against a common affective basis of 
facial mimicry and autonomic responses. Future studies should include the simultaneous 
recording of both facial EMG and autonomic reactions, to enlighten this issue on emotion 
evocation. 
Generally, the formation of empathy, i.e. sharing an emotion of others, seems to be a 
holistic process, and simultaneous processing of all communication channels (speech, gestures, 
face, voice) as well as context might be necessary for a complete empathic reaction (see Cwir et 
al., 2011; Hess & Fischer, 2013; Regenbogen et al., 2012). Presumably, emotional expressions are 
simply recognized first (cf. Britton et al., 2006; Zahavi, 2008), while empathic reactions are formed 
in a later processing step, after exhaustive evaluation of the situation, including evaluating the 
relevance of the sender (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). Empathy is then responsible for costly 
helping and prosocial behavior (Batson et al., 1981; Hein et al., 2011). 
My results are not in contrast with the assumption that emotional expressions are 
processed via a shared representation between experiencing and attending to an emotional 




level of affective processing. In contrast to SCRs (skin conductance responses), pupil size is a more 
sensitive marker indicating the slightest differences during stimulus processing (Laeng et al., 
2012). The affective reaction is just not intense enough to trigger emotional episodes including 
autonomic reactions (Laeng et al., 2012; Levenson, 2014). However, my findings indicates that if 
simulation and mirroring are important for understanding emotions (Carr et al., 2003; Morris et 
al., 1996; Wicker et al., 2003), the process is merely limited to shared mental representations in 
the central nervous system and does not automatically radiate to the peripheral physiology and 
induces “bodily sensations” (Singer, 2006). 
 
5.2.3 Emotional content of vocal expressions 
Situations that are of relevance for our well-being and future prospects possess an 
emotional meaning that elicits emotional reactions in the beholder including autonomic reactions 
(Lang, 1995), preparing the individual for rapid action. In fact, in Chapter 4 of this thesis I could 
confirm this notion by revealing reactions of the autonomic nervous system as response to 
affective sounds (such as dentist drills, bombs, baby babble, or slot machines) (see also Bradley et 
al., 2001; Bradley & Lang, 2000). Emotional expressions are not only thought to be shared 
between social partners (Chapter 5.2.2) but also are regarded as possessing emotional content 
itself, for example seeing an angry looking man approaching may induce fear. As to their social 
importance and high ecological relevance, emotional expressions are described to have high 
emotional value (see Okon-Singer et al., 2013). In this context it is even more surprising that 
sounds induced autonomic reactions, while vocal prosody did not. The same pattern was found 
for faces and pictures as well, strengthening our findings (Alpers et al., 2011; Wangelin et al., 
2012). On closer inspection, emotional expressions and affective sounds or pictures are however 
quite different in their meaning. Sounds/pictures might simply be more intense (Bayer & Schacht, 
2014; Okon-Singer et al., 2013), but presumably this is only one part of the explanation. Emotional 
expressions are highly social and context dependent. According to Walla and Panksepp (2013), 
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they do not depict the emotion of the situation itself, but rather the situational evaluation of the 
sender. Hence to understand the expression completely, the context is crucial for the receiver. 
Listening to a bomb on the other hand already depicts the whole situation. Beyond that, listening 
to the explosion of a bomb should involve everyone in proximity, while expressions are social, 
communicative entities. These examples emphasized the importance of regarding contexts when 
evaluating emotional expressions. Emotion research has made extensive use of context free 
expressions. They were used were used in laboratory experiments as emotion elicitors (Porter et 
al., 2012; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996) and regularly function as stimuli triggering 
emotion reactions in studies on affective neuroscience (Okon-Singer et al., 2013; Tamietto & de 
Gelder, 2010). My findings speak for a careful use of emotional expressions as affective stimuli, 
and are thus in line with Walla and Panksepp (2013), who highlighted the differences in emotional 
meaning between expressions and scenic stimuli (such as picture, or sound). As a whole, an 
expression (be it vocal or facial) alone does not have a strong emotional impact on the receiver. 
 
5.3 Conclusion and Outlook 
 
Studying spontaneous, daily life expressions showed how weak and ambiguous the 
emotional content of speech excerpts might be. The use of intensely and preselected play-acted 
expressions in prior studies overemphasized the importance of the vocal channel in emotion 
communication (e.g. K. R. Scherer et al., 2001) and masked emotion-specific difference in 
recognition accuracies. The voice, nevertheless, clearly transmits emotional information 
independent of verbal content. However, emotionality of prosodic excerpts is not invariably 
connected to an underlying emotional episode, but rather controlled by the speaker. Vocal 
expressions putatively do not inform the receiver about the emotional state of the sender, while 




emotional information by the vocal channel seems more strongly based on cognitive, rather than 
on affective processes. 
Barrett and colleagues (Barrett, 2011; Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011), argued that 
humans automatically integrate context information into their emotion classification; a fact that 
demonstrates a meaningful ambiguity of emotional expressions, per se. They spoke for a 
necessary paradigm shift in emotion research, away from the assumption that expressions (in 
their case facial expressions) can be read to infer the emotional state of others (see Mulligan & 
Scherer, 2012), towards viewing them contextualized. Considering the low intrinsic emotional 
content of vocal expression (Chapter 4) and the inconsistent emotion recognition of realistic 
emotion expressions (Chapter 2, Chapter 3) my findings are in line with this notion. 
Taking a single channel out of the whole picture is artificial, but it is nevertheless necessary 
before understanding the complex interplay of all expressive channels. Research so far has 
concentrated on single expression (cf. Cowie et al., 2001; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009; K. R. Scherer 
et al., 2001), but it is now time to move to more context-based, multimodal and realistic 
approaches, in order to understand the complexities of emotion communication (see also K. R. 
Scherer et al., 2011). Future studies should, in line with my findings, focus on two aspects. First, 
the coherence between the different emotional components should be investigated further. This 
should be done to investigate whether the subjective feeling, emotion expressions and 
physiological responses build one unit or whether they are decoupled from each other. We only 
understand what is being communicated when the interplay of autonomic reactions, subjective 
experience and emotional expressions is disclosed (Reisenzein et al., 2013). Second, research 
should shift the focus away from single channels to multimodal communication (cf. Mortillaro et 
al., 2013). It is the next challenge in emotion research to investigate the usage and recognition of 
emotional expressions regarding all modalities at once, in realistic, but controllable settings (see 
Bänziger & Scherer, 2007; Kotz & Paulmann, 2007; Regenbogen et al., 2012; Regenbogen et al., 
2012; Van den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007). There are already existing corpora which can 
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serve to provide stimuli for future studies. For example, the GEMEP – Corpus (Geneva Multimodal 
Emotion Portrayals, Bänziger & Scherer, 2007) consists of audiovisual recordings allowing the 
comparison of vocal, facial and bodily expressions. However, this corpus includes only nonsense 
verbal content and the recordings were acted and preselected, leaving intense and easily 
recognizable expression. The GEMEP corpus represents a promising start to investigate the 
interplay of all channels, but closeness to daily life is in this case still questionable. Recording 
multimodal emotional expression in spontaneous situations is especially difficult due to technical 
and ethical reasons, but realistic expressions should nevertheless be sought.  
In closing, my findings provide two methodological recommendations for future studies on 
vocal expression. First I demonstrated that acting-inexperienced people could even be more 
suitable to produce credible vocal expressions than professional actors, which is of importance for 
the creation of future speech corpora. Second, vocal expressions are less strongly processed by 
the autonomous nervous system than emotional sounds. This result might be of importance for 
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